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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is twofold. Firstly, it examines the 
relationship between the use of financial and non-financial performance 
measures in executives’ annual incentive systems and firm performance. 
Secondly, it looks at the extent to which this relationship is influenced by 
five different organisational contingencies (business risk, ownership 
structure, organisational culture, the quality of the performance measures 
used in executives’ annual incentives and the effectiveness of the 
executives’ reward system).  
Agency theory and contingency theory are used to develop the 
theoretical framework that underpins this study. The research design is 
based on survey and archival data from 132 private and publicly quoted 
organisations based in the UK. Data is studied using multivariate analysis, 
in particular, multiple regression analysis with main and interaction effects.  
Contrary to expectations, the study finds that the relationship between 
the use of financial and non-financial performance measures in executives’ 
annual incentives and economic firm performance (measured by return on 
assets and sales annual growth) is negative rather than positive. However, 
this relationship is not universalistic. Results suggest that when 
organisations operate in high or low business risk environments or when 
organisations have clan or adhocracy cultural values the use of multi-criteria 
performance measures in executives’ annual incentives is beneficial as it 
facilitates the achievement of business goals. Results also suggest that 
ownership structure, the quality of performance measures and the 
effectiveness of executives’ reward systems are organisational contingencies 
that do not influence the performance impact of using multi-criteria 
performance measures in executives’ annual incentive systems.  
This thesis contributes to the management literature; in particular, to 
the literature that looks at the use of non-financial performance measures in 
management control systems. It contributes to agency-based research by 
providing empirical evidence that refutes some of its premises regarding the 
use of multi-criteria performance measures in incentive systems. This thesis 
also contributes to contingency-based research as it supports the notion that 
there is no universally appropriate management control system –in this case, 
the executive incentive system– which applies equally to all organisations in 
all circumstances. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 1
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. It is structured in five 
sections. Section 1.1 briefly presents the research background of the 
research and its main purpose. Section 1.2 indicates the organisational 
theories that underpin the study. Section 1.3 describes the research 
philosophy and research methods employed, the research process and a 
summary of the aspects taken into consideration in order to ensure the 
validity of this study. Section 1.4 summarises the expected contributions of 
the research. Finally, section 1.5 shows an outline of the thesis. 
1.1.  Background and purpose 
In the management literature, many studies have been devoted to the 
examination of the impact of management control systems (MCSs) on firm 
performance. MCSs are the systems “that provide information that is 
intended to be useful to managers in performing their jobs and to assist 
organizations in developing and maintaining viable patterns of behaviour” 
(Otley, 1999, p. 364). Examples of MCSs are budgetary and compensation 
systems (Flamholtz, Das and Tsui, 1985).  
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In the case of compensation systems, an extensive review of the 
empirical and theoretical literature on the relationship between 
compensation systems and firm performance carried out by Gomez-Mejia 
(1994) suggests that “despite the vast volume of research on this topic, we 
know little about compensation and its impact on business results” (p. 199). 
Some issues related to this topic have not been addressed and most research 
has only been based on US archival data. Thus, Gomez-Mejia (1994) 
concludes, there is still a “window of opportunity” for insightful and novel 
research in this area. Other scholars such as Becker and Gerhart (1996), 
Bloom (1999), Bloom and Michel (2002), and Brown, Sturman and 
Simmering (2003) have also argued that more research on the firm 
performance implications of compensation systems is still required. 
One issue that has been overlooked in the management literature is the 
linkage among compensation systems, strategic performance measurement 
systems such as Balanced Scorecards (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) and firms’ 
performance (Ittner and Larcker, 1997; Ittner, Larcker and Meyer 2003). At 
present, the lack of knowledge in this area is of particular importance to 
academics and practitioners (e.g. Banker, Potter and Srinivasan 2000; Van 
der Stede, Chow and Lin, 2006)1. Many organisations are now replacing 
                                                 
 
1 When multiple references are cited, they are included in alphabetical order. 
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their accounting-based performance measurement systems with more 
sophisticated mechanisms that incorporate multi-criteria indicators of 
organisational performance –that is financial as well as non financial2 (Ittner 
and Larcker, 2003). Most of these organisations are making their 
executives’ compensation contingent upon these multi-criteria indicators 
(William Mercer and Co., 1999; Towers Perrin, 1996). However, the 
performance impact of using financial and non-financial information for 
compensation purposes is far from being understood (e.g. Ittner et al., 
2003).  
Researchers such as Said, HassabElnaby and Wier (2003), Ittner and 
Larcker (2003), Hoque and James (2000) and Van der Stede et al., (2006) 
have found that the use of financial and non-financial measures of 
performance in compensation systems has a positive impact on economic 
performance. However, researchers such as Perera, Harrison and Poole 
(1997) or Ittner, Larcker and Meyer (2003) have also found that the use of 
performance measurement diversity might not be associated with enhanced 
organisational performance.  
                                                 
 
2 The use of “financial as well as non-financial”, “measurement diversity”, and “multi-
criteria measures” are concepts that will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 4
Based on these contradictory findings, some scholars have argued that 
the different performance effects of the use of financial and non-financial 
information for evaluating and rewarding managerial actions can be 
explained when specific organisational conditions are taken into 
consideration. Hoque (2005) suggests that it is under conditions of high 
environmental uncertainty that the use of measurement diversity is most 
useful in improving firms’ economic performance. Nevertheless, there are 
many other organisational conditions that may influence the relationship 
between measurement diversity in compensation systems and firm 
performance (e.g. Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Said et al., 2003).  
Academic research investigating the relationship between the use of 
multi-criteria performance measures for evaluating and rewarding 
managerial actions and firm performance, and the effects of specific 
organisational conditions on this relationship, is still limited (Hoque, 2004; 
Ittner and Larker, 1997). This thesis aims to contribute to this area of 
knowledge by focusing on two key research questions. Firstly, what effect 
does the use of measurement diversity in executives’ incentive systems has 
on firm performance? Secondly, to what extent is the relationship between 
measurement diversity in executives’ incentive pay and firm performance 
influenced by organisational contingencies, in particular: business risk, 
ownership structure, organisational culture, quality of performance 
measures and reward system effectiveness?  
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1.2.  Theoretical background 
The theories underpinning this thesis are agency theory (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), specifically the positivist agency 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), and contingency theory (Donaldson, 2001). 
Agency theory is the most important theory guiding organisational research 
on the use of performance measures for compensation purposes (Bloom and 
Milkovich, 1998; Lambert, 2001). It predicts that the use of performance 
measures in compensation systems is positively associated with 
organisational success (e.g. Larcker, 1983; Banker, Lee and Potter, 1996; 
Lazear, 2000).  
The contingency theory of organisations mainly predicts that the 
relationship between an organisation’s characteristic such as its structure or 
its management control system and organisational performance depends 
upon specific organisational conditions, also known as contingencies 
(Donaldson, 2001). For instance, contingency researchers examining 
management control systems such as accounting argue that the design of an 
appropriate accounting system should depend upon the specific 
circumstances in which an organisation finds itself in order to positively 
affect organisational performance (Fisher, 1995b; 1998; Hayes, 1977; Otley, 
1980). 
Since the late eighties, agency theorists have directly or indirectly 
adopted contingency theory premises for explaining inconsistencies arising 
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from the empirical testing of their predictions. Consequently, agency 
theorists have started to suggest that the positive relationship between 
executive pay and firm performance is dependent upon (1) particular 
organisational contingencies such as business risk (uncertainty about 
outcomes or future events) (e.g. Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Gray and 
Cannella, 1997; Miller, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 2002), ownership 
structure (e.g. Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin, 1987; Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia, 1994), culture (e.g. Ekanayake, 2004); and (2) specific factors related 
to the design and implementation of compensation systems such as the 
quality of the performance measures (Indjejikian, 1999) and the perceived 
effectiveness of the reward system (Diaz and Gomez-Mejia, 1997).  
In short, the hypotheses proposed in this research are based mainly on 
agency theory (Hypothesis 1) and on the integration of both agency theory 
and contingency theory (Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6).  
1.3. Research philosophy, methods, 
process and validity 
Most agency and contingency predictions looking at compensation 
systems have been tested using a positivist approach (Donaldson, 2001; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). The positivist research philosophy corresponds with the 
author’s research philosophy and, therefore, this thesis has been conducted 
under a positivist paradigm.  
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In the literature examining the different research philosophies that can 
be adopted when conducting studies in social sciences, the concept of 
positivism has been defined in various ways (e.g. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe 
and Lowe, 1999). Most definitions describe positivism by focusing on its 
assumptions. Positivism assumes that social phenomena can be studied as 
hard facts and that the relationships between these facts can be established 
as scientific laws. Scientific laws have the status of truth and social objects 
can be investigated using the research methods developed for the study of 
natural objects (e.g. Blaikie, 1993; Smith, 1998).  
The general principles of the positivist philosophy of science have a 
number of implications for social research. These implications are 
summarised in Table 1-1.  
Table 1-1 Research implication of Positivism (adapted from Easterby-Smith et al. (1999)) 
Implications Description 
Methodological All research conducted using this philosophical approach 
should be quantitative. Only quantitative research can be the 
basis for valid generalisations and scientific laws. 
Value-freedom The choice of what to study and how to study it should be 
determined by objective criteria rather than human 
experiences, beliefs or interests. 
Causality Its main aim is to identify causal relationships and 
fundamental laws that explain human behaviour. 
Deduction Hypotheses are proposed based on a logical deduction 
process. 
Operationalisation Concepts or variables under study need to be operationalised 
in a way that enables facts to be measured quantitatively. 
Independence The role of the researcher is independent of the subject under 
examination. 
Reductionism The phenomenon under study is better understood if it is 
reduced to the simplest possible elements. 
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Based on the above implications: (1) this study has been conducted 
using quantitative methods only –that is survey and archival research; (2) 
the phenomenon that the study addresses has emerged from previous 
research within the performance measurement literature (e.g. Ittner and 
Larcker, 1997; Ittner, Larcker and Meyer, 2003); (3) the purpose of the 
study is to examine to what extent the use of measurement diversity in 
executives’ incentives causes a positive impact on firm performance; and to 
what extent this relationship is moderated by specific organisational 
contingencies; (4) a logical deductive approach has been used to arrive at 
the research hypotheses; (5) all study variables have been operationalised 
using quantitative measures; (6) the researcher has played an external 
observer role with no involvement whatsoever with the organisations under 
investigation; and (7) the phenomenon under study has been reduced and 
modelled to its simplest possible elements (Chapter 3 shows the theoretical 
framework used in this study).  
In line with the positivist view of the world, the research has been 
conducted using the process suggested by Black (1999) (see Figure 1-1).  
Figure 1-1 Research process (adapted from Black (1999)) 
 
 
 
 
State 
questions & 
hypotheses, 
identify 
variables
Determine 
design 
structure
Identify 
population 
and sample
Design 
instrument, 
data source,  
operational 
definitions
Select 
statistical 
test for 
resolving 
hypotheses
Carry out 
plan, collect 
data
Analyse data, 
draw 
conclusions 
and evaluate 
process
Planning stage Execution stage
Construct validity (measures)
External validity (sample)
Statistical 
validity
Literature 
Review
Internal validity 
(variables)
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 9
First, a review of the performance measurement literature was 
conducted. Second, the research questions and hypothesis were proposed 
(see Table 1-2). Third, the research design structure was specified –that is 
the development of a survey and the extraction of financial and contextual 
data from the financial database FAME. Fourth, the population and sample 
frame were selected. It was decided that the study was going to be focused 
on large organisations based in the UK. This decision was taken based on 
the study of Hoque and James (2000) who found that larger organisations 
are the ones which are more likely to use non-financial performance 
measures in addition to financial performance measures in their 
management control systems. Also, the fact that the researcher is based in 
the UK facilitated the access to data. Fifth, the research instruments and the 
operationalisation of the study variables were developed and, subsequently, 
they were tested by means of a pilot study. Sixth, the statistical tests for data 
analysis were chosen. The data was tested using multivariate data analysis, 
in particular, multiple regression analysis with the use of interaction effects. 
Seventh, the research data was collected. This was done between November 
2003 and March 2004. Finally, the research data was analysed and 
conclusions were reached. 
Table 1-2 Summary of research questions, hypotheses and study variables 
Research questions, hypothesis and variables 
Research 
questions 
RQ1: What effect does the use of measurement diversity in 
executives’ incentive systems has on firm performance?  
RQ2: To what extent is the relationship between measurement 
diversity in executives’ incentive pay and firm performance influenced 
by business risk, ownership structure, organisational culture, quality of 
performance measures and reward system effectiveness?  
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Research questions, hypothesis and variables 
Hypotheses H1: There is a positive relationship between measurement diversity in 
executive incentive pay and firm performance. 
 H2: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is moderated by the quality of the 
performance measures such that measurement diversity is positively 
associated with firm performance when the quality of performance 
measures is high.  
 H3: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is mediated by reward 
effectiveness such that measurement diversity is not related to firm 
performance when reward effectiveness is controlled. 
 H4: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is moderated by business risk such 
that measurement diversity in executive incentive pay is positively 
associated with firm performance when business risk is high or low 
and negatively associated with firm performance when business risk is 
moderate. 
 
 H5: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is moderated by ownership 
structure such that measurement diversity in executive incentive pay is 
positively associated with firm performance when firms are manager-
controlled and negatively associated with firm performance when firms 
are owner-controlled. 
 
 H6: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is moderated by organisational 
culture such that measurement diversity is positively associated with 
firm performance when organisational culture is perceived to be clan 
and adhocracy, and negatively associated with firm performance, when 
organisational culture is perceived to be market and hierarchy. 
 
Study 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Firm performance. 
Independent variable: Measurement diversity in executives’ annual 
incentive systems. 
Moderator variables: Business risk, ownership structure, 
organisational culture, and quality of performance measures. 
Mediator variable: Reward system effectiveness. 
Control variables: Firm size and industry. 
 
Issues related to the validity of the study were addressed in each of the 
research phases as suggested by Black (1999). Four constituent types of 
validity were taken into consideration: construct validity, internal validity, 
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external validity and statistical validity (Black, 1999). Construct validity     
–making sure that the survey instrument measures what it is supposed to 
measure– was carefully considered not only during the design of the 
instrument but also during the framing of the research questions, hypotheses 
and key variables. In order to minimise the threats to construct validity, 
scales that had already been tested in previous high quality3 research were 
chosen when available and when they were not available they were created 
following the recommendations of DeVellis (2003).  
Internal validity –ensuring that the independent variables are 
responsible for the change in the dependent variable– was dealt with during 
the time when the research design was being determined but also during the 
stages highlighted in Figure 1-1. The threats to internal validity were 
addressed by: (1) focusing the research in well grounded organisational 
theories –these are agency and contingency theory–; (2) cautiously selecting 
the research population and sample frame; (3) using measures of 
independent and dependent variables that had been previously used in 
similar research (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and Randall 2003); and (4) including 
control variables –firm’s size and industry– that had been found to be 
                                                 
 
3 In this context, high quality research refers to research published in highly rated peer 
reviewed academic journals. 
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associated with the firm’s performance in earlier related research (e.g. 
Gupta, 1987; Ittner and Larcker, 1995; Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003). 
External validity –taking care that the results of the study can be 
generalised to a larger population– was addressed mainly during the 
selection of the population and sample frame; although previous and later 
research phases were also considered. In order to minimise the threats to 
external validity the sample frame was methodically selected by making 
sure that each of the industries represented in the UK population were 
represented in the same proportion in the sample frame. In addition to this, 
the data were collected at one point in time (financial year 2003/04) and, 
once the data had been collected, several sample bias analyses were 
conducted for estimating the degree of generalisability of the study. 
Finally, statistical validity –ensuring that the appropriate statistical 
tests are used– was considered when the research instrument was being 
developed, when the statistical methods were decided upon, and when the 
data were collected. Threats to statistical validity were tackled mainly by 
carefully operationalising the variables under study and by choosing the 
statistical analysis method that had been previously recommended in the 
literature –that is, multiple regression analysis with main and interaction 
effects (e.g. Hartmann and Moers, 1999; Schoonhoven, 1981; Venkatraman, 
1989). 
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1.4. Findings and expected 
contributions 
The findings of this thesis are summarised as follows. Contrary to 
expectations, this study finds that the use of financial and non-financial 
performance measures in executives’ annual incentives is negatively related 
to return on assets and sales annual growth. The study suggests that neither 
the quality of performance measures, the effectiveness of the reward system 
or the organisational ownership structure seem to interact with the 
relationship between measurement diversity and firm performance. The 
study shows that business risk has a significant impact on the relationship 
between measurement diversity in executives’ incentive systems and 
business goals achievement. When business risk is high or low the 
relationship between measurement diversity in executives’ incentives and 
business goals achievement is positive and when business risk is moderate 
the same relationship is negative. Finally, the study finds that organisational 
culture also has a significant impact on the measurement diversity-business 
goals achievement relationship. When firms have a clan or adhocracy 
organisational culture –according to Cameron and Quinn’s (1999) cultural 
typology–, the use of measurement diversity in executives’ annual 
incentives is positively associated with business goals achievement. 
However, when firms have a market or hierarchy organisational culture the 
relationship between measurement diversity and business goals achievement 
is negative.  
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This research contributes to the management literature, more 
specifically to the performance measurement literature, in several ways. 
Firstly, it contributes to the body of research looking at the performance 
impact of measurement diversity (e.g. Banker et al., 2000; Hoque and 
James, 2000; Ittner and Larcker, 1995; Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003; 
Said et al., 2003; Van der Stede et al., 2006). Secondly, it contributes to the 
body of research looking at the moderator factors that may affect the 
relationship between measurement diversity and firm performance (e.g. 
Hoque, 2004; 2005). Thirdly, this thesis contributes to agency theory 
research in four ways: (1) by providing empirical evidence for the 
predictions of authors such as Feltham and Xie (1994) and Hemmer (1996) 
–these authors have predicted that the use of non-financial information in 
addition to financial information in incentives will be associated with higher 
organisational performance; (2) by providing theoretical arguments that 
associate agency theory with organisational culture using the Competing 
Values Framework (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, 2005); (3) by providing data 
obtained in the UK as the majority of the agency-based executive 
compensation and performance measurement research has been conducted 
in the US (Merchant, Van der Stede and Zheng, 2003); and (4) by providing 
an example of a research that applies a survey methodology in combination 
with archival data. This last contribution is important because agency-based 
hypotheses have been mainly tested using archival data alone, which has 
serious limitations for producing valuable insights (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). 
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Finally, this study contributes to the contingency theory of management 
control systems by providing empirical evidence concerning the notion that 
there is no universally appropriate management control system –in this case, 
the executive incentive system– which applies equally to all organisations in 
all circumstances (Fisher, 1995b; 1998; Otley, 1980). 
1.5. Research outline 
The outline of the thesis is presented below (see Figure 1-2). The 
structure of this thesis has been informed by the typical structure followed 
by academic papers such as the ones published in the Academy of 
Management Journal (http://www.jstor.org/journals/00014273.html).  
Figure 1-2 Outline of the thesis 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the management literature, specifically the 
performance measurement4 literature that looks at the adoption and impact 
of non-financial performance measures. Four key review questions were 
used when investigating this literature. These were: (1) What definitions of 
non-financial performance measures are used in previous research studies? 
(2) Why do organisations use non-financial information for measuring and 
rewarding executives’ performance? (3) What is the performance impact of 
using non-financial information in performance measurement and 
compensation? and (4) what are the organisational theories that support and 
explain the use of non-financial information for determining executives’ 
incentive pay?  
This chapter is structured according to the four questions used to 
review the literature. Section 2.1 reviews the different definitions found in 
previous investigations and presents the definition of non-financial 
performance measures employed in this research. Section 2.2 shows the 
                                                 
 
4 The performance measurement literature comprises studies from many management 
disciplines (Neely, 2002). The most salient ones are: operations, accounting, strategy and 
human resources management (Franco-Santos and Bourne, 2005). 
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reasons why organisations use non-financial measures. Section 2.3 
summarises the findings of previous research looking at the association 
between the use of non-financial performance measures in incentive 
compensation and performance. Section 2.4 describes the main theories that 
support the use of non-financial metrics for compensation purposes. 
2.1. Towards a definition of non-
financial performance measures 
In the literature, the distinction between financial and non-financial 
performance measures is often left to the reader’s common understanding of 
those terms (Morissette, 1996). When performance measurement scholars 
introduce the concept of non-financial measures, they tend to do it by 
providing specific examples of these measures. For instance, Lau and 
Sholihin (2005) describe non-financial performance measures as “those 
measures that relate to the customer, internal business process, and learning 
and growth performance perspectives” (p. 390), which is a description 
frequently used by Balanced Scorecard promoters (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992; 1996; 2001; 2004; 2006). Other researchers, for example, Banker, et 
al. (2000) and Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) are more specific and define 
non-financial measures as measures such as product quality, customer 
satisfaction, and market share. 
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This method of providing the meaning of a term by listing the objects 
that fall under the definition of the term in question is known as an 
extensional definition (Matthews, 1997). This type of definition is 
considered to be appropriate if the number of objects required for explaining 
the meaning of a term is limited or fixed. In the case of non-financial 
performance measures, it can be argued that there are an unlimited number 
of examples that can be use for describing what a non-financial measure is 
by extension. Thus, the use of just a couple of examples may generate 
confusion and misunderstanding. For instance, some researchers use the 
measure market share as an example of a non-financial performance 
measure (e.g. Banker et al., 2000), whereas others consider this measure to 
be a financial performance measure (e.g. Morissette, 1996).  
Confusion and misunderstanding about the meaning of non-financial 
performance measures might not only be occurring in academic research. 
Practitioners also seem to have difficulties comprehending what non-
financial performance measures are. Evidence of this lack of understanding 
is mentioned by Morissette (1996) in his doctoral dissertation. He argues 
that there is “anecdotal evidence suggesting that managers who are asked to 
identify non-financial information often confound qualitative information 
(i.e. information that is not expressed in terms of numerical metrics) with 
non-financial numerical expressions” (p. 12). Actually, Van der Stede, et al. 
(2006) have tried to reflect this qualitative notion of non-financial 
performance measures by making a clear distinction between non-financial 
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measures that are “quantitative and objectively derived (e.g. defect rates) 
and those that are qualitative and subjectively determined (e.g. an 
assessment of the degree of cooperation or knowledge sharing across 
departmental borders)” (p. 186). However, these authors also fail to provide 
a clear definition of what they mean by non-financial measures; they just 
describe both objective and subjective non-financial measures by citing 
examples of these measures. 
After reviewing the performance measurement literature, it seems that 
the only definition that offers some clarity, facilitating the understanding of 
what non-financial performance measures are, is the one provided by 
Morissette (1996). He reviews how financial performance measures are 
defined in the literature and then he defines non-financial performance 
measures using a similar structure. He suggests that financial information is 
“(1) a piece of information expressed as a monetary unit; (2) ratios resulting 
from mathematical manipulations of information expressed in monetary 
units; and (3) a piece of information resulting from a ratio that includes a 
piece of information expressed in a monetary unit and a non-monetary unit” 
(p. 12). As opposed to this, he proposes that non-financial performance 
measures are “any quantitative measure, (1) expressed in a metric other than 
a monetary unit, or (2) that results from mathematical manipulations or 
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ratios of pieces of information expressed in metrics other than monetary 
unit” (p. 13)5. Despite the fact that this definition is the most comprehensive 
found in the literature, it is not free of criticism. If the work of Van der 
Stede, et al. (2006) is taken into account, unfortunately, this definition could 
be considered incomplete as it leaves out the notion of qualitative or 
subjective non-financial information.  
As concluding remarks, this section argues that the common lack of 
attention to the non-financial performance measures definition in the 
performance measurement literature may be generating research 
comparability and generalisability issues. With the aim of addressing this 
limitation, a definition based on the work of Morissette (1996) and Van der 
Stede, et al. (2006), is here presented: Non-financial performance 
information is considered to be (1) any qualitative or subjective 
performance measure, and (2) any quantitative performance measure that is 
expressed in a metric other than a monetary unit, or that results from 
mathematical manipulations or ratios of pieces of information expressed in 
                                                 
 
5 Based on this definition of non-financial measures it can be understood why Morissette 
(1996) classifies market share as financial information, contrary to other authors who 
suggest that this measure is non-financial. According to Morissette, market share tends to 
be measured as total organisational sales divided by total market sales, both of which are 
monetary metrics. 
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metrics other than monetary units. The role of this definition has been 
crucial for assessing the relevance of the findings found in prior research. 
Prior research on non-financial performance measures has been 
mainly concerned with two phenomena. On the one hand, scholars have 
been interested in why firms should adopt non-financial metrics in their 
business performance measurement and compensation systems. On the other 
hand, scholars have focused on what effects the use of non-financial 
measures has on performance and/or behaviour. Both of these bodies of 
research are summarised in the next two sections.  
2.2. Reasons for using non-financial 
performance measures 
Scholars and practitioners use a diverse set of reasons to explain the 
use of non-financial information for measuring and rewarding managerial 
performance. The most common reason is based on the idea that non-
financial measures can focus managerial attention on the long-term as these 
measures contain forward-looking information about performance that is 
absent in financial indicators (Brancato, 1995; Fisher, 1995a; Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998). In fact, evidence suggests that non-financial performance 
measures are useful in predicting future financial performance (e.g. 
Anderson, Fornell and Lehmann, 1994; Behn and Riley, 1999; Nagar and 
Rajan, 2005; Rucci, Kirn and Quinn, 1998). Based on this idea, scholars and 
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practitioners assert that non-financial performance measures can be 
employed to overcome the short-termism6 of relying on financial 
information only (Banks and Wheelwright, 1979; Hayes and Abernathy, 
1980; Indjejikian, 1999; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Neely, 1998; 1999). 
Another reason that has been suggested in the literature is the notion 
that only a collection of financial and non-financial performance measures 
can properly align the efforts of an organisation with its strategic objectives 
The rationale behind this argument is based on the idea that non-financial 
performance measures can provide strategic information about customers, 
internal processes, competitors, intangible assets, etc. that are difficult to 
capture with the use of financial information only (e.g. Amir and Lev, 1996; 
Ittner and Larcker, 1998; 2003; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 1996; 2001; 
2004;2006; Neely, Mills, Platts, Richards, Gregory, Bourne and Kennerley, 
2000a; Neely, Adams and Kennerley, 2002; Otley, 1999). Perera et al. 
(1997) also argue that non-financial measures have been said to be critical 
because they deal with causes and not effects. They use a quote taken from 
another author to further explain this particular attribute of non-financial 
measures: “Profit measures [as an example of financial measures] show the 
effects of non-financial activities and achievements; [but] they do not pin 
                                                 
 
6 Shor-termism is defined as the concentration on immediate profit or advantage at the 
expense of long-term security (Fowler, Fowler and Pearsall, 2004). 
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down precisely what it is in your business that you are getting right or 
wrong (Singleton-Green, 1993, p. 52)” (in Perera et al., 1997, p. 561). 
An additional reason for the use of non-financial information is the 
belief that, due to the existing competitive realities organisations face (e.g. 
increased customisation, flexibility, innovation and responsiveness), 
traditional financial measures are no longer appropriate for managing the 
performance of an organisation. Non-financial performance measures 
together with financial performance measures are required to deal with the 
complexity and uncertainty of today’s business world (Dixon, Nanni and 
Vollmann, 1990; Ijiri, 1975; Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Neely, 1999).  
Finally, based on the premise that managers have an incentive to 
concentrate on those activities for which their performance is measured, 
often at the expense of other relevant but non-measured activities 
(Hopwood, 1974), a greater measurement diversity is being proposed as a 
way to reduce such dysfunctional effects (Lillis, 2002; Van der Stede et al., 
2006). Agency theory authors support this argument. They have shown that 
the use of non-financial measures for determining incentive pay can 
improve contracting as those measures provide information on managerial 
action that financial measures cannot fully capture (e.g. Datar, Kulp and 
Lambert, 2001; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Hemmer, 1996; Holmstrom, 1979; 
Lambert, 2001).  
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Despite the encouraging reasons supporting the use of non-financial 
information for performance measurement and compensation purposes, 
researchers have also highlighted potential drawbacks to the use of a diverse 
set of measures to manage business performance and compensation. There 
is evidence to show that the use of non-financial performance measures in 
addition to financial performance measures increases systems complexity 
and may affect managers’ cognitive abilities (Banker, Chang and Pizzini, 
2004; Gosh and Lusch, 2000; Lipe and Salterio, 2000; 2002; Van der Stede 
et al., 2006). The use of non-financial performance measures in addition to 
financial performance measures in incentives also complicates the process 
of assigning relative weights to the different measures (Ittner and Larcker, 
1998; Moers, 2005). Furthermore, the use of multi-criteria measures may 
generate internal conflicts due to the pursuit of incongruent goals (e.g. 
increase innovation and reduce cost) (Baker, 1992; Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991; Lillis, 2002; Van der Stede et al., 2006; Wong-On-Wing, 
Guo, Li and Yang, 2007). 
Chatterji and Levine (2006) also suggest that the administrative costs 
of the use of non-financial performance measures in addition to financial 
performance measures may be substantial; the accuracy of non-financial 
performance measures may be limited –due to measurement bias and 
subjectivity–; the introduction of additional measures may dilute the 
importance of previous measures, which suggests that more measurement 
might not always be advisable; multi-criteria performance measures may be 
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benefiting poor performers; and even worse, when non-financial measures 
do not appropriately measure what they are supposed to measure, increased 
measurement may actually diminish overall performance.  
It is crucial that researchers take into consideration all these 
drawbacks to the use of multi-criteria performance measures. However, to 
date, most conceptual work in this area seems to support the use of 
measurement diversity. In the majority of the cases, this is due to the 
assumed beneficial effect of the use of multi-criteria performance measures 
on firm’s performance. The following section aims to summarise the 
literature that focuses on the association between the use of non-financial 
performance measures and performance. 
2.3. The impact of using non-financial 
information 
Accounting research has traditionally been interested in the 
association between the use of performance measures and a firm’s business 
results. For many years, scholars have dedicated their time and efforts to 
examining (1) the association of accounting variables and firm performance 
(e.g. Bernard and Noel, 1991); (2) the ability of financial statements to 
predict future performance (e.g. Stober, 1993); and (3) the behavioural and 
performance consequences of greater reliance on accounting measures in 
performance evaluation (e.g. Briers and Hirst, 1990; Brownell, 1982; Dunk, 
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1990; Harrison, 1993; Hartmann, 2000; Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Otley 
and Fakiolas, 2000). During the Eighties (e.g. Hayes and Abernathy, 1980; 
Johnson and Kaplan, 1987) and early Nineties (e.g. Feltham and Xie, 1994; 
Kaplan and Norton, 1992), the limitations of financial measures for valuing 
a firm’s performance were highlighted; and the discussions that came 
afterwards resulted in an increased research interest in the use of non-
financial information and its effects on organisational performance.  
It must be noted though that it was not the first time the idea of using 
non-financial performance measures in organisations had entered the 
research arena. For instance, as suggested by Ridgway (1956), investigators 
in the Soviet Union “had concluded by 1940 that no single measure of 
success of a firm [e.g. profit] is adequate in itself and that there is no 
substitute for genuine analysis of all the elements entering into a firm’s 
work [e.g. financial as well as non-financial aspects of performance]” (p. 
243). In the Fifties, operation researchers were already concerned with the 
right choice of multi-criteria performance measures in manufacturing 
settings (Hitch and McKean, 1954); and management consultants such as 
Peter Drucker (1954) were stressing the importance of multi-criteria 
measures for evaluating managerial performance. However, it is from the 
late Eighties and early Nineties that empirical research into the adoption and 
consequences of diverse measurement at all organisational levels had a 
significant increase (Neely, 1999). 
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The body of literature looking at the performance impact of using 
non-financial information in performance measurement and compensation 
systems can be classified as follows. On the one hand, work in this area has 
looked at the performance impact of employing financial as well as non-
financial performance information in performance measurement systems 
(e.g. Total Quality Management and Balanced Scorecards), managerial 
evaluation and reward practices. On the other hand, research in this area has 
also paid attention to the different moderators that may affect the 
relationship between the use of multi-criteria performance measures for 
evaluating and rewarding employees and firm performance. The findings of 
both of these streams of research are now described. Table 2-1 summarises 
the key details of the body of literature looking at the performance impact of 
using multi-criteria performance measures for evaluating and/or rewarding 
managerial action. 
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Table 2-1 Empirical papers looking at the performance impact of using multi-criteria performance measures for evaluating and/or rewarding managerial 
action 
Author(s) Date Location 
of study 
Indust. Data 
collection 
method 
(sample) 
Data 
analysis 
method 
Org. 
theory 
Key findings 
Banker, R.D.//Potter, 
G.//Srinivasan, D. 
2000 US Leisure Archival data, 
and 
interviews 
with senior 
managers (18 
hotels) 
Regression 
analysis (time 
series)  
Agency 
theory 
Non-financial measures of customer satisfaction are significantly associated 
with future financial performance and contain additional information not 
reflected in the past financial measures. Furthermore, both non-financial and 
financial performance improved following the implementation of an 
incentive plan that includes non-financial performance measures. 
Boulianne, E. 2002 Canada Manufact. 
and service
Survey (90 
business 
units, 24% 
res. rate) 
Regression 
analysis  
Not clearly 
explicit 
Results suggest that the impact of broad scope information usage on 
performance will be more beneficial for managers operating in prospector-
type firms than for managers operating in defender-type firms. 
Chenhall, R.H. 1997 US Manufact. Survey (39 
firms) 
Descriptive 
statistics and 
regression 
analysis 
(interaction) 
Not clearly 
explicit 
The association between TQM and performance is stronger where diverse 
manufacturing performance measures (MPMs) are used as part of 
managerial evaluation (MPMs provide feedback that focuses attention).  
Chenhall, R.H. 1996 Australia Manufact. Survey (37 
BUs) 
Descriptive 
statistics and 
regression 
analysis  
Not clearly 
explicit 
The study finds that the performance of entities which had a high degree of 
manufacturing flexibility were positively associated with the extent to which 
managers were evaluated using diverse performance measures. 
Chenhall, R.H.// 
Langfieldsmith, K. 
1998 Australia Manufact. Survey (140 
firms) 
Cluster 
analysis 
Contingenc
y theory 
The authors study how combinations of management techniques and 
management accounting practices (including the use of diverse 
measurement) enhance the performance of organisations, under particular 
strategic priorities.  
Govindarajan, 1985 US Various Survey and Qualitative Not clearly The authors find a positive association between strategy, incentive bonuses 
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Author(s) Date Location 
of study 
Indust. Data 
collection 
method 
(sample) 
Data 
analysis 
method 
Org. 
theory 
Key findings 
V.//Gupta, A. K. industries interviews 
(58 BUs) 
analysis and 
regression 
analysis 
(interaction) 
explicit that include non-financial indicators and effectiveness at strategic business 
unit level. 
Gupta, A.K. 1987 US Various 
industries 
(Diversif. 
Fortune 
500 firms) 
Survey and 
interviews 
(58 SBIs and 
Managers in 
8 firms) 
Regression 
analysis 
(interaction) 
Not clearly 
explicit 
The present study examined the effects of 2 dimensions of SBUs strategic 
contexts: strategic mission and competitive strategy, on the performance 
implications of 3 aspects of corporate-SBU relations. Results show that, for 
SBUs trying to build market share or to pursue differentiation as a 
competitive strategy, openness in corporate-SBU relations and subjectivity 
in performance assessment are positively associated with effectiveness. For 
SBUs trying to maximise short-term earnings or to pursue low cost as a 
competitive strategy, the corresponding associations are negative. In 
contrast, corporate-SBU decentralisation is found to be positively associated 
with SBUs' effectiveness regardless of their strategic contexts; although 
SBUs' competitive strategies moderate the magnitude of that association, 
their strategic missions do not. 
Hoque, Z. 2004 Australia Manufact. Survey (52 
resp., 52% 
resp. rate) 
Descriptive 
statistics and 
regression 
analysis (path 
analysis) 
Contingenc
y theory 
The study found a significant and positive association between 
management’s strategic choice and organisational performance acting 
through management’s high use of non-financial measures for performance 
evaluation.  
Hoque, Z. 2005 Australia Manufact. Survey (52 
resp., 52% 
resp. rate) 
Descriptive 
statistics and 
regression 
analysis 
(interaction) 
Contingenc
y theory 
The study finds that the use of non-financial performance measures would 
lead to improved organisational performance under conditions of increased 
environmental uncertainty. 
Hoque, Z.//James, 
Wendy 
2000 Australia Manufact. Survey (66 
firms, 35% 
Descriptive 
statistics, 
Not clearly 
explicit 
Larger firms make more use of multi-criteria performance measures 
(balanced scorecard). In addition, firms that have a higher proportion of new 
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Author(s) Date Location 
of study 
Indust. Data 
collection 
method 
(sample) 
Data 
analysis 
method 
Org. 
theory 
Key findings 
resp. rate) correlation, 
regression 
and ANOVA 
analysis 
products have a greater tendency to make use of measures related to new 
products. A firm's market position has not been found to be associated 
significantly with greater balanced scorecard usage. It is also suggested that 
greater balanced scorecard usage is associated with improved performance, 
but this relationship does not depend significantly on organisation size, 
product life cycle, or market position. 
Ittner, C.D.//Larcker, 
D.F. 
1995 Canada, 
Germany, 
Japan & 
US 
Automob.
& 
computer 
industries 
Survey (249 
firms, 85% 
resp. rate) 
Description 
statistics, 
canonical 
correlation 
analysis, 
ANOVA and 
regression 
analysis 
Contingenc
y theory 
Self-reported use of manufacturing measures by managers had a positive 
impact on perceived performance in some manufacturing settings but not in 
others. 
Ittner, C.D.//Larcker, 
D.F. 
2003 US Service 
(financial) 
& 
Manufact. 
Survey (140 
senior exec. 
and 157 
CFOs) and 
interv. (60) 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Not clearly 
explicit 
They find a positive relationship between the use of non-financial 
performance measures and performance (measured by return on assets and 
return on equity) 
Ittner, C.D.//Larcker, 
D.F.//Meyer, M.W. 
2003 US  Financial 
(retail 
banking) 
Archival 
financial and 
employee 
survey data (1 
firm) 
Regression 
analysis 
Agency 
theory  
The use of measurement diversity (balanced scorecard) generated 
subjectivity and allowed superiors to reduce the “balance” in bonus awards 
by placing most of the weight on financial measures, to incorporate factors 
other than the scorecard measures in performance evaluations, to change 
evaluation criteria from quarter to quarter, to ignore measures that were 
predictive of future financial performance, and to weight measures that were 
not predictive of desired results. These outcomes led many branch managers 
to complain about favouritism in bonus awards and uncertainty in the 
criteria being used to determine rewards, and caused corporate executive 
and human resource managers to question the use of measurement diversity 
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Author(s) Date Location 
of study 
Indust. Data 
collection 
method 
(sample) 
Data 
analysis 
method 
Org. 
theory 
Key findings 
for compensation purposes. 
Ittner, C.D.//Larcker, 
D.F.//Randall, T. 
2003 US Service 
(Financial)
Survey & 
archival data 
(140 firms) 
Regression 
analysis 
Agency 
theory & 
contingenc
y theory 
This study presents evidence that firms making more extensive use of a 
broad set of financial and non-financial measures than firms with similar 
strategies or value drivers have higher measurement system satisfaction and 
stock market returns. This study also shows that the use measurement 
diversity is negatively related to ROA (although regression coefficient not 
significant) 
Olson, E.M.// Slater, 
S.F. 
2002 US Various 
industries 
Survey (200 
businesses, 
23% resp. 
rate)  
Descriptive 
statistics 
Not 
explicit 
This study suggests that the use of measurement diversity (balanced 
scorecard) is related to the firms’ overall success. For prospector firms the 
balanced scorecard approach actually represents the best management 
standard. However, for low-cost defenders an unbalanced approach actually 
represents the best management standard. 
Perera, S.//Harrison, 
G.//Poole, M. 
1997 Australia Manufact. 
firms/ 
divisions 
Survey (109 
resp., 54.5% 
resp. rate)  
Descriptive 
statistics and 
regression 
analysis 
Contingenc
y theory 
Firms that maintain a customer-focused manufacturing strategy also 
maintain an emphasis on non-financial (operations-based) measures in their 
performance measurement systems but this association is not linked to an 
increase in performance 
Said, 
A.A.//HassabElnaby, 
H.R.//Wier, B. 
2003 US Various 
industries 
Archival 
(2882 public 
quoted firms) 
Regression 
analysis 
Agency 
theory 
Firms that use diverse measurement have significantly higher mean levels of 
return on assets and higher levels of market returns. Although the authors 
find evidence that the adoption of non-financial measures improves firms' 
current and future stock market performance, these authors find only partial 
support for accounting performance improvements. The association between 
measurement diversity and firm performance is contingent on the firms’ 
operational and competitive characteristics. 
Scott, T.W.// Tiessen, 
P. 
1999 
Apr 
US Various 
industries 
(for profit) 
& not for 
Survey (248 
respondents  
from 12 org. 
for profit & 
15 org. non-
Correlation, 
regression 
analysis (path 
analysis) 
Agency 
theory 
Team performance is positively associated with the variety and 
comprehensiveness of performance measures used. This relationship is 
enhanced if members participate in setting performance targets. Further, 
team performance is enhanced when team performance is given a greater 
weight in compensation. Finally, these effects are mutually reinforcing, such 
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Author(s) Date Location 
of study 
Indust. Data 
collection 
method 
(sample) 
Data 
analysis 
method 
Org. 
theory 
Key findings 
profit for-profit) that team performance is substantially better when comprehensive and 
diverse performance measurement is combined with the participation of 
team members and a larger weight for team performance in their 
compensation. 
Sim, K.L.// Killough, 
L.N. 
1998 US Electronics Survey (89 
plants, 68% 
resp. rate) 
Descriptive 
statistics, and 
regression 
analysis 
Not 
explicit 
This study finds a positive relationship between the use of non-financial 
measures and firm performance 
Van der Stede, W.A.// 
Chow, C.W.// Lin, 
T.W. 
2006 US 
(Southern 
California) 
& Europe 
(Belgium) 
Manufact. Survey (128 
firms) 
Descriptive 
statistics and 
regression 
analysis 
Agency 
theory & 
Conting. 
theory 
Performance measurement diversity, per se, is beneficial. Firms with 
extensive performance measurement systems –especially those that include 
objective and subjective non-financial measures– have higher performance. 
They also find that firms which emphasise quality in manufacturing use 
more of both objective and subjective non-financial measures. However, 
there is only a positive effect on performance from pairing a quality based 
manufacturing strategy with extensive use of subjective measures, but not 
with objective non-financial measures. 
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2.3.1. The performance impact of diverse 
measurement  
Within the stream of research looking at the direct impact of using 
multi-criteria performance information in performance measurement and/or 
compensation systems and firm performance, the work of Ittner and Larker 
(1995), Chenhall (1996; 1997), Chenhall and Langfieldsmith (1998), Sim 
and Killough (1998), Scott and Tiessen (1999) and Banker et al. (2000) can 
be highlighted.  
Ittner and Larcker (1995) are among the scholars that have examined 
the relationship between the use of non-financial information, Total Quality 
Management (TQM) practices and organisational performance. In their 
analytical research conducted in two different manufacturing industries 
(automotive and computer) in Canada, Germany, Japan and the United 
States, they find that “in organisations without extensive formal quality 
programs, greater reliance on non-traditional7 information and reward 
systems is associated with higher performance levels” (p. 2). However, they 
                                                 
 
7 Here, the meaning of non-traditional information can be compared to the meaning of non-
financial information. Ittner and Larcker (1995) define non-traditional performance 
measurement systems as those that “provide more timely physical measure of operational 
performance, increase provision of problem-solving information to the workers actually 
performing the job, and reward systems that focus more on non-financial measures (e.g. 
customer satisfaction or quality)” (p. 2). 
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find no support for the proposition that, holding other determinants of 
performance constant, organisations making the greatest use of TQM, non-
traditional information and reward systems are the ones with higher 
organisational performance. Perera et al. (1997) find similar results in a 
survey of 200 managers of manufacturing firms in Australia. Their study 
shows that greater use of non-financial information is not associated with 
enhance performance for firms pursuing a customer-focused strategy driven 
by the employment of TQM practices –referred as “advanced management 
practices” (p. 562)– and advanced manufacturing technology (e.g. 
automation).  
Evidence provided by Chenhall (1996; 1997), Chenhall and 
Langfieldsmith (1998) and Sim and Killough (1998) contradicts the findings 
suggested by Ittner and Larcker (1995) and Perera et al. (1997) above. 
Chenhall (1996; 1997) and Chenhall and Langfieldsmith (1998) conducted 
their research in Australian and US manufacturing industries. Their results 
suggest that reliance on the non-financial performance measures included in 
TQM practices for evaluating individual performance is associated with 
higher organisational performance. Sim and Killough (1998) examined the 
use of measurement diversity in production systems (e.g. TQM) and 
performance-related rewards in US manufacturing plants. They find that 
plants using non-financial performance measures in addition to financial 
performance measures in their production and reward systems achieve 
higher performance. 
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Scott and Tiessen (1999) examine the influence and importance of 
diverse performance measurement for team performance. They conduct a 
survey in 27 organisations in the US with a total sample of 248 respondents. 
Their findings suggest that “team performance is positively associated with 
the variety and comprehensiveness of performance measures used. This 
relationship is enhanced if members participate in setting performance 
targets. Further, team performance is enhanced when team performance is 
given a greater weight in compensation. Finally, these effects are mutually 
reinforcing, such that team performance is substantially better when diverse 
and comprehensive performance measurement is combined with the 
participation of team members and a larger weight for team performance in 
their compensation” (p. 263). 
Banker et al. (2000) look at the relationship between the use of 
specific non-financial performance measures (e.g. customer satisfaction) for 
incentive compensation purposes and performance in the hotels of a US 
lodging chain. They find that when non-financial measures are use for 
evaluation and compensation purposes, managers more closely align their 
efforts to those measures, resulting in increased performance. They also find 
that, in the case of the lodging chain, improvements in non-financial 
measures are followed by increases in revenue and profit, and that the lag 
between the non-financial measures and changes in revenue and operating 
profit is six months.  
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In summary, two key learning points can be drawn from this stream of 
literature. On the one hand, the positive association of the use of non-
financial performance measures and performance is far from being 
conclusive. Some researchers have found convincing evidence of the 
positive relationship between both variables (e.g. Sim and Killough, 1998), 
others have found mixed results (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003), and 
some have found no association whatsoever (e.g. Perera et al., 1997). On the 
other hand, the consequences of measurement diversity usage seem to be 
mediated by the relationship of these types of measures with performance 
evaluation and/or compensation practices (e.g. Chenhall, 1997; Scott and 
Tiessen, 1999). 
2.3.2. Contextual factors that affect the 
performance impact of diverse 
measurement 
Within the body of research examining the different moderators that 
may influence the relationship between the use of measurement diversity in 
evaluation or reward systems and firm performance, the studies of 
Boulianne (2002), Govindarajan and Gupta (1985), Gupta (1987), Hoque 
(2004; 2005), Hoque and James (2000), Ittner and Larcker (2003), Ittner, 
Larcker and Randall (2003), Olson and Slater (2002), Said et al. (2003), and 
Van der Stede et al. (2006) should be cited. 
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Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) and Gupta (1987) are among the first 
researchers to empirically test the association between the use of “subjective 
(non-formula)” or “long-run criteria” of performance (i.e. non-financial 
measures) in the determination of incentive pay and business unit’s (BU) 
performance. In their research they use BU’s strategy as a variable, 
moderating the relationship between reliance on non-financial information 
and performance. They find that greater reliance on non-financial 
information for rewarding the BU’s management team contributes to better 
performance in the case of “build” (increased market share) BUs but 
hampers it in the case of “harvest” (maximisation of short-term earnings and 
cash flow) BUs. They also find that the association between reliance of 
short-run criteria (i.e. financial information) and performance is independent 
of BU’s strategy. In line with these findings, Olson and Slater (2002), 
Hoque (2004) and Boulianne (2002) provide evidence suggesting that the 
association between measurement diversity and performance is dependent 
on business strategy. 
Hoque and James (2000) examine the relationship between several 
contextual factors (organisation size, product life-cycle stage, market 
position), the use of financial as well as non-financial scorecard 
performance measures, and organisational performance. They conducted a 
survey of 66 Australian manufacturing companies finding that the use of the 
scorecard measurement diversity was associated with improved 
organisational performance. Other researchers have also looked at the 
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performance consequences of using the multi-criteria performance measures 
comprised in Balanced Scorecard systems. This is the case with Ittner and 
Larcker (2003) and Ittner, Larcker and Randall (2003).  
Ittner and Larcker (2003), based on data extracted from 157 Chief 
Financial Officers in a broad range of industries and 140 senior executives 
in the financial services industry, claim that firms which adopt non-financial 
measures and then establish a causal link between those measures and 
financial outcomes, produce a significantly higher return on assets and 
return on equity over a five-year period than those firms which do not. In a 
different paper published in the same year and based on the survey data 
obtained from the 140 senior executives in the financial service industry, 
Ittner, Larcker and Randall (2003) report less positive results. Their findings 
suggest that firms making a more extensive use of a broad set of financial 
and non-financial measures than firms with similar strategies or value 
drivers have higher measurement system satisfaction and higher 
performance measured by 1-year stock market return. However, 
measurement diversity does not seem to be associated with performance 
when it is measured by return on assets, sales growth or 3-year stock 
returns.  
In the same year, Said et al. (2003) published the results of a study 
investigating the implications of the use of multi-criteria measures in 
compensation contracts on current and future performance. They examine 
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1441 organisations and, in line with Ittner and Larcker’s (2003) research, 
they find support for the proposition that firms employing a combination of 
financial and non-financial measures of performance have significantly 
higher current and future performance (measured by mean levels of return 
on assets and market returns). However, they also find that the association 
between multi-criteria measures and firm performance is contingent on the 
firm’s operational and competitive characteristics.  
More recently, Hoque (2005), based on data collected from 52 New 
Zealand firms, provides evidence suggesting that the increase use of 
financial and non-financial performance measures leads to improve 
organisational performance but only under conditions of increased 
environmental uncertainty. Finally, Van der Stede et al. (2006) in a survey 
of 128 US and Belgian manufacturing firms find that, regardless of strategy, 
firms with more extensive performance measurement systems –especially 
those that include objective and subjective non-financial measures– have a 
higher performance. 
In summary, the impact of using non-financial performance measures 
seems to be highly moderated by contextual variables such as business 
strategy (e.g. Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985), environmental uncertainty 
(e.g. Hoque, 2005), and other firm’s operational and competitive 
characteristics (e.g. Said et al., 2003). 
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In the next section, the theories that have been used to explain these 
findings are explored with the aim of better understanding why and how 
measurement diversity might be associated with performance. 
2.4. Theoretical underpinning 
The majority of studies on the use and performance impact of non-
financial information are based on agency theory either by itself or in 
conjunction with other organisational theories such as contingency theory. 
The foundations, main streams and most important investigations of both of 
these theories are reviewed and summarised next.  
2.4.1. Agency theory 
2.4.1.1. Agency research foundations 
Agency theory has been regularly used in performance measurement 
research (Otley, 1999) and it is the dominant theory guiding organisational 
research on pay-for-performance relationships (Bloom and Milkovich, 
1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976)8. It has received a large amount of 
                                                 
 
8 In the economic and accounting literature several agency theory literature reviews can be 
found. The most cited ones –together with agency empirical work– have been used for the 
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attention in management literature as it provides a framework for examining 
the relationship between information systems, compensation, firm 
performance and behaviour (Lambert, 2001).  
Agency researchers suggest that this economic theory emerged from 
the work of Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of ownership and 
control in large North American firms. Ever since then, a whole body of 
literature worldwide has been dedicated to the study of the relationships 
between owners or shareholders –referred to as “principals”– and managers 
–referred to as “agents”. Owners own the capital of the firm, bear the 
financial risk and are represented by a board of directors who delegate their 
duties to managers (Davis and Edge, 2004). Managers work on behalf of the 
owners, coordinating and controlling activities within the firm and making 
decisions. The employment relationship between both parties is specified in 
a mutually agreed upon contract9 (Baiman, 1990). 
The employment contract is the central, most crucial concept in 
agency theory because it distinguishes agency theory from classical and 
                                                                                                                            
 
elaboration of this section (e.g. Baiman, 1982; 1990; Bourguignon and Chiapello, 2005; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Indjejikian, 1999; Lambert, 2001; Levinthal, 1988). 
9 According to Fama and Jensen (1983) a contract is an agreement that specifies the right of 
the parties, the system for monitoring the agent’s action, and the reward structure, including 
the degree to which managerial incentives are aligned with the interest of the owner. The 
total components of the contract might not always be explicit, some might be implicit 
(Baiman, 1990). 
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neoclassical economics (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In classical and 
neoclassical economics, market forces act as a disciplining mechanism on 
the owner who actively manages firms and firms are thought to behave in a 
value maximising way. On the other hand, in agency theory, the written and 
unwritten contracts among owners and managers are the mechanisms that 
provide the structure, which facilitates the analysis of the conflict of 
interests between both parties and the resulting equilibrium behaviour of the 
organisations (Jensen, 1994). 
According to the basic agency model, of which key aspects are 
outlined in Table 2-2, both owners and managers are assumed to be fully 
rational, with well-defined preferences, and motivated self-interest10 (i.e. 
willing to increase their own wealth with minimal effort). Additionally, 
managers are assumed to be both effort-averse, and risk-averse (i.e. prefer to 
avoid both work and risk). Shareholders are considered to be risk-neutral 
since they can diversify their capital across a variety of firms (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These different behaviours 
create conflicts of interest or, as agency researchers refer to them, “agency 
problems”. 
                                                 
 
10 Self-interest behaviour is often referred to as “opportunistic behaviour” (Baiman, 1990). 
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Agency theory aims to address two particular problems arising from 
the owner-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). One problem is known as moral hazard (hidden action or 
behaviour), the other as adverse selection (hidden information). A moral 
hazard problem arises due to the self-interest behaviours of both parties and 
the fact that it is difficult or expensive for principals to verify agents’ 
actions. The principal cannot directly observe whether agents are behaving 
as expected (i.e. in his/her best interest). An adverse selection problem 
arises due to the different levels of information the principal and the agents 
have regarding, for example, agents’ skills or private interests. Taking into 
account that the principal and the agents have different attitudes towards 
risk, agents may choose to misrepresent their private information and pursue 
actions that might not be aligned with the principal’s interests –e.g. receive 
ridiculously high salaries that are out of line with industry standards 
(Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Both, moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
are characterised by information asymmetry between agents and principals. 
If these problems are not resolved, they will lead to a loss in efficiency and 
a reduction in firm performance. This phenomenon is known as agency 
costs (Baiman, 1982).  
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Agency costs are seen as “necessary evils that can be reduced, yet 
seldom or perhaps never eliminated” (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). The agency-
based literature argues that in order to reduce the agency costs, principals 
need to find an optimal contractual relationship with their agents11 (Baiman, 
1982). In order to do so, principals may purchase information about the 
agents and design a compensation mechanism that makes them contingent 
upon the information purchased (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1993). In agency theory, information 
is regarded as a commodity and it has a cost. Principals need to balance the 
cost of purchasing information with the benefits that this information will 
provide. For instance, the cost of motivating misreporting through the use of 
a specific performance measure must be balanced against the benefit derived 
from choosing that specific performance measure in the first place (Baiman, 
1982; Lambert, 2001).  
As suggested by Feltham and Xie (1994), managerial actions and 
strategies are not directly observable, so managers cannot be compensated 
for their concrete contributions to the firm. In addition to this, the full 
consequences of managerial actions are not observable. This is mainly 
                                                 
 
11 Agency theorists assume that the inherent nature of people cannot be changed. Rather, 
what can be changed are the formal and informal employment relationships that are 
themselves created by people to govern their interactions (Jensen and Meckling, 1994). 
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because the impacts of those actions tend to expand beyond the managers’ 
areas of responsibility (i.e. his/her business unit) and beyond their time as 
managers of those areas of responsibility. Furthermore, uncontrollable 
events (e.g. mergers and acquisitions, economic crisis) may influence the 
consequences that are observed. As a result of these constraints, agency 
theorists argue that principals can only invest in the purchase of information 
mechanisms –these are performance measures– that may be employed as 
proxies or surrogates for assessing the consequences of managerial actions 
(Ijiri, 1975).  
Due to the fact that performance measures are proxies, they are 
frequently incomplete or imperfect representations of the consequences of 
managerial action. With this limitation in mind, agency theorists predict that 
the better principals’ performance measurement system reports agents’ 
actions impact, and the better performance contingent compensation 
mechanism motivates agents to focus on achieving principals’ goals, then 
the less adverse selection and moral hazard problems will be created 
(Baiman, 1982; Eisenhardt, 1989). If adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems are reduced then principals’ expected goals are more likely to be 
achieved and, in turn, firms’ overall performance will improve (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
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Table 2-2 Agency basic model (adapted from Eisenhardt (1989) and Lambert (2001)) 
Key elements  Description 
Main idea  Agency theory looks at the principal-agent employment 
relationship.  
Unit of analysis  Contract between principal and agent. 
Human nature assumptions  Agents are self-interested, rational, risk-averse and effort 
averse. 
 Principals are self-interested, rational and risk-neutral. 
Organisational assumptions  Goal-conflict between principal and agents due to self-
interested preferences. 
 Information asymmetry between principal and agent. 
Information assumption  Information is a purchasable commodity. 
Contracting problems  Moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Potential solutions to 
agency problems 
 Purchase information through monitoring and 
compensation. 
Sequence of events  Single period (normally one year): (1) Contract agreed 
upon (2) agent selects actions (3) performance measures 
are observed (4) agent is paid and principal received the 
organisational outcomes (minus salaries). 
 
From its origins, the basic agency model has been extended in a 
number of ways. Normally specific assumptions are relaxed, such as the 
assumption of agent’s risk-aversion (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1979) or the 
assumption of goal-conflict between the principal and the agent (e.g. 
Demski, 1980). The basic agency model has also been extended by adapting 
it to multi-agents (e.g. Holmstrom, 1982) or multi-period situations (e.g. 
Indjejikian and Nanda, 1999). Overall, the multiple agency models 
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developed in recent decades can be grouped into two categories: the 
principal-agency models and the positivist agency models (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen, 1983)12. Both of these streams of research are now described. 
2.4.1.2. Agency research streams 
The principal-agent and positivist agency-based models provide 
similar frameworks for analysing agency problems and their solutions; they 
both use the same unit of analysis: the contract between principals and 
agents; and they share common assumptions about human beings, 
organisations and information. However, they differ in their mathematical 
rigour, their dependent variables, their style, and in their focus on different 
aspects of a common research agenda (Baiman, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The agency theory common research agenda includes: (1) the modelling of 
the underlying economic context that generates the agency problems; (2) the 
examination of optimal employment relationships and the understanding of 
how different contractual relationships alleviate the underlying agency 
                                                 
 
12 It must be noted that Baiman (1990) classifies the agency literature into three streams: 
principal-agent, transaction cost economics and the Rochester literature. However, it can be 
argued that the Rochester stream is equivalent to the positivist stream suggested by 
Eisenhardt (1989) and that the transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975) stream 
cannot be considered as part of the agency theory literature (Donma and Schrender, 1998). 
Transaction cost economics shares specific aspects of agency theory but it has a complete 
different research focus. For instance, its unit of analysis is not the contract (as it is in the 
principal-agent and positivist literatures) but the transactions that take place across markets 
or within organisations (Donma and Schrender, 1998). 
Chapter 2. Literature review 
 48
problems; and (3) the comparison of results to observed practice as a check 
on the initial modelling and analysis (Baiman, 1990). Table 2-3 summarises 
the key elements of each agency-based research stream.  
Table 2-3 Agency-based research streams (adapted from Eisenhardt, 1989 and Baiman, 
1990) 
 Positivist Principal-agent 
Main focus  Interest on investigating how 
agency problems arise. 
 Description of governance 
mechanisms (e.g. monitoring 
technology, executive 
compensation) that alleviate 
opportunistic behaviours.  
 Special focus on the relationship 
between owner(s) and 
manager(s) of large, public 
corporations. 
 It offers a more complex view 
of organisations. 
 Its main aim is to test its 
theoretical frameworks with real 
data. 
 Interested in the formulation of a 
general theory of the 
relationship between principal(s) 
and agent(s). A theory that can 
be used for employer-employee, 
buyer-supplier, lawyer-client 
and other agency relationships. 
 It focuses on the optimal choice 
and design of ex-ante 
employment contracts between 
principal(s) and agent(s) and 
information systems. 
 Special interest in the trade-off 
between the cost of measuring 
behaviour and the cost of 
measuring outcomes and 
transferring risk to the agent. 
Models  Less mathematical than 
principal-agent models. 
 Terms are not as well specified 
as they are in principal-agent 
models. 
 Models are carefully specified 
and followed by logical 
deduction and mathematical 
proof. 
Key references  Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen 
(1983).  
 Holmstrom (1979, 1982), 
Shavell (1979). 
Criticisms  Poor specification of its models.  Abstract and hard to understand 
for non-agency experts (due to 
the degree of mathematical 
knowledge required). 
 Models tend to be very 
simplistic and unrepresentative 
of reality. 
 
Both research streams have produced studies looking at issues related 
to performance measurement and compensation. The contributions of both 
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literatures to these areas of investigation are reviewed in the next two sub-
sections. 
2.4.1.3. Agency research on performance 
measurement and incentive pay 
The major areas of concern for agency-based researchers looking at 
the relationship between performance measures and compensation seem to 
be: (1) the selection of the “best” measures of performance for determining 
pay; and (2) the relationship between performance contingent pay and firm 
performance. These two areas are now discussed in turn.  
2.4.1.3.1. The selection of the “best” measures of performance 
Performance measures affect the way in which people behave and 
make decisions (Indjejikian, 1999). As a consequence, one of the major 
concerns in agency-based research has been, and still is, how to select the 
most appropriate measures of performance (i.e. those that reduce the agency 
problems). Two key principles –the informativeness and controllability 
principles– and several other factors have been proposed by agency 
researchers in order to guide the selection of the “best” performance 
measures for evaluating and rewarding managerial performance. The 
performance measures’ principles and key factors investigated using agency 
theory are summarised as follows. 
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 Performance measures’ informativeness 
According to agency theorists, the most important aspect to take into 
account when selecting measures of performance is the informativeness 
principle (Holmstrom, 1979). This principle states that additional 
performance measures should potentially increase the expected utilities of 
the principal and the agent in order to be used to increase agent’s incentives 
or improve the risk sharing of the contract (Lambert, 2001). In other words, 
a measure should be included in the firm’s performance measurement or 
compensation system if it provides information about the dimensions of 
managerial action that the owner wishes to motivate (Ittner et al., 1997). 
According to this principle, the question is not what is the best measure of 
organisational performance but what combination of performance measures 
most appropriately reflects an agent’s contribution to the organisation 
(Indjejikian, 1999). 
 Performance measures’ controllability 
Agency theorists have also suggested what is known as the 
controllability principle (e.g. Demski and Feltham, 1978). This principle 
suggests that an individual should be evaluated and rewarded by a 
performance measure, if he or she can control or significantly influence that 
measure (Indjejikian, 1999). Antle and Demski (1988) and Demski (1994), 
relying on the informativeness principle, provide a more precise notion of 
the controllability principle by arguing that managerial performance 
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evaluation should be based on the concept of conditional controllability. “A 
performance measure is conditionally controllable if the information content 
of the measure is controllable conditional on whatever other information is 
being observed (e.g. an index computed from the performance of 
competitors firms is not controllable by a manager in the traditional sense, 
but may be informative –i.e. conditionally  controllable– and hence useful 
for relative performance evaluation purposes)” (Indjejikian, 1999, p. 150). 
 Performance measures’ relative weights: sensitivity and precision 
Due to the fact that measures tend to be aggregated in order to assess 
and reward managerial performance, agency researchers have been 
particularly interested in the investigation of the relative weight or 
importance placed on a pair of performance measures. Scholars such as 
Banker and Datar (1989) suggest that the weight of a performance measure 
should be based on its sensitivity and precision. The sensitivity of a measure 
refers to the degree to which the result of a performance measure changes 
with the agent’s actions. The precision of a measure refers to the lack of 
noise in a measure or, in other words, the ability of a measure to be 
Chapter 2. Literature review 
 52
consistent and accurate13. The noisier a measure is, the smaller its weight 
should be. The more sensitive to changes of managerial action a measure is, 
the greater the weight on that measure should be.  
For instance, when an accounting-based measure and a price-based 
measure are used for determining an incentive contract, then the relative 
weight of both measures can be calculated as a ratio of the “sensitive-times-
precision” of the accounting-based measure relative to the “sensitive-times-
precision” of the price-based measure (Indjejikian, 1999). Numerous agency 
researchers have examined the sensitivity and precision concepts through 
empirical studies (e.g. Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993; Kim and Suh, 1993; 
Lambert, 1993). As an extension, some researchers have found that firm- 
and manager-specific characteristics also have an influence on the relative 
weight placed on two measures of performance. Lambert and Larcker 
(1987), for example, found evidence suggesting that firms place relatively 
more weight on market performance (and less weight on accounting 
performance) in compensation contracts for situations in which (1) the 
variance of the accounting measure of performance is high relative to the 
variance of the market measure of performance, (2) the firm is experiencing 
                                                 
 
13 In statistical terms and as suggested by Banker and Datar (1989), sensitivity is calculated 
by the change in the mean of a performance measure in response to a change in the agent’s 
action. Precision is calculated as the inverse of the variance of a performance measure. 
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high growth rates in assets and sales, and (3) the value of the manager’s 
personal holdings of his firm’s stock is low. 
 Performance measures’ congruence 
Another aspect that has been examined by agency theory is the 
importance of performance measures’ congruence. Performance measures 
and incentive schemes are designed to align agents’ interests with 
principals’ interest. In agency-based research, alignment is achieved when 
the value agents assign to the different dimensions of their work is similar to 
the value principals assign to the dimensions of agents’ work (Schnedler, 
2005). This notion of alignment is also referred to as goal congruence 
between principal and agent (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995).  
Performance measures can be employed  in order to create goal 
congruence (Schnedler, 2005). However, not all measures of performance 
can be used for aligning the interests of both agents and principals. Some 
agency theorists have focused on the search for alternative methods of 
creating congruent performance measures. Others have paid more attention 
to alternative sets of performance measures that might be used to deal with 
the problems of goal congruence. The work of Feltham and Xie (1994) is 
crucial in this latter area of research as they find that the use of a non-
congruent performance measure (e.g. profit) will induce suboptimal effort 
allocation across tasks and that this non-congruity can be reduced with the 
use of additional measures of performance (e.g. non-financial measures).  
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Feltham and Xie (1994) are among the first authors who explored the 
benefits of using a diverse set of measures (financial as well as non-
financial) for incentive purposes. Other researchers have followed their 
work and their findings are summarised in the following subsection. 
 Performance measures’ diversity 
Agency-based research has traditionally been concerned with the use 
of financial measures of performance in incentive pay. In recent decades, 
the work of authors such as Johnson and Kaplan (1987) or Anthony and 
Govindarajan (1995) on the practical use of multi-criteria performance 
measures has had a great influence on agency research. Several extensions 
to the theory have been developed (e.g. Feltham and Xie, 1994; Sliwka, 
2002) and a number of empirical studies have been conducted in order to 
test the new theory developments. 
Analytical research conducted by Feltham and Xie (1994) has actually 
found that financial measures alone may not provide the most efficient 
means to motivate agents to act in the manner desired by the principal. 
Hemmer (1996), through a mathematical model, argues that given that 
financial measures are not completely effective, they should be 
supplemented or replaced by non-financial measures, which are more 
informative. Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) research adds a different 
perspective to the use of diverse measurement since they find that the use of 
financial and non-financial metrics may direct agents’ efforts to tasks that 
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are easily measured at the expense of tasks that are harder to measure. In 
summary, the true benefit of having multi-criteria measures of performance 
is still unclear (Ittner et al., 1997).  
Together with the interest in the key characteristics of performance 
measures in incentive schemes, agency researchers have devoted time and 
attention to the relationship between performance contingent incentive pay 
and firm’s economic results. A summary of this other body of research is 
presented as follows. 
2.4.1.3.2. Relationship between performance contingent pay and 
firm performance 
Several agency researchers have compared executive and/or firm 
performance before and after the adoption of a performance contingent 
incentive pay. Among these researchers, the work of Larcker (1983), Banker 
et al.. (1996), Lazear (2000), and Wallace (1997) is of great relevance. 
Larcker (1983) shows that firms adopting long-term performance plans 
(when compared to similar non-adopting firms) exhibit significant growth in 
capital expenditures. Banker et al.. (1996) find that sales increased after a 
sales-based performance plan was implemented at a retail establishment and 
the effect continued over time. Lazear (2000) finds that the output of 
workers installing automobile windshields increased after a switch from 
hourly wages to piece rates. Finally, Wallace (1997) finds that firms 
decreased new capital investments, intensified the disposition of existing 
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assets and increased stock repurchases after adopting a residual income-
based performance measure.  
Recently, some researchers have devoted their attention to the 
investigation of the relationship between the measures used for 
compensation purposes and firm performance. For instance, Hayes and 
Schaefer (2000) show that future firm performance is positively associated 
with the type of performance measures used in executive compensation. 
Banker et al..  (2000) show that current non-financial indicators of 
performance are associated with future financial performance and that both 
financial and non-financial performance improve following the introduction 
of an incentive plan based on non-financial measures. Similarly, Ittner and 
Larcker (1998) find that the relations between customer satisfaction 
measures and future accounting performance are generally positive and 
statistically significant. 
Concerning the relationship between incentives design and task 
performance, theoretically incentives can be used to align the actions of 
executives with desired organisational objectives (Baker, Jensen and 
Murphy, 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989). 
Further, incentive pay affects executives’ behaviour, which in turn improves 
task performance (Indjejikian, 1999). However, as evidence shows, the 
behaviours encouraged by incentives might not always be the desired ones. 
Healy’s (1985) study provides evidence of earnings manipulation in 
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response to accounting-based incentive plans. In fact, financial incentives do 
not necessarily lead to increased task performance (e.g. Jenkins, Gupta, 
Mitra and Shaw, 1998). Thus, as Bonner, Hastie, Sprinkle, and Young 
(2000) suggest, when studying the effect of incentives on organisational 
performance, it is important to examine external variables that may interact 
with this relationship.  
Agency-based research looking at the influence of a contextual factor 
(e.g. business risk, effort, culture) on the relationship between performance 
measurement or compensation systems and firm performance has been 
explicitly or implicitly based on contingency theory. Hence, a closer look at 
contingency theory research can help its understanding. However, before 
exploring the relevancy of contingency research, it is important to devote 
some attention to the criticisms that agency has received over the years.  
2.4.1.4. Agency theory critics 
Agency theory has received a number of criticisms. These criticisms 
can be classified into two groups. One set of criticisms has dealt with the 
limitations of classic agency theory. Critics within this group tend to support 
the theory by accepting most of its underlying assumptions; but have 
concerns with the simplicity, methods or findings of agency models. Most 
criticisms comprising the second group of critics to agency theory have 
come from disciplines such as psychology or sociology. These critics reject 
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the basic underlying assumptions of agency-based research and thus refute 
the whole theory. These two sets of criticisms are reviewed in turn. 
The work of Baker et al. (1988) is an example of the type of critics 
included in the first set of criticisms. These scholars, who are supporters of 
agency theory premises, claim that, so far, agency findings have given us 
little insight into the form and shape of observed performance measurement 
and compensation systems. They also suggest that most employer-employee 
relationships are far more complex than that which classic agency theory 
predicts.  
Other criticisms included in this first set of critics revolve around 
three related observations (Indjejikian, 1999). First, many employer-
employee relationships are based on implicit arrangements rather than on an 
explicit contract, which is the basis of agency theory. Second, there are 
collective behaviours and interactions that affect the nature of an 
organisation’s incentive problem beyond those captured by the classic 
agency model. Finally, organisations evolve over time. This evolution 
allows employees to learn and improve their performance. It also provides 
the employer with opportunities to redesign defective incentives and create 
long-term employment commitments. None of these circumstances is 
contemplated in the basic agency model.  
Most of the criticisms in this first set have been addressed by recent 
agency models. For example, multi-tasking (e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom, 
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1991) and multi-period models (e.g. Indjejikian and Nanda, 1999) have been 
developed in order to address the cited concerns. However, gaps still exist 
and further research is encouraged by agency supporters.  
The second set of criticisms focuses on the underlying assumptions 
used in principal-agent models. As has been seen in previous sections, 
agency theory is based on a specific model of man originated in economics. 
This model of man sees human beings as self-centred individuals interested 
in maximising their own personal economic wealth. Due to this perceived 
nature of human beings, the issue for agency theorists is to design the most 
appropriate performance measures and incentives as control mechanisms.  
However, psychologists and sociologists have challenged this model 
of man and have proposed another model. Their model sees human beings 
“as motivated by a need to achieve, to gain intrinsic satisfaction through 
successfully performing inherently challenging work, to exercise 
responsibility and authority, and thereby to gain recognition from peers and 
bosses” (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p. 51). This view of human beings has 
served as the basis for what is known as stewardship theory. Under this 
theory, executives are stewards of corporate assets. Thus, performance 
measures and incentives are not required as the interests of shareholders are 
already aligned with the interests of executives. The issue for stewardship 
researchers is whether or not the organisation structure and the executive’s 
collaborative relationship with shareholders helps the executive to formulate 
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and implement plans for achieving high corporate performance (Davis and 
Schoorman, 1997).  
Scholars such as Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) argue that both 
agency theory and stewardship theory can be seen as complementary 
theories rather than supplementary. Both might be valid depending on the 
contextual circumstances in which they are applied. Citing the work of 
Ghoshal and Moran (1996, p. 41) they stress that: “The context in which 
social relations and economic exchange are embedded can induce self-
aggrandizement or trust, individualism or collectivism, competition or 
cooperation among participants. Economic progress requires both kinds of 
behaviours in each set of alternatives, not just one or the other” 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003, p. 411). For them the use of other 
theories such as contingency theory can further inform the conflict between 
agency and stewardship research.  
In line with this suggestion and remarks highlighted in previous 
sections (see for example sections 2.3.2. or 2.4.1.3.2.), contingency theory is 
now reviewed. 
2.4.2. Contingency theory 
2.4.2.1. Contingency theory foundations 
“Contingency theory of organizations is a major theoretical lens used 
to view organizations” (Donaldson, 2001, p. 1). This theory is a subset of 
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the contingency approach in science, which basically says that the effect of 
one variable (X) on another (Y) depends upon some third variable (W) 
called a “moderator” or “contingency”. The contingency theory of 
organisations predicts that the relationship between an organisation’s 
characteristics such as its structure or its management control system and 
organisational performance depends upon specific contingencies14. The key 
premise in this type of research is that organisational characteristics cannot 
be universally appropriate. Each organisation needs to be designed 
according to its circumstances to avoid loss of performance. 
Contingency theorists use the concept of fit to designate the interest of 
organisations to be designed in accordance with their context so they can 
achieve higher performance. Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) argue that three 
different conceptual approaches to fit tend to be used in the development of 
contingency theory. These are: selection, interaction and systems 
approaches (see Table 2-4). Each of these three approaches modifies the 
essential meaning of a fit and the method in which fit is empirically tested. 
Researches need to be clear about the approach they are using in order to 
avoid misunderstandings and be aware of the limitations that each approach 
comprises (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985).  
                                                 
 
14 A contingency has been defined as “any variable that moderates the effect of an 
organisational characteristic on organizational performance” (Donaldson, 2001, p. 7) 
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Table 2-4 Interpretation of fit (adapted from Van de Ven and Drazin (1985)) 
Approach Definition Research method 
Selection  Fit is seen as congruence between context 
and the organisational characteristic being 
studied 
 Correlation analysis 
between pairs of 
variables 
Interaction  Fit is the interaction between a pair of 
variables and performance (bivariate 
interaction) 
 MANOVA or regression 
analysis (mediation and 
moderation analysis) 
Systems  Fit is the internal consistency of multiple 
contingencies and multiple organisational 
characteristics that affects performance 
(consistency analysis) 
 Pattern analysis (analysis 
of deviations from ideal-
type designs) 
 
2.4.2.2. Contingency research streams 
There are several streams within contingency research. Most 
contingency-based research has investigated organisational structure as the 
organisational characteristic that has to be aligned with organisational 
contingencies (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969). This body of research is known 
as structural contingency theory. Nevertheless, there are contingency 
theories of many different organisational characteristics such as 
management information systems (e.g. Weill and Olson, 1989), human 
resource management (e.g. Delery and Doty, 1996). There is also a specific 
stream of contingency-based research looking at compensation (e.g. Balkin 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1987) and performance measurement systems (e.g. 
Hayes, 1977; Otley, 1980). The rest of this section focuses on these two 
specific bodies of research due to their relevance for this dissertation. 
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2.4.2.3. Contingency theory of performance 
measurement and compensation systems 
Contingency-based research in the compensation literature has been 
mainly concerned with the relationship between compensation systems, 
organisational contingencies and organisational performance (Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin, 1992). In the performance measurement literature, contingency-
based studies have been mainly focused on the relationship between 
management accounting systems, contextual factors and organisational 
performance (Fisher, 1998). In both bodies of research the contingency 
factors that have been studied the most are: external environment 
(uncertainty or business risk), competitive strategy, culture (national and 
organisational), organisational size, organisational structure and industry 
(Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987; Otley, 1980). 
Contingency management control research, which includes 
performance measurement systems and compensation systems (Flamholtz, 
1983), can be classified into four categories according to the level of 
analysis complexity (Fisher, 1995b)(see Figure 2-1). At the first level of 
analysis, one contingent factor is correlated with one management control 
system. From this perspective, no attempt is made to evaluate whether the 
correlation between the contingent factor and the control mechanism has 
any impact on an outcome variable (e.g. Merchant, 1985; Simons, 1990). 
The second level of analysis investigates the joint effect of a contingent 
factor and a control mechanism on an outcome variable, which is usually 
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firm performance. This second level of analysis is the most common in the 
control literature (Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Simons, 1987). At the 
third level of analysis, the joint linkage between multiple control 
mechanisms, a contingent factor, and an outcome variable is examined 
(Fisher and Govindarajan, 1993; Merchant, 1981). The last level of analysis 
is similar to the third level but looks at multiple contingency factors, rather 
than focusing on just one (e.g. Fisher and Govindarajan, 1993).  
Figure 2-1 Levels of analysis complexity in contingency-based research (Fisher, 1995b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It has been noted that most contingency management control research 
has been based on either the first or the second level of analysis. Fisher 
(1995b) argues that more third and fourth levels of analysis are needed in 
order to advance understanding of management control systems. The third 
level analysis can be useful given that different organisational control 
systems can be complementary (Govindarajan, 1988) or substitutable 
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(Otley, 1980). It is likely that some control systems are used in a 
complementary way and others are used as substitutes, depending on the 
firm’s contingent factors (Fisher, 1995b). Regarding the fourth level 
analysis, Fisher suggests that this level of analysis can better capture the 
complexities of contingent control processes; even though, other issues may 
arise from this type of research.  
For instance, if contingencies are consistent (i.e. they demand the 
same type of control for better organisational performance), then the design 
of an appropriate control system would be simple. If contingencies are 
inconsistent, then different characteristics of a control system would be 
required, which automatically would increase the difficulty of the control 
design process. To resolve this conflict, Fisher suggests that companies can 
design a control system to be consistent with one contingency while 
ignoring the others. However, it has been found that ignoring an important 
contingency may result in lower business unit performance (Gresov, 1989). 
Alternatively, companies can use a hybrid design that includes control 
components for each contingency. The problem then can be that a hybrid 
system may not be internally consistent. In other words, an internal misfit 
may exist in the control system design because it is trying to address 
conflicting contingencies. This misfit in design can result in lower firm 
performance (Child, 1975). 
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Clearly, the level of complexity involved in the third and fourth level 
of analysis can explain their absence in the literature but a more extensive 
use of either of them could help in our understanding of management 
control systems. 
2.4.2.4. Contingency theory critics 
The contingency theory of organisations has been mainly criticised for 
issues regarding its empirical testing. For example, Venkatraman (1989) 
points out that a major problem in contingency theory research is the lack of 
correspondence between the way in which hypotheses are stated and then 
tested. In Venkatraman’s words “although it is common for theorists to 
postulate relationships using phrases and words such as matched with, 
contingent upon, consistent with, fit, congruence, and coalignment, precise 
guidelines for translating these verbal statements to the analytical level are 
seldom provided” (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 423). Van de Ven and Drazin 
(1985) have also argued that in the contingency theory literature there is an 
inadequate attention paid to the specification of the form of fit –that is, 
selection, interaction or systems.  
Furthermore, Hartmann and Moers (1999) have criticised how the use 
of specific statistical methods, in particular multiple regression analysis with 
interaction effects, has been incorrectly used in research examining the 
impact of organisational contingencies on the design and implementation of 
management control systems such as budgeting. They even suggest that this 
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problem “seriously affects the interpretability and conclusions of individual 
budgetary research papers [using contingency theory premises], and may 
also affect the budgetary research paradigm as a whole” (Hartmann and 
Moers, 1999, p. 291). In sum, for contingency theory to progress, careful 
attention must be paid to the methodologies used to empirically test their 
hypotheses.  
2.5. Chapter summary 
This chapter has reviewed the definition of financial as well as non-
financial performance measures, the reasons why non-financial information 
is used in performance measurement and compensation systems, and the 
research focused on the impact of non-financial measures on firm 
performance. It has also examined critical aspects of agency and 
contingency theory as these two organisational theories are crucial for 
understanding the phenomenon under investigation. The next chapter will 
be dedicated to the presentation of the theoretical framework that has been 
used to explain the relationship between the use of non-financial 
performance measures in incentive systems, organisational contingencies 
and firm performance. 
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it develops a theoretical 
framework about the relationship between the use of non-financial 
performance measures in addition to financial performance measures in 
executives’ incentive systems and firm performance. This framework is 
developed based on the premises of agency theory and contingency theory. 
Secondly, building on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, and adding new 
bodies of research when applicable, this chapter formulates the hypotheses 
that will then be tested. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 
outlines the theoretical framework that will help the reader to understand the 
different variables under study. Then, section 3.2 presents the hypotheses 
that predict the relationships between the different variables investigated 
and the impact of measurement diversity on firm performance. 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
Agency theory focuses on the different management mechanisms that 
can be used in order to align the interests of both principals and agents, 
reduce the so-called agency costs, and benefit firm performance (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theorists suggests that the use of 
financial performance measures for evaluating and rewarding managerial 
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performance may not be the most efficient means for aligning the interests 
of agents with those of principals (e.g. Feltham and Xie, 1994). These 
theorists base their predictions on the informativeness principle proposed by 
Holmstrom (1979).  
Holmstrom (1979) asserts that any measure which provides 
information about the dimensions of managerial action is suitable for 
contractual purposes. Thus, the agency researchers propose that a 
combination of financial as well as non-financial performance measures will 
be more appropriate for assessing agents’ contributions to the organisation 
than the use of financial performance measures only (Indjejikian, 1999). If 
measurement diversity –that is the use of financial as well as non-financial 
measures of performance– is an appropriate mechanism for evaluating and 
rewarding employees as it provides more information to the principal about 
agent’s actions, then it will help to reduce the agency costs and, as a result, 
it will positively affect firm performance (Banker et al., 2000) 
Several agency-based research studies have explored the performance 
implications of using measurement diversity in employee contracts. As 
presented in Chapter 2, some studies have found a positive relationship 
between the use of non-financial performance measures in addition to 
financial performance measures in incentive systems and business results 
(e.g. Said et al., 2003). Others have found mixed results in this relationship 
(e.g. Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003). Finally, a few studies have shown 
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that the use of measurement diversity for determining pay is negatively 
associated with firm performance (e.g. Perera et al., 1997). Contingency 
theory can provide an explanation for these inconclusive results (Hoque, 
2005).  
Contingency theory and, in particular the contingency theory of 
management control systems, states that the relationship between 
management control systems (e.g. performance measurement and incentive 
systems) and organisational performance is dependent on organisational 
conditions (e.g. Fisher, 1995b; 1998; Otley, 1980). There is a stream of 
research looking at the relationship between measurement diversity and firm 
performance that has taken into consideration the impact of specific 
organisational conditions –also referred to as organisational contingencies. 
This research has looked at the moderating effect of business strategy (e.g. 
Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Hoque, 2004; Olson and Slater, 2002), 
organisational size (e.g. Hoque and James, 2000), industry (e.g. Schiehll, 
2001) and environmental uncertainty (e.g. Hoque, 2005). However, there 
are a number of additional internal and external contingencies that may 
influence the relationship between measurement diversity and firm 
performance (Hoque, 2004). 
In recent years, agency research has been particularly interested on the 
moderating effects of contingencies such as business risk (e.g. Miller et al., 
2002), ownership structure (e.g. Werner, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 2005), and 
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culture (e.g. Johnson and Droege, 2004) on the relationship between 
executive incentives and firm performance. Due to their recognised 
importance in agency studies, this research focuses on these three 
contingencies arguing that the impact of using measurement diversity in 
executive incentive systems on firm performance, apart from being 
moderated by business strategy, organisational size and industry, is also 
moderated by business risk, ownership structure, and organisational culture. 
The predicted ways in which these three contingencies moderate the 
relationship between measurement diversity and firm performance are 
described in Sections 3.2.3.1, 3.2.3.2 and 3.2.3.3 respectively. 
Furthermore, the research examines two management control factors 
that may also influence the relationship between reliance on non-financial 
performance measurement and firm performance. These are: the quality of 
performance measures and the reward system’s effectiveness. The specific 
reasons why these two factors have been selected are explained in Section 
3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2.  
Figure 3-1 shows the key variables under study and an overview of the 
relationships that are explored in this research. These relationships are now 
further discussed and specific hypotheses are proposed. 
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Figure 3-1 Theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Hypotheses development 
This section is divided into three subsections. The first subsection 
looks at the rationale underpinning the relationship between measurement 
diversity and firm performance. The second subsection focuses on the two 
management control factors that influence this relationship: the quality of 
performance measures and the effectiveness of the reward system. The 
quality of performance measure interacts with the main effect as a 
moderator whereas the reward system’s effectiveness interacts with the 
main effect as a mediator. The third subsection discusses the moderating 
effects of three contextual factors commonly reviewed in the agency 
literature: business risk, ownership structure and organisational culture. 
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3.2.1. Measurement diversity and firm 
performance relationship 
Agency theorists stress that not all performance measures are equally 
appropriate for evaluating and rewarding managerial action (Feltham and 
Xie, 1994). Some measures are suitable for assessing firms’ value but may 
be unsuitable for determining individuals’ incentive pay (Gjesdal, 1981). 
Some measures may be useful for driving individual performance whilst 
others may be not (Hoskisson, Hitt and Hill, 1993). Some measures may 
generate behaviours that help organisations meet their strategic objectives 
whilst others may generate dysfunctional behaviours that diminish 
organisations’ economic results (Baker, 2000). Most research on the use of 
measurement diversity has relied on the informativeness principle 
(Holmstrom, 1979) together with the research of Feltham and Xie (1994) 
and Hemmer (1996).  
The informativeness principle, as reviewed in Chapter 2, states that a 
measure should be included in an incentive system if it provides information 
about the dimensions of managerial action that the principal wishes to 
motivate (Holmstrom, 1979). Feltham and Xie (1994) extend this principle 
by suggesting that financial measures alone may not provide the most 
efficient means for aligning the interest of both principals and agents. 
Furthermore, Hemmer (1996) asserts that financial performance measures 
should be supplemented or replaced by non-financial measures in order to 
positively affect business results. Based on the work of these scholars, it can 
Chapter 3. Theory and hypotheses 
 74
be argued that the use of financial and non-financial measures is appropriate 
for evaluating and rewarding managerial performance; and that it will 
positively affect firm performance (e.g. Banker et al., 2000). As a result, the 
following hypothesis can be stated: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between measurement diversity in 
executive incentive pay and firm performance. 
Contingency theory suggests that this relationship might be moderated 
by internal management control factors and external factors (Fisher, 1998; 
Otley, 1980). Even though internal control factors are crucial determinants 
of the effectiveness of multi-criteria incentive systems (Fisher, 1995b), little 
research has focused on them. In this study, it is proposed that the quality of 
the performance measures and the effectiveness of the reward system will 
have a great impact on the measurement diversity and firm performance 
relationship.  
As per the external factors influencing this relationship, a number of 
studies have explored their influence on the impact of multi-criteria 
incentive systems. Some scholars have asserted that business strategy 
(Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Hoque, 2004; Olson and Slater, 2002), 
organisational size (Hoque and James, 2000), environmental uncertainty or 
business risk (Hoque, 2005), or industry (Schiehll, 2001) might be potential 
variables that moderate the measurement diversity and firm performance 
relationship. In this study, it is proposed that ownership structure and 
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organisational culture will also affect this relationship. Furthermore, it is 
hypothesised that business risk will affect the impact of multi-criteria 
executive incentive systems in a non-linear way, contrary to what Hoque 
(2005) suggests.  
3.2.2. Management control factors influencing 
the measurement diversity and firm 
performance relationship 
3.2.2.1. Quality of performance measures as a 
moderator 
One factor that is highly likely to affect the performance impact of a 
multi-criteria incentive system is the quality of its performance measures. 
Quality is an elusive concept that may be interpreted in various ways. In this 
context, taking into consideration the quality definitions suggested by Smith 
(1993), quality of performance measures is defined as the degree to which 
performance measures conform to a set of specific attributes proposed by 
agency theory and performance measurement research. These attributes are: 
high controllability (e.g. Antle and Demski, 1988), high congruency (e.g. 
Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995), high objectivity (e.g. Bourguignon and 
Chiapello, 2005), high outcome orientation (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989), low 
distortion (e.g. Baker, 2002), few in number and high understandability (e.g. 
Meyer, 2002). These attributes are now presented in turn. 
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According to agency researchers, together with the informativeness 
principle –that supports diverse measurement–, the controllability and 
congruency15 principle may also have an effect on the performance impact 
of incentive systems (Indjejikian, 1999). On the one hand, the controllability 
principle suggests that individuals should be evaluated and rewarded by 
performance measures that they can have control over or significantly 
influence (Antle and Demski, 1988). On the other hand, the congruency 
principle specifies that performance measures should assess the 
achievement of goals that are congruent with principal’s business objectives 
(Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995).  
In spite of the informativeness, controllability and congruency agency 
principles, performance measurement research has also found other 
characteristics that may affect the likelihood of a measure to positively 
affect individual behaviour and, ultimately, firm performance. For instance, 
there is a vast body of research that shows that performance information 
used for compensation purposes should be outcome oriented (Eisenhardt, 
                                                 
 
15 Agency researchers do not seem to use the term “congruency principle” as such. 
However, based on the vast amount of research that has proved the importance of this 
characteristic, in this dissertation the term “congruency principle” is used. Mainly because 
it is believed that this characteristic meets the Oxford dictionary definition of “principle”: a 
fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or 
behaviour or for a chain of reasoning (Matthews, 1997). 
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1985) and objectively measured16 (Bourguignon and Chiapello, 2005). 
Traditional agency research has suggested that outcome and objective 
measures of performance should be linked to incentive pay, whereas 
behavioural and subjective measures of performance should be linked to 
base pay (Colon and Parks, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1985; 1988).  
Furthermore, it is known that users tend to distort the data used for 
measuring performance (Baker, 2002; Indjejikian, 1999). Thus, another 
characteristic that designers aiming to create high quality measures should 
take into consideration is the degree to which a measure can be manipulated 
by managerial actions. For instance, a study conducted by Eccles and 
Mavrinac (1995) has found that investors and financial analysts had the 
perception that some of the information reported to external shareholders 
had been prone to managerial manipulation. For instance, non-financial 
performance measures do not need to be audited before being reported to 
shareholders and this may motivate executives to distort some of their 
computations or chose for external reporting only the non-financial 
performance measures that show good firm results (Eccles and Mavrinac, 
                                                 
 
16 Outcome oriented measures which tend to be objectively measured can have a non-
financial nature. For example, customer satisfaction can be considered an outcome measure 
and, if it is assessed based on the responses to a survey, it can be argued that it will also be 
objective. Agency empirical research conducted previous to the work of Feltham & Xie 
(1994) tends to assume that outcome measures are financial measures only, mainly because 
that tended to be the case in most organisations in those days. However, recent agency 
empirical research does not make that assumption.  
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1995). This is why it is crucial that the measures included in executive 
incentive systems are those that are less subject to managerial distortion. 
Finally, from a cognitive point of view, it has also been found that 
performance measures should be few in number and easy to understand (e.g. 
Meyer, 2002). Regarding the ideal number of measures, research suggests 
that the magic number is seven plus or minus two (Miller, 1956; Simons, 
1999). Individuals can remember and pay attention to seven bits of 
information at one moment in time. With 10 or more bits of information, 
individuals suffer from information overload (Miller, 1956). Moreover, if 
people are assessed according to too many performance measures, no single 
initiative will receive enough attention to assure success (Simons, 1999). As 
per the understandability of performance information, researchers have 
found that performance measures should be easy to understand by 
individuals in order to drive decision-making and have a positive effect on 
performance (e.g. Lipe and Salterio, 2000; Meyer, 2002).  
In summary, despite the notion that the use of diverse performance 
measures in incentive systems is positively associated with firm 
performance; there are other characteristics that performance measures must 
meet in order to positively affect firm performance. Performance measures 
should be (1) controllable by executives; (2) congruent with the owner’s 
business objectives; (3) objectively measured; (4) outcome oriented; (5) 
with low opportunities for distortion; (6) few in number; and (7) easy to 
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understand. It can be argued that if performance measures meet all these 
criteria they will be perceived as high quality measures. Thus, when 
organisations use non-financial performance measures in addition to 
financial performance measures, and these measures are perceived to be of 
high quality, the expectation is that firm performance will be positively 
affected. This argument can be stated in the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is moderated by the quality of the 
performance measures such that measurement diversity is positively 
associated with firm performance when the quality of performance measures 
is high. 
3.2.2.2. Reward system effectiveness as a mediator 
A variable which is likely to mediate the relationship between reliance 
on non-financial performance measurement and firm performance is reward 
system effectiveness. Reward system effectiveness has been defined as the 
extent to which the reward system contributes to the achievement of 
organisational goals (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987). Agency theorists 
have argued that the use of financial and non-financial performance 
measures for determining executive incentives can be beneficial as it 
reduces the agency costs (for further information on this point, please refer 
to Chapter 2).  
Firstly, multi-criteria performance measures can be employed to 
overcome the short-term focus created by relying on financial information 
only for evaluating and rewarding managerial actions (e.g. Indjejikian, 
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1999). Secondly, this type of measure can enhance the alignment between 
principals’ and agents’ goals (e.g. Hemmer, 1996). Finally, the use of non-
financial performance measures in addition to financial performance 
measures for determining pay can be used as a means of reducing 
dysfunctional behaviours (e.g. Feltham and Xie, 1994). As a result, if all 
these benefits are realised, it can be argued that reward systems dependent 
on diverse performance measures are more likely to be perceived as 
effective, i.e. they are more likely to facilitate the achievement of 
organisational goals. If that is the case, it is probable that firm performance 
will increase. This is the rationale for hypothesis 3:  
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is mediated by reward system 
effectiveness such that measurement diversity is positively related to firm 
performance when the reward system is perceived to be effective. 
3.2.3. Contextual factors moderating the 
measurement diversity - firm performance 
relationship 
3.2.3.1. Business risk  
A contextual variable that is likely to moderate the relationship 
between reliance on non-financial performance measurement in executive 
incentives and firm performance is business risk, also known as 
environmental uncertainty (Hoque, 2005). Risk is “uncertainty about 
outcomes or events, especially with respect to the future”; and business risk 
has been defined as “greater variability in organisational returns and 
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increased chances for corporate ruin” (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998, p. 285). 
From a contingency point of view, it has been asserted that there is a linear 
association between the use of diverse measurement, business risk and firm 
performance (Hoque, 2004). According to this relationship, diverse 
measurement in incentives will lead to improved performance under 
situations of high business risk. However, based on recent agency research 
(e.g. Miller et al., 2002), it can be argued that this relationship is curvilinear 
rather than linear. This would mean that the use of diverse measurement will 
lead to improved firm performance under conditions of both high and low 
levels of business risk. The paragraphs that follow clarify the rationale 
supporting this argument. 
From an agency theory perspective, high business risk is of concern to 
both principals and agents. From the principals’ point of view, high levels of 
business risk make it difficult for them to determine whether variations in 
financial firm performance are the product of agents’ decisions or specific 
external events outside the agents’ control (Antle and Smith, 1986). Greater 
business risk aggravates the agency problem as the firm’s financial 
measures used to determine incentives become less reliable, costly and 
hence less adequate to serve as proxies of managerial decision-making 
(Miller et al., 2002).  
From the agents’ point of view, high levels of business risk reduce 
their ability to influence the financial measures used to determine their 
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incentives. This is because external contingencies may affect the results of 
those measures. Moreover, agents’ reduced control over their measures of 
performance can have detrimental effects on their incentive compensation 
and, ultimately, on their employment security (Bloom and Milkovich, 
1998). Because high levels of business risk impose higher income and 
employment risk on agents, they may be pushed to adopt risk reduction 
strategies that damage principals’ interests (Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
Examples of these types of strategies include broadening diversification at 
the expense of profits (Amihud and Lev, 1981), avoiding high-risk projects 
(Hoskisson et al., 1993), or reducing R&D expenditures (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990).  
Based on the above agents’ and principals’ concerns, agency theorists 
propose that in order to reduce the additional agency problems generated by 
high business uncertainty, principals should reduce their reliance on 
incentive pay (Eisenhardt, 1989). Several agency researchers, using a 
diverse set of organisational samples, employee populations and measures, 
have empirically tested the relationship between business risk and incentive 
pay (e.g. Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1988; Gray and Cannella, 
1997; Miller et al., 2002; Stroh, Brett and Bauman, 1996; Umanath, Ray and 
Campbell, 1996; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). They have found that under 
conditions of high business risk, it is less efficient to rely on incentive pay 
as a mechanism to reduce agency costs.  
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However, less emphasis on incentive pay may no longer be a solution 
for the agency problems generated by high business risk. The size of 
executive incentive pay in the majority of organisations these days is being 
set according to industry standards and organisational size. The degree of 
business risk is not even a variable being considered in the incentives’ 
design process (e.g. Davis and Edge, 2004). If the size of executive 
incentive pay is something that in practice cannot be adjusted to neutralise 
the negative consequences of high levels of business risk on agents’ 
behaviour (as this may motivate executives to seek opportunities 
elsewhere), then what other mechanisms can be used? An alternative 
solution to the agency problems generated by high levels of business risk 
may rest on balancing the use of financial and non-financial performance 
measures in the design of incentive pay systems. 
Incentive pay can be contingent on different types of performance 
measures (i.e. financial and non-financial) as shown in Chapter 2. Previous 
research on the relationship between business risk and incentive pay has 
mainly relied on an assumption that incentive pay is just dependent on 
outcome measures, which are financial only (e.g. accounting or market 
based measures). For example, Gray and Cannella (1997) state that business 
risk affects “the personal risk of the executive when compensation is 
contingent upon firm-level outcomes such as profitability or stock price 
movements” (p. 521). However, this assumption may no longer hold for 
most organisations as the use of diverse measurement is increasing and 
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more and more firms are using a combination of financial as well as non-
financial measures of performance to determine pay (e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 
2003).  
When business risk is high, non-financial performance measures, such 
as customer satisfaction or leadership, may be better suited to determine 
incentive pay. Non-financial performance measures can give agents 
strategic information about customers, internal processes, competitors, and 
human capital that are difficult to capture with the use of financial measures 
only (e.g. Amir and Lev, 1996; Feltham and Xie, 1994). Non-financial 
performance measures can be used to drive and better predict financial firm 
performance (Aaker and Jacobson, 1987; Anderson et al., 1997; Nagar and 
Rajan, 2005). Furthermore, under conditions of greater business risk, 
principals can use non-financial performance measures to better assess 
agents’ performance as these measures are less likely to be subject to the 
effects of external factors and more likely to be influenced by agents’ 
decisions (Hoque, 2005).  
In short, it has been argued that when business risk is high agency 
problems will rise and the solution to these problems suggested by previous 
agency research (i.e. reduce the size of incentive pay) may no longer be 
valid. These days, the size of executive incentive pay is agreed based on 
criteria that do not take into consideration the level of environmental 
uncertainty surrounding the firm. If a firm facing high business risk decides 
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to reduce the size of their executives’ pay, in the short-term executives may 
seek opportunities in other organisations offering more competitive 
incentives. Therefore, an alternative solution may be to focus on the design 
of an incentive system that includes not only financial measures of firm 
performance but also non-financial measures. Based on this rationale, it 
seems that firms under conditions of high business risk will be better off by 
mainly relying on non-financial performance measures rather than on 
financial performance measures. If they do so, the expectation is, according 
to contingency theory, that they will reach higher firm performance. This 
may be the case under conditions of high business risk, but what happens 
under conditions of low and moderate risk?  
Under conditions of low business risk, incentive systems based on 
financial measures only may not be adequate. In low-risk firms, financial 
performance uncertainty and cause-effect ambiguity are low, therefore 
evaluating and rewarding executives for results that tend to be largely 
disassociated from their strategic decisions will not be economically rational 
(Miller et al., 2002). A high reliance on financial performance measures in 
circumstances of low business risk –where growth opportunities are absent– 
may even be counterproductive. Executives may be driven to take actions, 
which may damage the principals’ interests (e.g. manipulating earnings, 
initiating mergers or acquisitions that are detrimental for the long term 
performance of the firm) (Miller et al., 2002; Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 
1992). As a result, greater reliance on non-financial measures of 
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performance might be a more appropriate solution for firms operating in low 
business risk environments. 
In the case of moderate risk, a different selection of performance 
measures may be more effective. As suggested by Miller et al. (2002), “in 
contrast to those in high-risk settings, managers in settings with moderate 
risk should be able to share the uncertainty of performance outcomes with 
owners without bearing risk to such an extent that they are tempted to 
engage in risk reduction strategies prejudicial to shareholders [...]. Hence 
managerial risk reduction is not so critical an element in the design of 
incentive mechanisms in moderate risk firms as it is in high-risk firms. At 
the other end, risk sharing should be more meaningful in moderate-risk 
contexts than in low-risk contexts, since in moderate-risk settings there is 
sufficient variation in firm outcomes that CEOs stand to gain significant 
improvements in those results.” (p. 747). Financial performance measures 
transfer greater risk to agents than non-financial performance measures and 
they may be sufficient to motivate the actions that best align the interests of 
both agents and principals. Thus, a higher reliance on financial measures for 
incentive pay purposes may be appropriate under conditions of moderate 
risk.  
In summary, it has been argued that the level of business risk to which 
an organisation is exposed will affect the organisation’s agency problems. 
Under conditions of high and low risk, organisations will be better off by 
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increasing their reliance on non-financial performance measures to 
determine executives’ incentives. Under conditions of moderate risk 
organisations will be better off by mostly relying on financial performance 
measures to evaluate and reward their executives. Therefore, linking this 
reasoning to the relationship between the use of measurement diversity in 
executive incentives and firm performance, it is hypothesised that:  
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is moderated by business risk such that 
measurement diversity in executive incentive pay is positively associated with 
firm performance when business risk is high or low and negatively associated 
with firm performance when business risk is moderate. 
3.2.3.2. Ownership structure 
As will be argued here, the relationship between measurement 
diversity in executive incentive pay and firm performance may also be 
influenced by the firm’s ownership structure. According to agency theory, 
ownership structure can be used to determine the degree of management 
power or managerial discretion17 (i.e. top management latitude of action) 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995). It has been found that managerial 
discretion is positively associated to the use of diverse measurement in 
executive incentive systems (Schiehll, 2001). Therefore, by extension, it can 
                                                 
 
17 Managerial discretion and ownership structure tend to be used interchangeably in the 
agency literature (e.g. Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995) and they will be used as such in this 
study. 
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be argued that managerial discretion may also influence the relationship 
between measurement diversity and firm performance. The specific 
rationale underlying this statement is discussed as follows. 
Managerial discretion is associated with the degree of principal-
agent conflict of interest (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987). The higher the 
discretion of an agent the more conflict would exist between his or her 
interest (i.e. maximise earnings) and the principals’ interests (i.e. maximise 
profits) (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995). In the agency literature, most 
research on ownership structure adopts an approach that uses categorisation. 
Two extreme categories of ownership structure can be identified in large 
firms. These are manager-controlled firms and owner-controlled firms18. A 
manager-controlled firm has no single major owner. In this type of firm 
managerial discretion is considered to be high. Owners are supposed to 
exert little vigilance over managers and the owner-manager conflicts of 
interest are deemed to be notorious (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Hambrick 
                                                 
 
18 There is a third category of ownership structure named owner-managed firms. Owner-
managed firms have at least one member of the management team as a major shareholder. 
In this situation, managerial discretion is high, but the role of the principal and the agent are 
the same so the conflicts of interest between both parties may be absent. This category has 
been less used in the literature as it is harder to identify. The majority of research on 
ownership and managerial discretion focuses on the two extreme categories –owner-
controlled and manager-controlled– and this is why these two categories have been taken 
into consideration and owner-managed firms have been excluded from the argument. 
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and Finkelstein, 1995; Kroll, Simmons and Wright, 1990; Werner and Tosi, 
1995; Werner et al., 2005).  
In contrast, an owner-controlled firm has at least one major owner 
who is not a member of the management team. In this firm, managerial 
discretion is low and owners have more interest in controlling the 
management actions; thus, the conflicts of interest are supposed to be less 
problematic (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995; 
Kroll et al., 1990; Werner and Tosi, 1995; Werner et al., 2005).  
Manager-controlled firms, when compared with owner-controlled 
firms, are considered to be more risk averse (Palmer, 1973); they tend to 
replace non-performing executives less readily (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980); 
they engage in merger and acquisitions more frequently (Amihud and Lev, 
1981; Kroll et al., 1990); they tend to over-report earnings (Salamon and 
Smith, 1979); they tend to have higher levels of administrative complexity 
(Pondy, 1969); and they are more likely to take part in actions that may 
violate antitrust laws (Blair and Kaserman, 1983). Theorists have argued 
that, in those firms where owners have limited control over the management 
team, executives will tend to maximise their own welfare by establishing 
management systems that will reduce their risk and increase their prestige, 
personal pay or employment security. They will do so although their actions 
might not maximise the owners’ interests. On the other hand, in those firms 
where the owners have control over the management team, executives will 
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design management systems with the objectives of maximising the owners’ 
interests and pleasing the board of directors (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 
1995). 
Previous agency research has suggested that the degree of managerial 
discretion in a firm is likely to influence the selection of the financial 
performance measures that determine executive incentive pay (e.g. 
Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995). The majority of this research has focused 
on the relationship between managerial discretion and the choice of specific 
financial performance measures for evaluating and rewarding managerial 
performance. For example, Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987) found that manager-
controlled firms tend to rely on measures of organisational size such as sales 
or revenues for rewarding their executives, whilst owner-controlled firms 
tend to rely on profitability measures (e.g. Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987).  
Recent research has started to explore the impact of managerial 
discretion on the choice of both financial as well as non-financial 
performance measures. In his dissertation, Schiehll (2001) provides some 
evidence showing that greater managerial discretion may lead to greater 
emphasis on non-financial measures of performance in the CEO bonus plan. 
Ittner and Larcker (2003), based on anecdotal evidence, argue that “self-
serving managers are able to choose –and manipulate– [non-financial] 
measures solely for the purpose of making themselves look good and 
earning nice bonuses” (p. 89). The underlying mechanisms that may explain 
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these relationships may be found if the ultimate goal of the performance 
measures used for rewarding purposes is investigated.  
For instance, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) argue that in manager-
controlled firms the performance measures used for determining pay have 
the ultimate goal of maximising executive pay, subject to the demonstration 
of legitimacy of that pay. In owner-controlled firms the performance 
measures for determining pay have the ultimate goal of minimising 
executive pay, subject to economic returns. This is probably why studies 
such as those conducted by Kroll et al. (1990) or Wright, Kroll and Elenkov 
(2002) have found that in manager-controlled firms executive pay tends to 
be based on performance criteria that executives can easily control. 
However, in owner-controlled firms executive pay tends to be based on 
performance criteria that directly reflect the owner’s economic interest.  
Non-financial performance measures are expected to be more subject 
to manipulation as managers have more control over their computation. For 
example, Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) found that analysts and investors 
perceived the non-financial data reported by companies to be biased. In their 
words: “analysts fear that such information [i.e. non-financial] could be 
manipulated without sanction by outside auditors, that companies might 
report only good measures, and that the ways the measures are calculated 
could change over time, making historical comparisons impossible” (p. 20). 
This may suggest that manager-controlled firms will tend to rely more on 
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the use of non-financial performance measures for determining incentives 
than owner-controlled firms. These types of measures in manager-controlled 
firms will maximise executives’ pay above the level justified by the firm’s 
overall performance.  
Despite this driver to maximise their income, managers in manager-
controlled firms will also have the desire to increase business results as they 
share some ownership of the firm. Therefore, managers will make sure that 
the measures included in their performance measurement and reward 
systems meet two requirements; they maximise their income but they are 
also appropriate for improving firm performance. As a result, the 
relationship between reliance on non-financial performance measurement 
and firm performance will be stronger in firms that are manager-controlled 
than in firms that are owner-controlled. This hypothesis can be formally 
stated as: 
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is moderated by ownership structure 
such that measurement diversity in executive incentive pay is positively 
associated with firm performance when firms are manager-controlled and 
negatively associated with firm performance when firms are owner-
controlled. 
3.2.3.3. Organisational culture 
Another factor that is likely to affect the relationship between reliance 
on non-financial performance measurement and firm performance is 
organisational culture. Organisational culture is a variable that has received 
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a lot of attention in the management literature (see, for example, the reviews 
of Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Frost, Moore, Louis, Lundberg and Martin, 
1991). Researchers have found that organisational culture helps to explain 
differences in organisational performance (Denison and Mishra, 1989; 1995; 
Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Marcoulides and Heck, 1993; Sorensen, 2002). 
Researchers have also found that organisational culture can influence the 
design and perceived effectiveness of management control systems 
(Bhimani, 2003; Gittell, 2000). In particular, organisational culture has been 
shown to influence the degree of measurement diversity that organisations 
use for evaluating their performance (Henri, 2006; Kerr and Slocum, 1987). 
In short, if organisational culture is likely to affect firms’ performance and 
the degree of measurement diversity in management control systems, then it 
can be argued that it will also influence the relationship between 
measurement diversity and firm performance.  
The following discussion explains how the moderating effect of 
culture can be explained based on agency and contingency theory premises. 
For clarity purposes, the argument is structured as follows. Firstly, a 
definition of culture and issues surrounding its research is first introduced. 
Secondly, the approach typically used in the performance measurement 
literature for investigating culture is reviewed. Thirdly, the key premises 
that help to frame the rationale underpinning the relationship between 
measurement diversity, firm performance and culture are discussed. Finally, 
a hypothesis is formulated. 
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3.2.3.3.1. Organisational culture definition 
Organisational culture is a complex concept. A priori, there seems to 
be little consensus about the specific way in which organisational culture 
can be defined; the theoretical models that can be employed to explain it; or 
even the methodologies that can be used to observe it and measure it 
(Marcoulides and Heck, 1993). There seems to be some consensus, 
however, about a few aspects of organisational culture such as: (1) the 
notion that organisational culture reflects the pattern of shared values, 
beliefs and assumptions that organisations adopt in order to solve their 
problems; (2) the idea that organisational culture is an explanatory variable 
that helps to distinguish one organisation from another one; (3) the 
acknowledgement that any study of culture will not be free of limitation due 
to the complexity of this variable; and, after all, (4) the understanding that 
organisational culture research is crucial for the advancement of 
organisational sciences due its importance in the explanation of many 
organisational phenomena (Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Rousseau, 1990; 
Schein, 1990). Based on these aspects, and on the last two in particular, 
organisational culture researchers have devoted time and resources to 
overcome the theoretical and methodological limitations associated with the 
study of this variable.  
A classic way used for overcoming the theoretical and methodological 
limitations associated with the study of organisational culture has been to 
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focus on the different layers of organisation culture proposed by Schein’s 
(1990) research (Lenartowicz and Roth, 1999). Schein (1990) suggests that  
“culture manifests itself at three levels: the level of deep tacit assumptions 
that are the essence of the culture, the level of espoused values that often 
reflect what a group wishes ideally to be and the way it wants to present 
itself publicly, and the day-to-day behavior that represents a complex 
compromise among the espoused values, the deeper assumptions, and the 
immediate requirements of the situation. Overt behavior alone cannot be 
used to decipher culture because situational contingencies often make us 
behave in a manner that is inconsistent with our deeper values and 
assumptions. For this reason, one often sees ‘inconsistencies’ or ‘conflicts’ 
in overt behavior or between behavior and espoused values. To discover the 
basic elements of a culture, one must either observe behavior for a very long 
time or get directly at the underlying values and assumptions that drive the 
perceptions and thoughts of the group members” (p. 11). Other scholars 
have proposed a similar framework also based on three layers (e.g. Allaire 
and Firsirotu, 1984).  
3.2.3.3.2. The Competing Values framework 
Most of the management literature on the influence of culture on 
management control systems has looked at the second layer of culture: the 
level of espoused values (Harrison and Mckinnon, 1999). In particular, 
recent studies in this area such as Bhimani’s (2003) or Henri’s (2006) have 
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focused on organisational values and their impact on the design of 
performance measurement systems. In order to do so, they have used an 
organisational culture framework that has been praised for its clarity, 
validity and reliability (Garman, 2006) named: the Competing Values 
Model (Cameron and Quinn, 1999; 2005; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). 
This model has been extensively used in other areas of research such as 
leadership (Denison, Hooijberg and Quinn, 1995); information systems 
(Cooper and Quinn, 1993) or Total Quality Management (Prajogo and 
McDermott, 2005). This model is structured around two dimensions 
represented by two axes with each representing a superordinate continuum 
as shown in Figure 3-2.  
Figure 3-2 The Competing Values Framework (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 32) 
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The first dimension, located on the y-axes, refers to the level of 
flexibility or control that organisations demonstrate. In the words of 
Cameron and Quinn (1999), on the y-axes “the continuum ranges from 
organizational versatility and pliability on one end to organizational 
steadiness and durability on the other end” (p. 31). The second dimension, 
located on the x-axes, refers to the internal or external orientations 
organisations have. As Cameron and Quinn (1999) explain, on the x-axes 
“the continuum ranges from organizational cohesion and consonance on the 
one end to organizational separation and independence on the other” (p. 31). 
Based on these two dimensions, organisational culture is classified into four 
categories: clan, adhocracy, hierarchy, and market19 (Cameron and Quinn, 
1999; 2005; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983)20. A brief summary of the key 
values and characteristics that each of these organisational cultures 
encompasses are presented in Table 3-1.  
 
 
                                                 
 
19 It must be noted that these organisation culture’s typologies represent ideal types. In 
practice some combination of these four categories is expected to occur (Cameron and 
Quinn, 1999; 2005). 
20 Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1983) developed these categories based on the work of scholars 
such as Weber (1947), Williamson (1975) or Ouchi (1979; 1980). 
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Table 3-1 Organisational culture typologies 
Org. 
culture 
typology 
Brief description based on the Competing Values Framework 
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999)  
Market  Results are all that matters 
 Leaders are hard-driving producers and competitors, tough and 
demanding 
 There is a great orientation to goals and targets 
 Success is defined in terms of market share and penetration 
 The most important thing is to be market leaders.  
Adhocracy  Dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative workplaces 
 People are willing to take risks 
 Leaders are visionary, innovative and risk-oriented 
 Everyone is committed to experimentation and innovation as the 
emphasis is on developing new knowledge, products or services, the 
organisation long-term orientation is on growth. 
Hierarchy  Formal rules, procedures and policies hold the organisation together 
 Effective leaders are good coordinators and organisers 
 The long-term concerns of the organisation are stability, predictability 
and efficiency; and maintaining a smooth running organisation is 
important. 
Clan  People share a lot of themselves 
 Leaders behave as mentors and parent figures 
 Loyalty and tradition are paramount, employees are highly committed 
 People development, teamwork, participation and consensus are greatly 
valued 
 The focus is on the long-term. 
 
3.2.3.3.3. Agency theory and the Competing Values framework 
Before continuing with the discussion, it is important to clarify some 
key aspects of agency theory that are going to be used in order to advance 
the argument. In Chapter 2, agency-based research suggests that agency 
conflicts may be reduced, never eliminated, by employing certain control 
mechanisms such as performance-related rewards and performance 
measurement systems (Baiman, 1982; Eisenhardt, 1989; Indjejikian, 1999; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Several extensions to this model have been 
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proposed (Baiman, 1982; 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989). Feltham and Xie (1994)  
suggest that principals may be better off using a combination of financial 
and non-financial performance measures in incentive systems for aligning 
their interests to those of the agents. However, this premise might not be 
universal. Based on their cultural values, some organisations will be more 
open to the use of non-financial information about agents’ decisions and 
actions, whereas others will be more resistant to this idea.  
Building on the Competing Values Framework (Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh, 1983) and taking into consideration the agency theory premises, 
it can be suggested that the four types of organisational culture will reveal 
different degrees of agency conflict and, as a result of this, different control 
mechanisms. This assertion can be better explained by adding two further 
dimensions to the ones proposed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983). The first 
dimension will be the level of agency conflict found in each of the cultures 
(i.e. divergence between agents’ and principals’ interests) (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This dimension will be reflected in the x-axes 
of the Competing Values Framework as shown in Figure 3-2. The second 
dimension will be the degree of reliance on non-financial performance 
measurement; i.e. measurement diversity (Eisenhardt, 1989; Feltham and 
Xie, 1994; Hemmer, 1996; Holmstrom, 1979). This dimension will be 
reflected in the y-axes of the Competing Values Framework. The 
implications of these dimensions are now considered and they are 
summarised in Table 3-2.  
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Figure 3-3 Agency-based adaptation of the Competing Values Framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2 Agency theory and the Competing Values framework 
Org. 
culture 
typology 
Brief description using agency theory premises 
Market  High agency conflicts (key assumption agents and principals self-
interested) 
 Strong focus on incentive pay and performance evaluation 
 Greater reliance on financial performance measurement for 
evaluating and rewarding agents 
 Greater reliance on monetary rewards 
Adhocracy  High agency conflicts (key assumption agents and principals self-
interested) 
 High focus on incentive pay and performance evaluation for 
improvement purposes  
 Greater reliance on objective non-financial performance 
measurement for evaluating and rewarding agents 
 Greater reliance on non-monetary formal rewards  
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Org. 
culture 
typology 
Brief description using agency theory premises 
Hierarchy  Low agency conflicts (assumption agents and principals self-
actualising) 
 Low focus on incentive pay and performance evaluation for 
control purposes. The focus is on improvement 
 Greater reliance on financial performance measurement for 
evaluating and rewarding agents 
 Greater reliance on monetary rewards 
Clan  Low agency conflicts (assumption agents and principals self-
actualising) 
 Low focus on incentive pay and performance evaluation for 
control purposes. The focus is on improvement 
 Greater reliance on subjective non-financial performance 
measurement for evaluating and rewarding agents 
 Greater reliance on non-monetary informal rewards 
 
 Agency conflict and culture type 
According to the level of agency conflict, it can be argued that 
organisations whose main cultures are market or adhocracy cultures are 
likely to have large agency conflicts whereas organisations whose main 
cultures are clan or hierarchy cultures are likely to have small agency 
conflicts.  
Market cultures will match the description of “agency cultures” 
(Kulik, 2005, p. 349). Managers in this type of organisation are likely to 
behave as “corporate egoists” (Jones, Felps and Bigley, 2007, p. 144). In 
market cultures the central agency assumptions, those of self-interested 
agents and principals (Eisenhardt, 1989), and of risk-averse agents and risk-
neutral principals, are highly likely to be manifested. In this type of 
organisation, the agents’ main goal is to maximise their income and the 
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principals’ main goal is to maximise their profits (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, as suggested, the degree of agency conflict between 
agents and principals is likely to be high.  
Adhocracy cultures are also likely to have high degrees of agency 
conflict but for different reasons to the ones applicable to market cultures. In 
adhocracy organisations the assumption about the risk preference of agents 
may not be manifested. In this type of culture managers are willing to take 
risks (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). These organisations, however, 
subscribe to the “doctrine of enlightened self-interest” (Jones et al., 2007, p. 
147). Managers behave opportunistically but in a strategic way. Due to their 
risk orientation they will align their interests to those of stakeholders but 
only to the extent that it is personally advantageous to do so (Jones et al., 
2007). Consequently, agency conflicts will also occur in these organisations. 
Clan culture organisations will match the description of “stewardship 
cultures” (Kulik, 2005). In these cultures none of the agency main 
assumptions may be manifested. Agents and principals of clan cultures are 
self-actualising (i.e. they are rational individuals but they aim for the good 
of the organisation and not themselves) (Argyris, 1973) rather than self-
interested. Agents and principals in clan cultures have risk-taking 
preferences instead of risk-averse and risk-neutral preferences. Then, it can 
be argued that under these circumstances the expectation is that agency 
conflicts will be low, or, as some researchers have suggested, agency 
Chapter 3. Theory and hypotheses 
 103
conflicts may be absent (e.g. Davis and Schoorman, 1997; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991).  
Hierarchy cultures are also likely to have low levels of agency 
conflicts, but the causes of these reduced conflicts are different from the 
ones suggested in clan cultures. In hierarchy cultures the agency assumption 
of self-interested agents and principals does not hold, but the assumption 
about the risk preferences of agents and principals does. In hierarchy 
cultures, agents are concerned with the long-term survival of the 
organisation. They prefer stability and predictability so they will avoid 
decisions that may put at risk their status quo. They will be risk-averse. 
Principals will behave in a risk neutral way as they are able to diversify their 
risk across different organisations. Thus, differences in the risk preferences 
of both agents and principals will generate low but noticeable agency 
problems. 
 
 Measurement diversity and culture types 
Regarding the second dimension proposed, i.e. measurement diversity, 
it can be suggested that organisations whose main cultures are market and 
hierarchy are likely to have greater reliance on financial performance 
measurement in incentive systems. On the other hand, organisations whose 
main cultures are clan or adhocracy are likely to have greater reliance on 
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non-financial performance measurement in incentive systems. The rationale 
underpinning these statements is explored below.  
As suggested earlier, market cultures will be characterised for having 
large agency problems. In order to reduce these conflicts, principals will 
tend to use the control mechanisms proposed by classic agency models. In 
particular, those of great reliance on performance-related pay and outcome-
oriented monitoring (Indjejikian, 1999). In a US study of fourteen 
organisations, Kerr and Slocum’s (1987) study found six organisations that 
matched the description of market culture. These organisations were 
characterised by having (1) highly objective and quantifiable financial 
measures of performance that were strongly linked to employees’ rewards 
(the qualitative aspects of performance were not evaluated); (2) a great 
orientation to short-term results regardless of the methods used to attain 
them; and (3) a clear focus on subordinates’ outcome and not development 
(Kerr and Slocum, 1987). Based on this evidence, it can be proposed that 
organisations whose predominant values are market values will rely mainly 
on financial performance measures for evaluating and rewarding their 
executives. 
In hierarchy cultures, where agents are believed to be self-actualising 
and risk-averse, agency conflicts will be small. They will require managerial 
control mechanisms though, for addressing the risk preference differences 
between agents and principals. The focus of principals is on stability, 
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predictability and efficiency. Principals might also be interested in 
benchmarking and on fairness. Therefore, it is probable that the 
management systems they design will rely highly on the outcome measures 
of performance. Outcome performance measures, such as financial 
measures, are perceived to be more appropriate for benchmarking purposes 
(Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995). They are also perceived to be more objective 
and fair than non-financial measures (Ittner, Larcker and Meyer, 2003). As a 
result, it can be argued that hierarchy cultures will rely greatly on financial 
performance measures to evaluate and reward their executives. 
In clan cultures, as agents and principals are self-actualised and risk-
taking, they will share the same goals and values. These goals and values 
will be both financial (e.g. profits) as well as non-financial (e.g. good 
climate, consensus, job satisfaction), even though the non-financial ones 
will predominate. This will occur as the long-term survival and consensus of 
the organisation is paramount. Based on this lack of misalignment between 
agents’ and principals’ interests, agency control mechanisms might not even 
be required here. However, taking into consideration that incentive pay 
these days seems to be ubiquitous (Hall, 2004) and that it is difficult to find 
organisations which do not display any of the control mechanisms proposed 
by agency theory, it can then be suggested that if clan culture organisations 
have agency management control mechanisms, these systems will be used 
for improvement purposes rather than control, and they will rely highly on 
non-financial performance measures. 
Chapter 3. Theory and hypotheses 
 106
In adhocracy cultures, where agents have risk-taking preferences but 
are self-interested, agency management systems are likely to be used to 
reduce agency conflicts. The main role of these management systems, 
however, is likely to be performance improvement rather than performance 
control. This might be so because the main organisational goal is growth 
and innovation rather than financial results. Agents are willing to take risks. 
They will exert effort to meet the principal’s objectives but only to the 
extent that it is personally advantageous for them. Thus, principals will 
concentrate on developing agents’ skills and on enhancing the 
organisational capabilities. This will make agents feel personally recognised 
and at the same time well rewarded (not necessarily in economic terms). 
Thus, in this type of organisation the expectation is that their incentive 
systems will rely heavily on non-financial performance measures, which are 
better methods for assessing aspects such as innovation, creativity, etc.  
In summary, and going back to the focus of this study, it can be 
argued that organisational culture is likely to influence the impact of 
measurement diversity on firm performance. Market cultures and hierarchy 
cultures have different levels of agency conflicts but both are likely to rely 
on financial performance measures for evaluating and rewarding their 
executives. On the other hand, clan and adhocracy cultures are likely to rely 
on non-financial performance measures for evaluating and rewarding their 
executives. Taking into consideration contingency theory, this greater 
reliance on financial measures for market and hierarchy cultures, and on 
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non-financial measures for clan and adhocracy cultures, will be associated 
with higher firm performance. As a conclusion the following hypothesis is 
stated: 
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between measurement diversity in executive 
incentive pay and firm performance is moderated by organisational culture 
such that measurement diversity is positively associated with firm 
performance when organisational culture is perceived to be clan and 
adhocracy and negatively associated with firm performance when 
organisational culture is perceived to be market and hierarchy. 
3.3. Chapter summary 
In summary, this chapter proposes that measurement diversity has an 
impact on firm performance but that this impact is moderated by three 
external context variables –business risk, ownership structure and 
organisational culture–, and two internal context variables –performance 
measures quality and reward systems effectiveness. Figure 3-4 shows the 
specific relationships among these variables and Table 3-3 summarises the 
different hypotheses that have been proposed throughout the chapter. The 
next chapter explains how each of these variables has been operationalised 
in this study and what data collection and analysis methods have been used 
to test the hypotheses here presented.  
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Figure 3-4 Theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-3 Summary of hypotheses under investigation 
 Key variables Type of 
interaction  
Type of 
relationship  
H1  Measurement diversity and firm performance Main effect Linear (positive) 
H2  Measurement diversity, firm performance, and 
quality of performance measures 
Main effect and 
Moderator 
Linear (positive) 
H3  Measurement diversity, firm performance and 
reward effectiveness 
Main effect and 
Mediator 
Linear (positive) 
H4  Measurement diversity, firm performance and 
business risk 
Main effect and 
Moderator 
Curvilinear 
(positive/negative) 
H5  Measurement diversity, firm performance and 
ownership structure 
Main effect and 
Moderator 
Linear (positive) 
H6  Measurement diversity, firm performance and 
organisational culture 
Main effect and 
Moderator 
Linear (positive) 
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4. RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter describes the research methods used to empirically test 
the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3. The chapter is divided into 
three sections. Section 4.1 outlines the methods of data collection, in which 
the sources of data, the sample selection, and the survey development 
process are described and presented. Section 4.2 explains how the different 
variables under investigation are measured. Finally, section 4.3 specifies the 
methods of data analysis that are used in order to test the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 3. 
4.1. Methods of data collection 
In accordance with the research philosophy presented in Chapter 1, 
two methods of data collection have been used in this dissertation: survey 
research and archival research. Survey research was mainly used for 
collecting data on those variables for which information is unavailable or 
hardly accessible from public sources21. Archival research was used for 
                                                 
 
21 Based on the Directors’ remuneration report regulations published in 2002 (Queen's 
Printer of Acts of Parliament, 2002), public quoted firms now disclose information about 
the performance measures they use to determine Directors’ annual incentive pay. This 
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collecting data that tends to be publicly available in economic databases 
and/or firm’s annual reports. Archival research was also used for validating 
the information extracted from the survey research. The following sub-
sections describe in detail how survey data and archival data were collected. 
4.1.1. Survey research 
The survey research comprised three stages. The first stage consisted 
of developing the survey instrument that was used to collect data for the 
purpose of this research. The second stage comprised the choice of sampling 
criteria and the selection of the study sample frame. The third stage 
consisted of the distribution of the survey instrument to the firms included 
in the sample frame and the collection of the data from those companies. 
Each of these stages is described in turn. 
4.1.1.1. Survey development 
The survey design process was conducted according to the guidelines 
provided by Dillman (1999) and Fowler (1995a; 1995b). The literature was 
searched for existing scales whenever available and those that were not 
                                                                                                                            
 
information is not audited but appears in their Annual Reports. However, the purpose of 
this research was to focus on public quoted, public non-quoted and private companies. 
Since only information of public quoted firms is publicly disclosed, the use of a survey 
instrument to gather performance measurement information was required. 
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available were created based on the recommendations of DeVellis (2003). 
The survey was developed with the support of the consultancy firm Watson 
Wyatt Ltd. and Worldatwork (previously known as the American 
Compensation Association). Watson Wyatt’s support consisted of offering 
the financial resources needed for developing a glossy version and a web-
version of the survey instrument. In addition to this, Watson Wyatt also 
helped the researcher to find contact details of companies included in the 
research sample frame. Worldatwork support consisted of providing the 
researcher with access to those companies included in the sample frame that 
were Worldatwork members. 
A glossy paper version and a web-based version of the survey 
instrument were created between March and October of 2003. The survey 
took place from November 2003 to March 2004. A hard copy of the 
questionnaire was sent out by post to Human Resources and Finance 
Directors. An introductory letter explaining the purpose of the research and 
including a link to the web-based version of the questionnaire accompanied 
the questionnaire (a copy of this letter can be found in Appendix A). The 
Human Resources and Finance Directors were chosen as respondents for the 
survey as they were likely to be the most knowledgeable about the 
performance measurement and reward systems of their organisations.  
The design of the survey instrument included: (1) consultations with 
academics, Watson Wyatt consultants, and Worldatwork personnel; and (2) 
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a pilot study where the instrument was tested. Appendix B presents the list 
of people that reviewed and participated in the pilot survey. The researcher 
reviewed the instrument and the results of the pilot study taking into 
consideration the feedback received from both academics and practitioners. 
In total, twelve versions of the survey instrument were developed until a 
definitive version was agreed. A copy of the final version of the survey 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix C.  
The final version of the survey questionnaire comprised six sections. 
The first section looked at the performance measurement system used by the 
organisation to assess business performance. The second section included 
questions about the organisation’s reward and performance evaluation 
practices. The third section explored the organisation’s corporate culture. 
The fourth section examined the organisation’s business strategy. Finally, 
the fifth section focused on demographic information and on the perceived 
organisational performance. It must be noted that not all the questions of the 
survey instrument were devised to address the theoretical framework under 
investigation in this research. Some questions were included for descriptive 
purposes only and not for addressing the research hypotheses included in 
this dissertation.  
4.1.1.2. Sampling criteria and sample frame 
The study sample was selected according to the following criteria. The 
starting point was to focus on large companies in the UK. This type of 
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company was chosen because there is evidence suggesting that they are the 
most likely to use non-financial performance measures in addition to 
financial performance measures to assess business performance (e.g. 
Bullinger and Huber, 1990; Hoque and James, 2000). The researcher was 
particularly interested in including within the sample both private and public 
companies. This was because one of the key variables under study was 
ownership structure, and because most previous research in compensation 
and performance measurement had only been based on public quoted firms 
(e.g., Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Ittner et al., 
1997; Morissette, 1996; Schiehll, 2001).  
The FAME database, which includes not only publicly quoted 
companies’ information but also private companies’ information, was used 
to determine the study population, sample frame and final sample. A list of 
those companies meeting the DTI 2003 criteria for large companies (i.e. 
those with more than 250 employees and more than £22.8 million of 
turnover) was downloaded from FAME. A population of over 7000 
companies (after omitting those that were in a ‘dissolved’, ‘liquidation’ and 
‘receivership’ status) were retrieved from this database. Then, as 
recommended by Black (1999) for choosing the sample frame, a stratified 
random sample of 10% of the companies included in the population was 
selected. This selection was done based on industry classification. This 
option was chosen to ensure that all industry sectors were represented in 
proportion to their appearance in the population. Table 4-1 shows the 
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estimated population of UK large companies and the companies included in 
the sample frame classified by industry. 
Table 4-1 Industry based stratified random sample 
Industry sector1 Population2 
Count (%) 
Sample frame3 
Count (%) 
A,B,C: Agriculture, hunting and forestry; 
fishing; mining and quarrying 
143 (2.0%) 14 (2.0%) 
D: Manufacturing 2,241(31.0%) 218 (31.1%) 
E: Electricity, gas and water supply; 
construction 
589 (8.1%) 57 (8.1%) 
G: Wholesale and retail trade; hotels and 
restaurants 
1,572 (21.7%) 151(21.6%) 
I: Transport, storage and communication 563 (7.8%) 54 (7.7%) 
J: Financial intermediation; real estate, 
renting and business administration 
2,128 (29.4%) 206 (29.4%) 
Total 7,236 (100%) 700 (100%) 
1 UK Sector Industry Classification 
2 Data extracted from FAME (based on DTI 2003 large organisations criteria) 
3 Sample fractions randomly selected with SPSS (approximately 10% of the population) 
4.1.1.3. Questionnaire distribution and final sample 
A glossy paper copy of the survey instrument was sent out by post to 
the 700 companies included in the sample frame. After the questionnaire 
was sent out, follow ups were conducted by telephone, email and post. In 
total more than 250 hours were spent on the phone, three rounds of follow 
up letters were posted, and thousands of emails were sent out. Responses 
from 159 organisations were received (23 percent of the sample frame); but, 
unfortunately, only 132 organisations (19 percent or the sample frame) 
completed usable surveys (Appendix D shows the list of companies that 
participated in the research). Tables 4-2 summarises the composition of the 
final sample. The data extracted from the questionnaires received were 
inputted into a single file in SPSS. 
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Table 4-2 Final sample classification per industry sector 
Industry Count (%) 
A,B,C: Agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing; mining and 
quarrying 
5 (3.8%) 
D: Manufacturing 33 (25.0%) 
E: Electricity, gas and water supply; construction 11 (8.3%) 
G: Wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants 19 (14.4%) 
I: Transport, storage and communication 9 (6.8%) 
J: Financial intermediation; real estate, renting and business 
administration 
53 (40.2%) 
Unknown 2 (1.5%) 
Total 132 (100%) 
 
In order to assess potential sample biases, four different tests were 
performed (Fowler, 1995). Firstly, telephone conversations with a random 
sample of 20 HR Directors and 20 Finance Directors of non-respondent 
companies were conducted. It was found that lack of time or interest in the 
topic stopped companies from returning the questionnaire. Secondly, a 
comparison of the variances of the study final sample and the variances of 
the study sample frame was developed. The purpose of this test was to 
investigate the null hypothesis that the group of non-respondent companies 
(N=567) was not significantly different from the group of companies 
included in the final study sample (N=132). Results suggest that the null 
hypotheses of equality of means and variances cannot be rejected, taking 
into account the companies total turnover; however, it can be rejected taking 
into account the companies’ number of employees (at p < .10). These 
findings indicate that the study is biased towards organisations employing a 
large number of employees. Table 4-3 documents these results. 
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Table 4-3 Variances and means comparison between study sample and sample frame 
Selection 
criteria 
Sample group Mean Std. Dev. Levene’s test 
/F-test (Var) 
T-test 
(Means) 
Study sample 12,030 23,325 23.42*** 3.55*** Number 
employees 
03/04 Sample frame 5,436 17,111   
Study sample 3,134,562 3,588,587  1.85 1.27 Turnover 
03/04 
(ThGBP) Sample frame 873,297 5,922,881   
*** p<.001 
 
Thirdly, a non-respondent bias test was carried out by comparing the 
industry distribution of the final sample and the industry distribution of the 
sample frame. Table 4-4 shows this comparison.  
Table 4-4 Industry distribution comparison 
Industry sector* Sample frame 
(%) 
Final sample 
(%) 
Percentage 
difference 
A,B,C: Agriculture, hunting and forestry; 
fishing; mining and quarrying 
14 (2.0%) 5 (3.8%) 1.8% 
D: Manufacturing 218 (31.1%) 33 (25.0%) -6.1% 
E: Electricity, gas and water supply; 
construction 
57 (8.1%) 11 (8.3%) 0.2% 
G: Wholesale and retail trade; hotels and 
restaurants 
151(21.6%) 19 (14.4%) -7.2% 
I: Transport, storage and communication 54 (7.7%) 9 (6.8%) -0.9% 
J: Financial intermediation; real estate, 
renting and business administration 
206 (29.4%) 53 (40.2%) 10.8% 
Unknown  2 (1.5%) -1.5% 
Total 700 (100%) 132 (100%)  
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Finally, a non-respondent test comparing early versus late respondents 
(i.e. those who responded after the final follow-up phone call) was 
conducted with the metric survey variables used in the statistical analysis22 
(business goals achievement before it was converted into a dummy variable, 
quality of performance measures, and reward effectiveness). Results suggest 
that the null hypotheses of equality of means and variances cannot be 
rejected taking into account these variables (at p < .10) as shown in Table 4-
5. This finding indicates that there is no statistical difference between the 
survey responses of early and late respondents. 
Table 4-5 Variances and means comparison between early and late respondents 
Selection criteria Sample group Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Levene’s test 
/F-test (Var) 
T-test 
(Means) 
Late resp. 3.24 .71 .86 .818 Business goals achievement 
(BGOALS) Early resp. 3.10 .88   
Late resp. 4.06 .52 .45 1.09 Quality of performance measures 
(QPM) Early resp. 3.94 .54   
Late resp. 3.74 .50 1.71 .49 Reward effectiveness 
(RWEFF) Early resp. 3.68 .65   
 
The results of these tests show that the survey sample is biased 
towards organisations with large numbers of employees. This bias may be 
associated with the evidence provided by Hoque and James (2000) which 
                                                 
 
22 The exercise of comparing variance (Levene’s test) and means (t-test) can only be done 
with parametric data.  
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suggests that large organisations are more likely to rely on non-financial 
information for evaluating and rewarding their executives than medium and 
small organisations. Results also show that firms in the financial 
intermediation, real estate, renting and business administration industries 
have a greater representation in the study sample compared to firms 
operating in manufacturing and retail industries. 
4.1.2. Archival research 
Once the data from the survey were collected, then a matching 
exercise with the financial and contextual data included in the FAME 
database was conducted. The names of the companies that had completed 
the survey instrument were searched for through the FAME database and 
the data relating to their firm performance, ownership structure, industry, 
executive rewards and firm’s size were downloaded. These data were then 
added to the file containing the collected survey information on SPSS. 
In addition to this, Annual Reports from the year 2003-2004 were 
obtained from all the publicly quoted companies that had participated in the 
survey. The information included in the reports was compared to the data 
extracted from FAME. This exercise gave confidence to the researcher 
about the reliability of the FAME database. Furthermore, the Directors’ 
Remuneration Reports contained in the Annual Reports were explored. 
Their information on Directors’ annual incentives was contrasted with the 
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one provided by the companies in the survey instrument. It was found that 
the information provided in the survey about the type of financial 
performance measures used in executives’ incentive systems matched the 
data that companies included in their Directors’ Remuneration Reports. 
However, it was also found that most companies avoid disclosing the non-
financial information used for evaluating and rewarding their executives in 
their Directors’ Remuneration Reports. This finding verified the need for the 
survey research in order to gather this type information. 
4.2. Measurement of study variables 
This section describes in detail how each of the variables in this study 
has been measured. The main variables are firm performance as the 
dependent variable, and measurement diversity or reliance on non-financial 
performance measurement in executive incentive systems23 as the 
independent variable. Four variables are examined as moderators: quality of 
performance measures, business risk, ownership structure, and 
organisational culture. One variable is investigated as a mediator: reward 
effectiveness. Finally, two variables are taken into consideration as control 
                                                 
 
23 Measurement diversity and reliance on financial and non-financial performance measures 
in executive incentives are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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variables: organisational size and industry. The operationalisation of these 
variables is reviewed next. 
4.2.1. Dependent variable: Firm performance  
Firm performance was assessed using a variety of measures extracted 
from both the research survey and FAME. As suggested by Gomez-Mejia et 
al. (1987) and many other scholars (e.g. Weiner and Mahoney, 1981), using 
multiple indicators of firm performance is crucial because any single 
measure may not reflect the complex nature of this variable. Most research 
looking at the performance impact of measurement diversity has 
operationalised firm performance using at least two empirical indicators: (1) 
publicly available information on the firm’s accounting performance (e.g. 
return on assets, sales growth) and stock market performance (e.g. stock 
returns) (e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 1995; Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003; 
Said et al., 2003) and/or (2) a composite measure assessing managers’ 
perception of firm performance (e.g. Hoque and James, 2000).  
In order to facilitate the comparability of results with previous 
research and at the same time add new knowledge to the field, this research 
looks at firm performance using three different proxies. These are (1) the 
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extent to which firms achieve their business goals; (2) return on assets 
(fiscal year 2003/04); and (3) sales growth (fiscal years 2003/04 to 
2005/06)24. Each of these measures is now described in turn. 
Firstly, firm performance was operationalised in terms of the extent to 
which firms had achieved their overall business performance goals. In the 
survey, respondents were asked about their firm’s degree of achievement of 
its business goals (see Appendix C, question 40). A four-Likert scale going 
from ‘exceed its performance goals’ (coded as 4) to ‘significantly failed to 
meet its performance goals’ (coded as 1) was developed. Due to the 
skewness of the data, this measure was transformed into a dummy variable 
where ‘achievement of business goals’ was coded as 1 and ‘not achievement 
of business goals’ was coded as 0. This measure is denoted as BGOALS.  
Secondly, firm performance was assessed using the firms’ return on 
assets (ROA) data. ROA is a “measure of the success of a firm in using 
assets to generate earnings independent of the financing (debt versus equity) 
of those assets” (Selling and Stickney, 1989, p. 43).  ROA is a measure 
typically used in management research and in particular in the performance 
measurement and compensation literature (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 
                                                 
 
24 This research encompasses companies that are publicly quoted but also companies that 
are privately held. Thus, the research is unable to use stock market data as a measure of 
firm performance. 
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2003; Said et al., 2003; Werner and Tosi, 1995).  ROA is calculated as 
Equation (1) shows. In this study ROA data for the fiscal year 2003/04 were 
extracted from FAME.  
(1)  
alAssetsAverageTot
penseInterestExTaxRateNetIncomeROA ))(1( −+=  
Finally, firm performance was assessed using firms’ sales annual 
percentage growth in order to increase the comparability of the results as 
this measure was also used by previous researchers in the field of 
performance measurement (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003). This is a 
measure of how capable a firm is to increase its sales revenues over time. As 
recommended by Rockoff (2006), in this study sales growth was calculated 
as shown in Equation (2). Sales turnover data for years 2003/04 and 2005/06 
were extracted from FAME.  
(2)  %100*)
2
04/200306/2005( LnTurnoverLnTurnoverSALESG −=  
It must be noted that ROA and sales annual growth are expected to 
be associated with each other; whereas business goals achievement might 
not be associated with ROA and sales annual growth as it measures a 
different dimension of firm performance. It can be argued that the aim of 
business goals achievement is to capture the survey respondents’ perception 
of how well an organisation is doing as a whole. The aim of ROA and sales 
annual growth is to capture the organisation’s economic results. 
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4.2.2. Main independent variable: Measurement 
diversity in executive incentives 
In order to obtain data about the performance measures used to 
determine top executives’ annual incentives, a list of potential performance 
measures was included in the survey (see Appendix C, question 17). When 
completing the survey, respondents were asked to mark those measures that 
their organisations used for assessing business performance and for 
determining top executives’ annual incentives. Only the measures used for 
incentive purposes were used in this study25. The list of performance 
measures included in the survey was created based on (1) the work of Ittner 
et al. (1997), Schiehll (2001) and Morissette (1996); (2) a review of  the 
Director’s Remuneration Report of a sample of 25 public listed companies; 
and (3) the researcher’s own experience as a Compensation Consultant. 
Respondents could mark measures from the list and if required they could 
also write in additional measures.  
                                                 
 
25 This differs from previous approaches taken in the literature where authors have only 
considered if firms “used” non-financial performance measures, meaning “the existence of 
a measure in the performance measurement and evaluation system” (Van der Stede et al., 
2006, p. 192). However, practical and anecdotal evidence from the pilot study revealed that 
measures used for performance measurement and evaluation purposes might not be 
specifically used for reward purposes. This is the reason why a different approach to the 
one taken in previous research was used in this survey. 
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Consistent with the definition of financial and non-financial 
performance measures provided by Morissette (1996) and reviewed in 
Chapter 2, a table classifying the performance measures included in the 
survey was created (see Table 4-6). Morissette (1996) defines a financial 
measure as “(1) a piece of information expressed as a monetary unit, (2) a 
ratio resulting from mathematical manipulations of information expressed in 
monetary units (Ratio=Monetary metric/Monetary metric), or (3) a piece of 
information resulting from a ratio that includes a piece of information 
expressed in a monetary unit and a non-monetary unit (Ratio=Monetary 
metric/Non-Monetary metric)” (p. 13). According to this definition, 
measures such as profit, sales, cash flow, cost, return on assets and any other 
measure coming from a firm’s balance sheet or profit and loss accounts is 
considered to be financial information26.  
Morissette (1996) defines a non-financial measure as “any quantitative 
measure (1) expressed in a metric other than a monetary unit, or (2) that 
results from mathematical manipulations or ratios of pieces of information 
expressed in metrics other than monetary units (Ratio=Non-Monetary 
metric/Non-Monetary metric)”. Based on this definition, measures such as 
                                                 
 
26 Measures such as market share may cause classification problems. Market share tends to 
be calculated as total organisation sales divided by total market sales so, according to 
Morissette’s (1996) definition, it is considered to be a financial measure.  
Chapter 4. Research methods 
125 
customer satisfaction, productivity/yield, and safety are considered non-
financial information (p. 14).  
Table 4-6 Classification of financial and non-financial performance measures 
FINANCIAL MEASURES NON-FINANCIAL MEASURES 
Cash flow ratio 
Earnings per share (EPS) 
EBITDA 
EVA© 
Gross margin 
Net operating income 
Return on assets 
Return on equity 
Revenues 
Year-over-year growth 
TSR 
Cost (quality, maintenance) 
Profit 
R&D spend 
Market share 
Advertising spend vs. sales 
 
Other financial measures  
Capacity to innovate 
Defects rates 
Idea generation rate 
New product development 
Productivity/yield 
Service quality audit 
Competitors measures 
Customer loyalty 
Customer retention 
Customer satisfaction 
Personal scorecard 
Employee satisfaction 
Employee turnover 
Leadership 
Workforce capabilities 
Safety incidents 
Core competencies and skills 
Other non-financial performance measures  
 
Based on this classification of performance measures, the 
measurement diversity variable was operationalised as a dummy variable 
with codes 1 and 0 (e.g. Ittner et al., 1997). Code 1 was given to those 
companies which had financial as well as non-financial corporate 
performance measures in their executives’ incentive system. Code 0 was 
given to those companies that only had financial corporate measures in their 
executives’ incentive system.  
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4.2.3. Independent moderating variables: 
Quality of performance measures, 
business risk, ownership structure and 
organisational culture 
4.2.3.1. Quality of performance measures  
Perceptions about the quality of the performance measures used to 
determine executives’ annual incentives were sampled with ten items. These 
items were designed by the researcher as no appropriate scale was found in 
the literature. In particular, the items were created based on previous 
performance measurement research (Busby and Williamson, 2000; Dixon et 
al, 1990; Franco-Santos and Bourne, 2005; Neely, Gregory, M.J. and Platts, 
1995; Neely, Mills, Platts, Gregory, and Richards, 1996) and agency based 
research (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995; Banker and Datar, 1989; 
Demski and Feltham, 1978; Indjejikian, 1999; Holmstrom, 1979) (see 
Appendix C, question 20). These items were evaluated using a five-point 
Likert scale going from ‘strongly agree’ (coded as 5) to ‘strongly disagree’ 
(coded as 1) (the option of ‘don’t know’ was also included). The 
comprehensiveness and understandability of these items was assessed 
during the pilot study. Once the data from the survey were collected, a 
principal component analysis (varimax rotation) and a reliability analysis 
were conducted. Table 4-7 shows the results of these analyses. 
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Table 4-7 Performance measures quality: results of factor and reliability analysis 
 F1 F2 F3 
Quality of performance measures:    
q20a - TEs have control over measures .610     
q20b - TEs’ measures are few in number       
q20c - TEs’ measures reflect strategic goals .710     
q20d - TEs’ measures reflect BU's goals .763     
q20e - TEs’ measures reflect individual goals   -.600   
q20f - TEs’ measures are easy to understand .754     
q20g - TEs’ measures are easy to set .653     
q20h - TEs’ measures are easy to manipulate     .853 
q20i - TEs’ measures are outcome oriented .515     
q20j - TEs’ measures are objective .589 .534   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin = .76    
Eigenvalues 3.29 1.39 1.09 
Cronbach’s alpha .79 - - 
 Note: Factor loadings less than .5 have not been included in the table.  
 
Based on the outputs of these analyses, items q20b, q20e, and q20h 
were excluded27. Only one factor comprising items q20a, q20c, q20d, q20f, 
q20g, q20i, q20j had an eigenvalue greater than 1. Its Cronbach’s alpha28 
was .79, which is considered to be valid (Nunnelly, 1978). Thus, the average 
of the value of those items was calculated and the result was considered to 
be the final measure of the quality of performance measures. This measure 
was denoted as QPM. 
                                                 
 
27 Due to the size of the final sample (N=132), factor loadings above .5 are considered to be 
good provided that the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure is between .7 and .8 (Field, 
2005; Kaiser, 1974; MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang and Hong, 1999). 
28 Values above .70 are acceptable values for Cronbach’s alpha. Values substantially lower 
indicate an unreliable scale (Nunnally, 1978). 
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4.2.3.2. Business risk 
In the last two decades, agency research has paid close attention to 
business risk as a variable influencing agency predictions (Miller and 
Bromiley, 1990). Most researchers have defined risk as the volatility in an 
organisation’s performance and measured it in two ways: as variation in a 
firm’s income stream (i.e. return on assets), and as variability in a firm’s 
stock market return (e.g. Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Gray and Cannella, 
1997; Miller et al., 2002). This research only focuses on the volatility of a 
firm’s income stream as most of the companies in the study sample are 
private companies or non-quoted public companies. Only a few are public 
quoted companies. Firm’s income variability was measured as the standard 
deviation of firms’ Return on Assets (ROA). For calculating this indicator 
ROA data from fiscal years 1999/00 to 2003/04 were downloaded from 
FAME data. The final measure of business risk was denoted as RISK.  
4.2.3.3. Ownership structure 
Similar to compensation studies conducted by Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1995), Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989), and Werner et al (2005), 
ownership structure [OWN] is a dummy variable that classifies firms as 
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manager-controlled and owner-controlled29. Manager-controlled (MC) firms 
are those in which no individual or institution other than an employee 
benefit plan owns five percent or more of the firm’s outstanding stock. 
Owner-controlled (OC) firms are those in which at least five percent of the 
firm’s outstanding stock belongs to an individual or institution that is not 
involved in the management of the company and it is not an employee 
benefit plan.  
In the United States a five percent cut-off point of the firm’s 
outstanding stock is normally used as a proxy for ownership structure based 
on research developed by Hunt (1986). This measure is a common measure 
in compensation research (O'Reilly, Main and Crystal, 1988; Tosi and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Werner et al., 2005) and for this reason, it was selected 
as a proxy for ownership structure in this study. However, the FAME 
database only reports ownership data with a cut-off point of 25 percent 
because in the UK this cut-off point is more common than the 5 percent cut-
                                                 
 
29 Some researchers have argued that ownership structure should be measured in continuous 
terms (Cubbin and Leech, 1983). However, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) examined the 
moderating effects of ownership structure on CEO pay, adopting both a categorical and a 
continuous approach to ownership structure. They found that “the categorical measure 
appeared to be actually a stronger moderator than the continuous measure, despite the fact 
that the categorical measure discards a great deal of variance” (1995: 188). This finding led 
them to conclude that the categorical approach to ownership control was valuable at least 
for issues related to executive pay. 
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off point. As a result, due to data constraints the 25 percent cut-off point had 
to be used instead of the 5 percent cut-off point. 
FAME provides an indicator that represents the degree of 
independence of a company with regard to its shareholders. It is called the 
BvDEP Independence Indicator. Each of the companies of the sample for 
which financial data were found in FAME had a BvDEP indicator. This 
indicator has four categories. Companies are assigned an “A” BvDEP 
indicator when none of their known recorded shareholders has more than 25 
percent of direct or total ownership. Companies are assigned a “B” BvDEP 
indicator when one or more of their known recorded shareholders have an 
ownership percentage greater than 25 percent. Companies are assigned a 
“C” BvDEP indicator when one of their shareholders has a total or a 
calculated total ownership over 50 percent. Companies are assigned a “D” 
BvDEP indicator when one of their shareholders has a direct ownership of 
over 50 percent.  
Taking into account that the focus of this research is to differentiate 
between manager-controlled and owner-controlled companies, the BvDEP 
indicator was transformed into a dummy variable with codings 1 and 0. 
Code 1 represented companies with an “A” BvDEP indicator (MC). Code 0 
represented companies with “B”, “C” or “D” BvDEP indicators (OC). This 
transformed variable was denoted as OWN. 
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4.2.3.4. Organisational culture 
This variable was operationalised in terms of the extent to which the 
firm’s culture was considered to be a clan culture, an adhocracy culture, a 
hierarchy culture, or a market culture (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Table 4-
8 provides the definitions of each culture typology.  
Table 4-8 Organisational culture typologies (Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 58) 
Typology Description 
Clan culture A very friendly place to work where people share a lot of themselves. It 
is like an extended family. The leaders are considered to be mentors and 
parent figures. The organisation is held together by loyalty or tradition. 
Commitment is high. The organisation emphasises the long-term benefit 
of human resources development and attaches great importance to 
cohesion and morale. Success is defined in terms of sensitivity to 
customers and concern for people. The organisation places a premium on 
team work, participation, and consensus. 
Adhocracy culture A dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative place to work. People stick 
their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered innovators and 
risk takers. The ‘glue’ that holds the organisation together is 
commitment to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on 
being at the leading edge. The organisation’s long-term emphasis is on 
growth and acquiring new resources. Success means gaining unique and 
new products or services. Being a product or service leader is important. 
The organisation encourages individual initiative and freedom. 
Hierarchy culture A very formalised and structured place to work. Procedures govern what 
people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and 
organisers who are efficiency-minded. Maintaining a smooth-running 
organisation is most critical. Formal rules and policies hold the 
organisation together. The long-term concern is on stability and 
performance with efficient, smooth operations. Success is defined in 
terms of dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low cost. The 
management of employees is concerned with secure employment and 
predictability. 
Market culture A results-oriented organisation whose major concern is getting the job 
done. People are competitive and goal-oriented. The leaders are hard 
drivers, producers, and competitors. They are tough and demanding. The 
glue that holds the organisation together is an emphasis on winning. 
Reputation and success are common concerns. The long-term focus is on 
competitive actions and achievement of measurable goals and targets. 
Success is defined in terms of market share and penetration. Competitive 
pricing and market leadership are important. The organisation style is 
hard-driving competitiveness. 
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Six dimensions were used for identifying the different culture 
typologies (see Appendix C, questions 27 to 32): The first dimension 
referred to the dominant characteristic of the organisation (i.e. people-
oriented, dynamic and entrepreneurial, results-oriented, or control and 
structure-oriented); the second dimension referred to the organisation’s 
management style; the third dimension referred to the leadership style or 
approach; the fourth dimension referred to the organisational ‘glue’ or 
bonding mechanism that holds the organisation together; the fifth dimension 
referred to the organisation’s strategic focus; finally, the sixth dimension 
referred to the criteria of success that the organisation uses to define what 
gets measured, rewarded and celebrated.  
The six culture dimensions were taken from the Organisational 
Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) developed by Cameron and Quinn 
(1999; 2005) and included in the research survey. Taking into account the 
different culture survey instruments that exist in the literature (e.g. Hofstede, 
Neuijen, Ohayv and Sanders, 1990; Kotter and Heskett, 1992), the OCAI 
was chosen due to its simplicity, clarity, validity and reliability30 (Garman, 
                                                 
 
30 Cronbach’s alpha coefficients found in previous studies were: (1) .74 for the clan culture, 
.79 for the adhocracy culture, .73 for the hierarchy culture, and .71 for the market culture in 
a study conducted by Quinn and Spreitzer (1991) with 796 executives from 86 public 
utilities firms. (2) .79 for the clan culture, .79 for the adhocracy culture, .80 for the 
hierarchy culture, and .77 for the market culture in a study developed by Yeung, Brockbank 
and Ulrich (1991) with 10,300 executives in 1064 businesses; (3) .82 for the clan culture, 
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2006). Each culture dimension was assessed using a survey question with a 
5-point Lickert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ (coded as 5) to ‘strongly 
disagree’ (coded as 1) (the option of ‘don’t know’ was also included) (see 
Appendix, questions 27 to 32). The six culture questions had four items 
each. These items related to the four culture typologies: Item (a) of each 
culture question described aspects of a clan culture type; item (b) of each 
culture question described aspects of an adhocracy culture type; item (c) of 
each culture question described aspects of a market culture type; and item 
(d) of each culture question described aspects of a hierarchy culture type.  
In order to verify the internal validity and reliability of the scales, a 
principal component analysis (varimax rotation method) and a reliability 
analysis were developed with the survey data. Table 4-9 shows the results of 
these analyses, which are similar to the ones obtained in previous studies. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
.83 for the adhocracy culture, .67 for the hierarchy culture, and .78 for the market culture in 
a study conducted by Zammuto and Krakower (1991) with more than 1300 respondents in 
higher education institutions (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). 
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Table 4-9 Organisational culture: results of factor and reliability analysis  
  
F1 
Market 
F2 
Clan 
F3 
Adhocracy 
F4 
Hierarchy 
Organisational culture characteristics     
q27a - People oriented…   .685     
q27b - Dynamic and entrepreneurial…     .696   
q27c - Results oriented .806       
q27d - Control and structure oriented       .742 
Management style     
q28a - Teamwork, consensus…   .761     
q28b - Individual risk-taking…     .688   
q28c - Hard-driving… .820       
q28d - Security of employment…     .519 
Leadership     
q29a - Mentoring, facilitating…   .667     
q29b - Entrepreneurship, innovating…     .752   
q29c - An aggressive, results-oriented… .695     
q29d - Coordinating, organising…       .584 
Company “glue”     
q30a - Loyalty and mutual trust…   .776     
q30b - Commitment to innovation…     .774   
q30c - Emphasis on achievement… .806       
q30d - Formal rules and policies…       .823 
Company emphasis     
q31a - Human development…   .805     
q31b - Acquiring new resources…     .593   
q31c - Competitive actions… .803       
q31d - Permanence and stability…       .747 
Success definition     
q32a - Employee commitment…   .764     
q32b - Having the unique products…     .666   
q32c - Winning in the market place… .603       
q32d - Efficiency…       .662 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin = .83     
Eigenvalues 5.13 4.87 2.63 1.66 
Cronbach’s alpha .82 .85 .88 .76 
Note: Factor loadings less than .5 have not been included in the table. 
 
Based on the above results, the measurement of the four culture types 
was developed as follows: The clan culture (denoted as CLAN) was 
measured using the average of all the values of the (a) items included in the 
six culture dimensions; the adhocracy culture (denoted as ADHOC) was 
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measured using the average of all the values of the (b) items included in the 
six culture dimensions; the market culture (denoted as MARKET) was 
measured using the average of all the values of the (c) items included in the 
six culture dimensions; and the hierarchy culture (denoted as HIER) was 
measured using the average of all the values of the (d) items included in the 
six culture dimensions.  
Next, in order to obtain just one value –rather than four– for the 
corporate culture measure, an approach described by Henri (2006) in his 
work on the impact of culture on performance measurement systems was 
used. This approach focuses on the two key perspectives suggested by 
Cameron and Quinn (1999) as critical for differentiating between the four 
organisational cultures’ typologies. These are control and flexibility as 
reviewed in Chapter 3. According to this approach, the value of clan culture 
(CLAN) was added to the value of adhocracy culture (ADHOC). The 
resulting value represents the extent to which the firm emphasises flexibility 
rather than control and was denoted as FLEX. Then, the value of market 
culture (MARKET) was added to the value of hierarchy culture (HIER). 
The resulting value represents the extent to which the firm emphasises 
control rather than flexibility and it was denoted as CONTROL. Finally, the 
value of CONTROL was subtracted from the value of FLEX. The resulting 
value was denoted as CULTdom as it indicates the emphasis the firm makes 
on flexibility (values closer to -10), control (values closer to 10) or both at 
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the same level (zero values). These operations are shown in Equations (3), 
(4), and (5). 
(3) FLEX = ADHOCRACY + CLAN 
(4) CONTROL = MARKET + HIERARCHY 
(5) CULTdom = FLEX - CONTROL 
4.2.4. Independent mediating variable: Reward 
effectiveness 
Reward effectiveness was operationalised in terms of the extent to 
which reward systems contribute to the achievement of organisational goals. 
In order to allow comparability of the results of the study with previous 
research, six items previously developed and tested by Balkin and Gomez-
Mejia (1987; 1990) were used to measure reward effectiveness (see 
Appendix C, question 21). These items were assessed using a five-point 
Likert scale going from ‘strongly agree’ (coded as 5) to ‘strongly disagree’ 
(coded as 1) (the option of ‘don’t know’ was also included). A principal 
component analysis (varimax rotation) and reliability analysis was run with 
the collected survey data. Table 4-10 presents the results. Only one factor 
had an Eigenvalue greater than 1 and the Cronbach’s alpha found for the 
items comprised in it was .89. Reward effectiveness was then calculated by 
averaging the values of q21a, q21b, q21c, q21d, q21e, and q21f. This 
measure was named RW_EFF in the research data analysis. 
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Table 4-10 Reward effectiveness: results of factor and reliability analysis 
 F1 
Reward system effectiveness:  
q21a - Overall effectiveness of TEs’ rewards .874 
q21b - Rewards contribute to retention and attraction of TEs .822 
q21c - TEs happy with how rewards contribute to achievement of goals .858 
q21d - TEs understand their reward practices .724 
q21e - TEs accept their reward practices .788 
q21f - TEs are motivated by their reward practices .846 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin = .87  
Eigenvalues 4.03 
Cronbach’s alpha .89 
  Note: Top executive (TE) 
4.2.5. Control variables: Organisational size and 
industry 
4.2.5.1. Firm’s size 
In performance measurement research, organisational size tends to be 
calculated as the logarithm of firm’s assets (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 
2003) or the logarithm of firms’ sales revenues (e.g. Bushman et al., 1996; 
Gupta, 1987). In the compensation literature, it is common to find 
organisational size measured as a composite of organisational total assets, 
turnover and number of employees (e.g. Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Werner 
and Tosi, 1995; Werner et al., 2005).  
Data for the fiscal year of 2003/04 were extracted from FAME. In 
order to increase the comparability of the results of this study, the three key 
indicators of organisational size were measured and their logarithms were 
calculated, given the extreme variability found in them. The logarithms of 
the three indicators were factor analysed and one factor resulted from this 
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analysis with an Eigenvalue greater than 1. A composite measure of the 
logarithms of total assets, number of employees and turnover was then 
created (see Table 4-11). A reliability analysis was run and a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .95 was obtained31. No specific prediction, however, is suggested 
about the effects of firm size as this variable was used mainly to preserve 
comparability with related work in the literature.  
Table 4-11 Organisational size: results of factor and reliability analysis 
 F1 Org. Size 
LogASSETS03 .950 
LogTURN03 .967 
LogEMP03 .957 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin = .76  
Eigenvalues 2.75 
Cronbach’s alpha .95 
4.2.5.2. Industry 
The information used to compute the industry measures was 
downloaded from FAME (UK SIC codes). Six industry dummy variables 
were created, one per each of the sectors typically used in EUROSTAT’s 
studies: (1) Agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying; 
(2) manufacturing; (3) Electricity, gas and water supply, construction; (4) 
wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; (5) transport, storage and 
                                                 
 
31 A scale of number of employees was also included in the survey (see Appendix C, q37). 
However, this scale was only used to contrast the reliability of the FAME’s data. Data from 
FAME were found to be reliable when compared against the survey data. 
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communication; and (6) Financial intermediation; real estate, renting and 
business administration. Compared to the UK SIC sector classification, the 
classification used by EUROSTAT’s studies is more concise, which was a 
critical criterion for this research due to its sample size. Appendix E shows 
the companies that have participated in the research organised according to 
their industries using both the UK SIC and the EUROSTAT SIC.  
Previous research has found that regulated (e.g. Bushman et al., 1996; 
Ittner and Larcker, 1995) and financial industries (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and 
Randall, 2003) may be more likely to use measurement diversity in their 
executive pay packages with beneficial performance results. Thus, it is 
expected that the relationship between the use of financial and non-financial 
performance measures in executives’ incentive pay and firm performance is 
positive when organisations operate in financial or utility industries. No 
specific prediction is made about the effect of other industries on the 
performance impact of measurement diversity. 
4.3. Methods of data analysis 
Due to the focus of this study and based on previous research 
conducted in the same area, the hypotheses suggested in Chapter 3 are tested 
using multivariate data analysis, specifically multiple regression analysis 
with interaction effects. The software used for conducting the quantitative 
analyses was SPSS version 14. Before the regression analyses were 
Chapter 4. Research methods 
140 
performed the data extracted from the survey and from the FAME database 
were cleaned and outliers analysed32. In total, mainly due to missing values, 
the sample was reduced from 159 companies to 132 as discussed in Section 
4.1.1.3. Once the data were cleaned and the statistical assumptions33 for 
conducting multivariate analysis were tested, the regression equations were 
computed. The following subsections explain the equations that were used 
in order to test the research hypotheses.  
4.3.1. Main effect 
Hypothesis 1, shown in Chapter 3, describes the expected main effect 
between a predictor variable (measurement diversity) and a dependent 
variable (firm performance). This hypothesis is tested using Equation (1), 
where Y represents the dependent variable, which in this research is 
measured with three different proxy variables (business goals achievement, 
return on assets, and sales growth), X1 and X2 represent two control 
                                                 
 
32 As suggested by Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatham (2005) and Field (2005), 
outliers were identified and studied with SPSS using boxplots and z-scores. Outliers were 
only deleted if they were thought to be truly aberrant, not representative of the population 
or with an absolute z-score greater than 3.00; otherwise they were retained. 
33 The four statistical assumptions required for conducting regression analysis –these are 
normality, homoscedasticity, linearity and absence of correlated errors (Hair et al., 2005) – 
were tested before any of the regression analysis was conducted. When required, data was 
transformed in order to achieve the necessary requirements. Due to the length of these 
analyses the full results are not reported in this thesis. However, they can be provided upon 
request.  
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variables, which in this research are firm size and industry, and X3 
represents the main predictor variable, which in this research is the use of 
measurement diversity in executives’ annual incentive systems. Hypothesis 
1 will be supported if β3 is positive and statistically significant. 
(1) Y= β0 + β1 X1+ β2 X2+ β3 X3+ε 
4.3.2. Interaction effects 
According to Schoonhoven “when contingency theorists assert that 
there is a relationship between two variables […] which predicts a third 
variable […] they are stating that an interaction exists between the first two 
variables” (Schoonhoven, 1981, p. 351). Based on this definition, 
Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 focus on interaction effects between 
measurement diversity and the quality of performance measures (H2); 
measurement diversity and reward system effectiveness (H3); measurement 
diversity and business risk (H4); measurement diversity and ownership 
structure (H5); and measurement diversity and organisational culture (H6). 
These effects are conceptually different. The interaction effect in 
Hypotheses 2, 4, 5 and 6 involves a moderation effect whereas the 
interaction effect in Hypothesis 3 involves a mediation effect. The methods 
used to test these two interaction effects are now described in turn.  
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4.3.2.1. Testing moderation effects 
When the impact that a predictor variable has on a dependent variable 
is subject to the level of a third variable –termed as a moderator–, a 2-way 
moderation effect is said to exist. In this case, the “fit” between the 
moderator variable and the predictor variable is the primary determinant of 
the dependent variable (Venkatraman, 1989). If the interaction effect is 
considered to be linear then this “fit” can be mathematically expressed as 
Equation (2) shows, where two control variables have been included 
(Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken, 2003; Hartmann and Moers, 1999; Jaccard 
and Turrisi, 2003; Venkatraman, 1989). In Equation (2), Y is the dependent 
variable, X1 and X2 are the two control variables, X3 is the main predictor 
variable, X4 is the moderator variable, and X3X4 is the interaction term.  
(2) Y= β0 + β1X1 + β2 X2+ β3 X3+ β4 X4 + β5 X3X4 +ε 
The moderation effect is supported when β5 is statistically significant. 
This beta coefficient indicates by how many units the slope of Y on X is 
predicted to change given a one-unit change in the moderator variable X4 
(keeping the control variables constant). β3 is a simple effect and reflects the 
impact of X3  on Y when the rest of the variables are 0.  
If the interaction effect is considered to be non-linear (curvilinear) this 
is mathematically expressed as Equation (3) shows (Cohen et al., 2003; 
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Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). Moderation effects are tested when β7 is 
statistically significant.  
(3) Y= β0 + β1X1 + β2 X2+β3 X3+ β4 X4 + β5 X42 + β6 X3X4 + β7 X3X42 + ε 
When interaction terms are used in regression equations some 
researchers are concerned with multicollinearity issues. In order to reduce 
this issue Cohen et al. (2003) and Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) suggest 
centring predictor variables but only when the predictor variable does not 
have a natural 0 value. Based on this suggestion the values of the quality of 
performance measures variable (QPM) were centered as this was the only 
variable in the research that did not have a natural 0 value in its range. 
Once the statistical significance of the interaction term is analysed, 
Cohen et al. (2003) and Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) recommend graphically 
representing the effect of the predictor variable on the dependent variable at 
different values of the moderator variable (e.g. its mean, its mean plus 1 
standard deviation, and its mean minus 1 standard deviation). This is 
mathematically represented in Equation (4) and the plot of this function is 
shown in Figure 4-1.  
(4) Y= (β3 + β5 X4 ) X3 
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Figure 4-1 The effect of the predictor variable (X3) on the dependent variable (Y) at three 
different levels of the moderator variable (X4) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 helps the interpretation of results as it indicates how the 
slope of Y on X3 changes at different values of X4. However, as stated by 
Schoonhoven (1981), there is another way of representing the joint effect of 
the main and interaction terms by rewriting Equation (4) as its partial 
derivative (shown in Equation 5). This way is more reliable and easier to 
interpret as it represents the relationship between the predictor and the 
dependent variable over the range of values of the moderator variable. If the 
joint effect of the main and interaction terms is non-monotonic, the 
representation suggested by Schoonhoven also indicates the point of 
inflection of this joint effect as Figure 4-2 shows. This point of inflection 
can be calculated with Equation (6), which can be rewritten as Equation (7). 
(5) ∂Y/∂ X3= β3 + β5 X4  
(6) ∂Y/∂ X3= β3 + β5 X4 =0 
(7) X4= - β3/β5  
Y
X3
X4= X4 MEAN
X4= X4 MEAN+1SD
X4= X4 MEAN-1SD
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Figure 4-2  The effect of the predictor variable (X3) on the dependent variable (Y) over the 
range of values of the moderator (X4) 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2.2. Testing mediation effects 
A mediation effect is said to exist when there is “a significant 
intervening mechanism […] between an antecedent variable […] and the 
consequent variable […]. Thus while moderation specifies varying effects 
of an independent variable on a dependent variable as a function of the 
moderating variable, [mediation] specifies the existence of intervening 
(indirect) effects between an antecedent variable and its consequent 
variable” (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 429). A mediation effect can be tested by 
performing the two different regressions models. These models are shown in 
Equations (8) and (9) where two control variables have also been included. 
In these Equations Y is the dependent variable, X1 and X2 are the two 
control variables, X3 is the main predictor variable, and X4 is the mediator 
variable.  
 (8) Y= β0 + β1X1 + β2 X2+ β3 X3+ β4 X4 +ε 
∂Y/ ∂X3
X4
(-)
(+)
0
Low High
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(9) X4= α0 + α1X3 +ε 
If the β3 coefficient is not statistically significant and the β4 and α1 
coefficients are statistically significant, this indicates that the presence of a 
mediator variable (X4) is necessary for the transmission of effects of X3 on 
Y and this is termed as a “complete mediational model” (Venkatraman, 
1989, p. 430). If the β3 coefficient is statistically significant and the β4 and α1 
coefficients are also statistically significant, this indicates that a direct effect 
exists between Y and X3, and an indirect effect between X3 and Y through 
X4 also exists, which implies a “partial mediational model” (Venkatraman, 
1989, p. 430). 
4.4. Chapter summary 
This chapter has described how the research has been conducted, how 
each of the study variables has been operationalised and how the research 
data has been analysed. In summary, the research is based on survey and 
archival data. A sample frame of 700 firms located in the UK was surveyed. 
A total of 159 firms completed the research questionnaire and the financial 
and contextual data (e.g. ROA, Turnover, UK SIC code, Ownership 
structure, etc.) of those firms were downloaded from the database FAME. 
However, due to missing data the final sample had to be reduced to 132 
firms.  
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The different variables used in this research are summarised in Table 
4-12. This table also shows how they have been denoted in the statistical 
analysis, the type of measures they are (metric or non-metric/dummy), and a 
brief description of how these variables have been operationalised. 
Table 4-12 Summary of the measurement of study variables 
Variable name Denoted 
as… 
Type Operationalisation Key references 
Dependent variables:     
 Firm’s performance      
 Business goals 
achievement 
BGOAL Metric/
dummy
Based on q40 (code 1: 
business goals 
achieved, code 0: 
business goals not 
achieved) 
Developed by the 
researcher 
 Return on assets ROA Metric ROA (2003/04) Ittner et al.. (2003); 
Said et al. (2003) 
 Sales growth SALESG Metric Turnover annual 
percentage growth 
(2003/04 - 2005/06) 
Ittner et al.. (2003) 
Independent variables:     
 Measurement diversity 
in incentives 
MDIV Metric/
dummy
Based on q20 (code 1: 
financial and non-
financial corporate 
performance measures 
in executives’ annual 
incentives, code 0: 
financial corporate 
performance measures 
in executives’ annual 
incentives) 
Ittner and Larcker 
(1997) 
Independent mediating 
variable: 
    
 Reward systems’ 
effectiveness  
RWEFF Metric Average of q21a, q21b, 
q21c, q21d, q21e and 
q21f 
Balkin & Gomez-
Mejia (1987, 1990) 
Independent 
moderating variables: 
    
 Quality of performance 
measurement 
QPM Metric Average of q20a,q20c, 
q20d, q20f, q20g, q20i 
and q20j 
Developed by the 
researcher 
 Ownership structure  OWN Metric/ 
dummy
Code 1: MC, code 0: 
OC  
Hambrick & 
Finkelstein (1995); 
Werner et al.. 
(2005) 
 Business risk RISK Metric Standard deviation of 
ROA (1999/00-
2003/04) 
Bloom & 
Milkovich, (1998); 
Miller et al.. (2002) 
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Variable name Denoted 
as… 
Type Operationalisation Key references 
 Organisational culture  CULTdom Metric/ 
dummy
FLEX cultural values-
CONTROL cultural 
values 
Cameron & Quinn 
(1999, 2005); 
Henri (2006) 
Control variables:     
 Firm’s size FSIZE Metric Average of logASSET, 
log TURN and logEMP 
(2003/04) 
Bushman et al. 
(1996); Ittner & 
Larcker (1995);  
 Industry  IND Metric/ 
dummy
EUROSTAT’s 
classification 
Ittner et al. (2003) 
 
The data have been analysed using multivariate analysis, mainly 
regression analysis with moderator and mediator interaction effects. The 
software used for conducting the data analysis has been SPSS version 14. 
The next chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the data collected and 
the results of the correlation and regression analyses conducted.  
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5. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The objective of this chapter is to present the results of the analyses 
conducted in order to test the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3. The chapter 
is structured in three sections. Section 5.1 introduces the descriptive statistics 
of the data collected. Section 5.2 shows the results of the correlation analyses 
performed. Section 5.3 presents the findings from the regression analyses 
carried out for testing each of the hypotheses previously proposed. 
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics for all variables appear in Table 5-1. The 
statistics presented come from raw data and centred data in the case of those 
variables that have been centred34. The data show that the sample represents 
large organisations in diverse industries (a table showing the industries 
represented in the final sample compared to the industries represented in the 
sample frame can be found in Chapter 4, Table 4-4). The average number of 
employees of the companies in the sample is 12,030, the average turnover is 
                                                 
 
34 As suggested by Jaccard & Turrisi (2003) and by Cohen et al.. (2003) the data of those 
variables that did not have a natural zero value have been centred in order to avoid 
multicollinearity problems and to facilitate the interpretation of the interaction effects in the 
multiple regressions conducted. 
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around £3,135 million and the average value of total assets is around £11,088 
million. The average ROA is 6.095 percent and the average sales percentage 
growth is 1.140 percent. 21 percent of the sample has failed to meet its 
business goals.  
Table 5-1 Descriptive statistics 
Codes1 Units of measurement Min (%)2 Max (%) Mean Std 
BGOAL Dummy variable .00 (21%) 1.00 (79%) - - 
ROA Percentage -10.38 22.40 6.095 6.530 
SALESG Percentage -8.93 11.43 1.140 4.298 
MDIV Dummy variable .00 (40%) 1.00 (60%) - - 
QPM Survey scale 2.71 5.00 3.973 .537 
QPM_cent Survey scale (centred) -1.22 1.06 .035 .537 
RWEFF Survey scale 2.33 5.00 3.699 .615 
RISK Standard deviation .02 11.93 4.194 3.158  
OWN Dummy variable .00 (75%) 1.00 (25%) - - 
CULTdom Survey Scale -4.83 5.83 .755 1.549 
CULT_CLAN Survey scale 1.00 4.67 3.448 .7122 
CULT_ADHO Survey scale 1.00 5.00 2.989 .6929 
CULT_MARK Survey scale 1.33 5.00 3.708 .7389 
CULT_HIER Survey scale 1.83 4.50 3.484 .6191 
FSIZE Composite 2.64 6.57 4.733 .901 
TURN03 Th. GBP 43,574 172,872,000 3,134,562 16,421,379 
TASSETS03 Th. GBP 199 440,000,000 11,088,757 50,454,225 
NEMP03 People 600 116,300 12,030 23,325 
IND_A Dummy variable .00 (96%) 1.00 (4%) - - 
IND_M Dummy variable .00 (74%) 1.00 (26%) - - 
IND_E Dummy variable .00 (91%) 1.00 (9%) - - 
IND_W Dummy variable .00 (85%) 1.00 (15%) - - 
IND_T Dummy variable .00 (93%) 1.00 (7%) - - 
IND_F Dummy variable .00 (59%) 1.00 (41%) - - 
1 BGOAL= Business goals achievement (code 1=Goals achieved, code 0=Goals not achieved); 
ROA=Short-term economic results (ROA2003/04); SALESG= Sales growth (turnover growth 2003/04-
2005/06); MDIV= Measurement diversity (code 1=Financial and non-financial performance measures in 
executives’ incentive pay, code 0=Financial performance measures only in executives’ incentive pay); 
RWEFF= Reward system effectiveness; QPM= Quality of performance measures; QPM_cent=Quality of 
performance measures data after centring it (QPM-QPMmean); RISK= Business risk (standard deviation of 
ROA 1999/00-2003/4); OWN= Ownership (code 1=Manager-controlled, code 0=Owner-controlled); 
CULT_dom= Culture dominance (ranges from 10 representing MARKET and HIERARCHY cultures to -
10 representing CLAN and ADHOCRACY cultures); CULT_CLAN= Clan organisational culture data 
from survey scale; CULT_ADHO= Adhocracy organisational culture data from survey scale; 
CULT_HIER= Hierarchy organisational culture data from survey scale; CULT_MARK= Market 
organisational culture data from survey scale; FSIZE= Firm’s size (average log total assets, log turnover 
and log number employees 2003/04); TURN03= Turnover 2003/04, TASSETS03 = Total assets 2003/04, 
NEMP03= Number of employees 2003/04; IND_A= Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining and 
quarrying industry (code 1=Yes, code 0=No); IND_M= Manufacturing industry (code 1=Yes, code 0=No), 
IND_E= Electricity, gas, water, construction industry (code 1=Yes, code 0=No); IND_W= Wholesale and 
retail, hotels, restaurants industry (code 1=Yes, code 0=No); IND_T= Transport, storage and 
communications industry (code 1=Yes, code 0=No); IND_F= Financial intermediation, real estate, business 
administration industry (code 1=Yes, code 0=No). 
2 In the case of dummy variables the percentage of companies in each category (0 and 1) is included. 
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Regarding the type of performance measures used to determine 
executives’ incentive pay, 60 percent of the sample used a combination of 
financial performance measures and at least one non-financial corporate 
performance measure in their executives’ annual incentives. The remaining 40 
percent of the companies only used financial performance measures in their 
executives’ incentive system.  
Tables 5-2 and 5-3 present the corporate performance measures that were 
most commonly used by sample firms in their executives’ incentives systems 
(EIPM). These tables also show the most commonly used corporate 
performance measures for assessing firm performance (CPM) and the 
percentage of the corporate performance measures that were used for 
determining executives’ incentive pay (EIPM/CPM). As can be seen, Net 
Operating Income, Revenues, and Earnings per share (EPS) are the most used 
corporate financial performance measures in executives’ incentives. As per 
non-financial corporate performance measures, the most used for determining 
executives’ incentive pay are Customer Satisfaction, Employee Satisfaction 
and Core Competencies and Skills.  
Table 5-2 also indicates that around 50 percent of the financial 
performance measures used for evaluating corporate performance were used 
for compensation purposes. In the case of non-financial performance measures 
(Table 5-3) this percentage is 46.8. This finding indicates that only half of the 
measures used for assessing firm performance are included in the executives’ 
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incentive system. In the subsequent section, the results of the correlation 
analyses conducted are illustrated. 
Table 5-2 Descriptive statistics on FINANCIAL performance measures  
FINANCIAL MEASURES CPM 
(%) 
EIPM 
(%) 
EIPM/ CPM 
(%) 
Net operating income 46.72 31.39 67.19 
Revenues 50.36 29.20 57.98 
Earning per share (EPS) 36.5 27.74 76.00 
Year-over-year growth 46.72 24.09 51.56 
Cash flow ratio 42.34 23.36 55.17 
Gross margin 43.80 22.63 51.67 
EBITDA 28.47 19.71 69.23 
Profit 20.44 16.06 78.57 
Return on assets 33.85 14.60 43.13 
TSR 16.06 14.60 90.91 
Market share 38.69 12.41 32.08 
Return on equity 22.63 8.76 38.71 
EVA© 8.03 5.11 63.64 
Cost  10.22 5.11 50.00 
R&D spend 11.68 2.92 25.00 
Advert. spend vs. sales 9.49 2.19 23.08 
Other financial measures  10.22 3.65 35.71 
Average %EIPM/%CPM   51.43 
Table 5-3 Descriptive statistics on NON-FINANCIAL performance measures  
NON-FINANCIAL 
MEASURES 
CPM 
(%) 
EIPM 
(%) 
EIPM/ CPM 
(%) 
Customer satisfaction 44.53 22.63 50.82 
Employee satisfaction 36.5 18.98 52 
Core competencies and skills 22.63 13.87 61.29 
Leadership 17.52 13.14 75 
Safety incidents 31.39 11.68 37.21 
Customer retention 26.28 10.22 38.89 
Service quality audit 23.36 8.76 37.5 
Productivity/yield 20.44 8.03 39.29 
Personal scorecard 7.3 8.03 110 
Employee turnover 35.77 8.03 22.45 
New product development 17.52 7.3 41.67 
Capacity to innovate 13.87 5.84 42.11 
Customer loyalty 17.52 5.84 33.33 
Internal customer satisfaction 11.68 5.11 43.75 
Defects rates 14.6 4.38 30 
Workforce capabilities 10.95 3.65 33.33 
Idea generation rate 6.57 2.92 44.44 
Competitors’ measures 10.22 2.92 28.57 
Other non-financial measures  24.82 16.79 67.65 
Average %EIPM/%CPM   46.80 
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5.2. Correlation analysis 
This subsection reports the results of the Pearson’s correlation analysis35. 
Firstly, the correlations between measurement diversity and the firm 
performance proxies are reviewed. Secondly, the statistically significant 
correlations of measurement diversity and the rest of the research variables are 
presented. Thirdly, other statistically significant correlations that are relevant 
for the subsequent regression analysis are highlighted. The Pearson’s 
correlation matrix is shown in Table 5-4. All statistics are based on raw data 
prior to centring.  
5.2.1. Measurement diversity and firm 
performance correlation results 
The correlation matrix shows that measurement diversity in executive 
incentives (MDIV) is negatively correlated to firm performance measured as 
business goals achievement (BGOALS) and as sales growth (SALESG). 
Nevertheless, these correlations are not significant at p≤.10 (BGOALS and 
MDIV: r=-.015; SALESG and MDIV: r=-.136). Firm performance measured 
                                                 
 
35 Due to the fact that some of the research variables are dummy variables, it would be more 
appropriate to refer to these correlations as point-biserial correlations (Field, 2005). The point-
biserial correlation coefficients are equal to the Pearson’s correlation coefficients so the 
analysis does not vary, only the conceptual meaning of the coefficients.  
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as Return on Assets (ROA) is also negatively correlated to measurement 
diversity in incentive systems and this correlation coefficient is significant 
(ROA and MDIV: r=-.229, p≤.05). These findings suggest that the use of 
measurement diversity in executives’ incentives is likely to be associated with 
low firm performance36.  
5.2.2. Measurement diversity, moderator, 
mediator and control variables 
Table 5-4 shows that measurement diversity in executives’ incentives is 
positively and significantly correlated to electricity, gas, water supply and 
construction industries (IND_E and MDIV: r=.252, p≤.01 ) and to financial 
intermediation, real estate, renting and business administration industries 
(IND_F and MDIV: r=.174, p≤.10). It is negatively correlated to 
manufacturing industries (IND_M and MDIV: r=-.317, p≤.001). The 
correlations between measurement diversity and the other key research 
variables are not statistically significant at p≤.10. These findings indicate that 
firms operating in financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business 
administration industries or electricity, gas, water and construction industries 
are likely to use financial as well as non-financial corporate performance 
                                                 
 
36 It must be noted that correlation results do not imply causation, and that this finding could 
also be interpreted in the opposite direction (Cohen et al., 2003).  
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measures in their executives’ incentive schemes. These results are in line with 
results found by previous research in this area (e.g. Bushman et al., 1996; 
Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003). The findings also show that those firms 
operating in manufacturing industries are likely to use only financial 
performance corporate measures to determine their executives’ incentive pay.  
5.2.3. Other interesting correlations 
It is interesting to note that the different firm performance proxies do not 
necessarily correlate with each other. Business goals achievement (BGOALS) 
does not seem to significantly correlate with any of the other firm performance 
measures (ROA and BGOALS: r=-0.042, p>.10, SALESG and BGOALS: 
r=.138, p>.10). Return on assets (ROA) and sales growth are positively 
associated (SALESG and ROA: r=.186, p≤.10). This evidence indicates that 
business goals achievement is capturing a different dimension of firm 
performance to the one captured by the rest of firm performance proxies as 
described previously in Chapter 4. 
Other correlation coefficients that are worth noting are those associated 
with reward system effectiveness. Table 5-4 shows that reward system 
effectiveness (RWEFF) is positively and significantly associated with the 
extent to which business goals are achieved (BGOALS and RWEFF: r=.158, 
p≤.10); with the quality of performance measures (QPM and RWEFF: r=.440, 
p≤.001); with ownership structure (OWN and RWEFF: r=183, p≤.05); and 
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with organisational size (FSIZE and RWEFF: r=.365, p p≤.001). Reward 
effectiveness is negatively associated with organisational culture (CULTdom 
and RWEFF: r=.203, p≤.05). These correlations indicate that firms in which 
their reward system is perceived to be effective are more likely (1) to have 
high quality of performance measures; (2) to achieve their business goals; (3) 
to be manager-controlled; (4) to be large organisations; and (5) to have an 
organisational culture where control values are predominant (i.e. Market or 
Hierarchy culture).  
In addition, it is important to review the correlations between the control 
variables of the study and the rest of the research variables. In Table 5-4 it can 
be seen that firm size (FSIZE) is correlated with most of the variables in the 
research. In particular, it is highly correlated to reward system effectiveness 
(RWEFF and FSIZE: r=.365, p≤.001), to business risk (RISK and  FSIZE: r=-
.250, p≤.01), and to ownership structure (OWN and FSIZE: r=.436, p≤.001). 
Some of the industry dummy variables are significantly correlated to the firm 
performance proxies (e.g. SALESG and IND_A: r=.230, p≤.05), to 
measurement diversity (e.g. MDIV and IND_M: r=-.317, p≤.001), to the 
quality of performance measures (e.g. QPM and IND_T: r=-.187, p≤.10), to 
ownership structure (e.g. OWN and IND_F: r=-.158, p≤.10), to organisational 
culture (e.g. CULTdom and IND_f: r=.157, p≤.10), and to firm size (e.g. 
FSIZE and IND_F: r=-.286, p≤.05). These findings support previous research 
(e.g. Hoque and James, 2000) and indicate that it is appropriate to include 
these two variables as controls in the subsequent regression analyses. 
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The rest of this chapter focuses on the results of the regressions used to 
test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4.  
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Table 5-4  Pearson’s correlation matrix 
Codes2 BGOAL ROA SALESG MDIV QPM RWEFF RISK OWN CULTdom FSIZE IND_A IND_M IND_E IND_W IND_T 
ROA -.042               
SALESG .138 .186♣              
MDIV -.015 -.229* -.136             
QPM .090 .116 .033 .129            
RWEFF .158♣ .043 -.024 .112 .440***           
RISK -.377*** .255** -.052 -.099 -.055 -.045          
OWN -.156♣ .036 -.050 .018 .128 .183* .073         
CULTdom -.065 -.095 -.013 .113 -.098 -.203* .064 -.042        
FSIZE .167♣ -.090 .111 .075 .168♣ .365*** -.250** .436*** .101       
IND_A .103 .182♣ .230* .056 .130 -.001 .091 .072 .028 .063      
IND_M -.144♣ .163♣ -.133 -.317*** .031 .073 .001 .130 -.143 .054 -.117     
IND_E .148♣ -.062 -.123 .252** .046 .013 -.125 .083 .059 .198* -.061 -.177*    
IND_W -.018 -.138 -.027 -.090 -.091 .130 .112 -.140 -.143 -.037 -.083 -.241** -.126   
IND_T -.088 -.144♣ .051 .010 -.187* -.075 -.045 .127 .054 .176♣ -.055 -.159 -.083 -.113  
IND_F .065 -.016 .122 .174♣ .059 -.123 -.026 -.158♣ .157♣ -.286** -.166♣ -.484*** -.252** -.343*** -.226** 
1     Statistical significance (2-tailed): ♣ p≤0.10; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001  
2     BGOAL= Business goals achievement (code 1=Goals achieved, code 0=Goals not achieved); ROA= Short-term economic results (ROA2003/04); SALESG= Sales growth 
(turnover growth 2003/04-2005/06); MDIV= Measurement diversity (code 1=Financial and non-financial performance measures in executives’ incentive pay, code 0= 
Financial performance measures only in executives’ incentive pay); RWEFF= Reward system effectiveness; QPM=Quality of performance measures; RISK= Business risk 
(standard deviation of ROA 1999/00-2003/4); OWN= Ownership (code 1= Manager-controlled, code 0=Owner-controlled); CULT_dom= Culture dominance (ranges from 10 
representing MARKET and HIERARCHY cultures to -10 representing CLAN and ADHOCRACY cultures); FSIZE= Firm’s size (average log total assets, log turnover and 
log number employees 2003/04); IND_A= Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining industry (code 1=Yes, code 0=No); IND_M= Manufacturing industry (code 1=Yes, 
code 0=No), IND_E= Electricity, gas, water, construction industry (code 1=Yes, code 0=No); IND_W= Wholesale and retail, hotels, restaurants industry (code 1=Yes, code 
0=No); IND_T= Transport, storage and communications industry (code 1=Yes, code 0=No); IND_F= Financial intermediation, real estate, business administration industry 
(code 1=Yes, code 0=No).
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5.3. Regression analysis and 
Hypotheses testing 
5.3.1. Hypothesis 1: Measurement diversity and 
firm performance  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that there is a positive relationship between 
measurement diversity in executive incentive pay and firm performance. 
This hypothesis is tested by separately regressing measurement diversity 
used in executives’ annual incentive systems (MDIV) on the three measures 
of firm performance: business goals achievement (BGOALS), return on 
assets of fiscal year 2003/04 (ROA), and sales annual growth (SALESG). 
Equation (1), where Y represents the different firm performance proxies 
shows how.  
 (1) Y= β0 + β1FSIZE + β2IND_M + β3IND_E + β4IND_W + β5IND_T 
+ β6IND_F + β7MDIV + ε 
Firm size (FSIZE) and industry (IND) were used as control variables 
in the regressions with return on assets and sales growth as dependent 
variables. In the case of business goals achievement as a dependent variable, 
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only firm size was used as a control variable37. The process followed for 
performing the regression analyses was hierarchical. First, the control 
variables were included in the regression and then measurement diversity 
was added. The operations resulted in six regression models that are shown 
in Table 5-5. 
Only two out of the three multiple regression models assessing the 
impact of measurement diversity on firm performance are statistically 
significant (Model 2, GOALS: R2= .029, χ2= 2.685, p>.10; Model 4, ROA: 
R2=.220, F-ratio=2.742, p≤.05; Model 6, SALESG: R2=.140, F-ratio=1.677, 
p≤.10; and Model 8). Furthermore, Table 5-5 shows a statistically 
significant increase in the F-ratio of two out of the three models that include 
measurement diversity as a predictor (these are Models 4 and 6), compared 
to the two models that do not include this predictor (these are Models 3 and 
5). This result indicates that the use of measurement diversity in the 
regression models has significantly improved the ability to predict firm 
performance assessed by return on assets, and sales growth.  
                                                 
 
37 When business goals achievement was computed as the dependent firm performance 
variable, the industry dummy variables were included initially but, as a result, the 
regression coefficients had unreasonably large standard errors. Due to this issue, the 
industry dummy variables were excluded from the logistic regression analysis as 
recommended by Field (2005). 
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Based on the parameters (unstandardised beta coefficients)38 of 
Models 2, 4, and 6 results show that, contrary to predictions, measurement 
diversity exhibits a negative association with firm performance. This 
relationship is statistically significant when firm performance is measured as 
return on assets (ROA: β7= -3.135, p≤.05) and sales growth (SALESG: β7=-
1.825, p≤.10).  
 
                                                 
 
38 Table 5-5 and all the subsequent tables presenting the results of the regression analyses 
report unstandardised beta coefficients –together with Exp(b) values in the case of logistic 
regressions. The rationale for this decision is based on the work of Jaccard & Turrisi 
(2003). They suggest that when analysing interaction effects it is best to use unstandardised 
beta coefficients because standardised coefficients “have the potential to lead theorists 
astray” due to their numerous limitations (p. 68). For a specific discussion on the 
limitations of standardised beta coefficients see Jaccard, Turrisi & Wan (1990). 
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Table 5-5 Hypothesis 1: Results of regression analyses of MDIV as predictor of the firm performance measures1,2 
 BGOALS3 ROA SALESG 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 4
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.]
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Constant (β0) -.634 .530 -.460 .631 21.943*** 25.415*** 6.191 7.435 
(1.29)[.62]  (1.31)[.72]  (6.56)[.00] (6.64)[.00] (5.54)[2.68] (5.53)[.18] 
FSIZE (β1) .375 1.455 .392 1.480 -.396 -.460 .620 .722 
(.27)[.15] [.85][2.48] (.27)[.15] [.87][2.53] (.93)[.67] (.91)[.61] (.58)[.29] (.58)[.22] 
IND_M (β2)     -11.876* -13.907** -8.850* -10.006* 
    (4.58)[.01] (4.59)[.00] (4.53)[.05] (4.53)[.03] 
IND_E (β3)     -14.290** -14.261** -10.407* -10.366* 
    (5.01)[.01] (4.89)[.00] (4.67)[.02] (4.62)[.02] 
IND_W (β4)     -14.793** -16.109*** -8.487♣ -9.298* 
    (4.76)[.00] (4.69)[.00] (4.62)[.07] (4.59)[.04] 
IND_T (β5) 
    
-
17.417*** -18.657*** -7.637
♣ -8.290♣ 
    (5.21)[.00] (5.13)[.00] (4.70)[.10] (4.66)[.08] 
IND_F (β6)     -12.183* -13.368** -6.918 -7.429♣ 
    (4.65)[.01] (4.58)[.01] (4.59)[.13] (4.55)[.10] 
MDIV (β7)   -.449 .638  -3.135*  -1.825♣ 
   (.52)[.39] [.23][1.77]  (1.54)[.05]  (1.10)[.10] 
         
         
Durbin-Watson=      2.033  1.791 
R2= .020  .029  .173 .220 .107 .140 
Adj R2=     .101 .140 .034 .057 
∆R2=   .009   .048  .033 
Model χ2 / F= 1.929  2.685  2.399* 2.742* 1.462 1.677♣ 
Block χ2  / ∆F=   .756   4.142*  2.754♣ 
N= 85  85  76 76 80 80 
1  Statistical significance: ♣p≤.10; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001  
2 The industry dummy representing agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying (IND_A) is used as reference category. Its beta coefficient is represented 
by the constant (β0). 
3 These results were obtained through a logistic regression due to the fact that BGOALS is a dummy variable. The R2 of this regression shown in the table represents the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test. The Durbin-Watson test and Adj. R2 do not apply for logistic regressions. 
4 Numbers within ( ) are the standard errors (SE). Numbers within [ ] are p-values [Sig]. In the case of Exp (b) the numbers within [ ] are the lower and upper significance 
values. 
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5.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Measurement diversity, firm 
performance and quality of performance 
measures 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the relationship between measurement 
diversity and firm performance is moderated by the quality of performance 
measures such that measurement diversity is positively associated with firm 
performance when the quality of performance measures is high. This 
hypothesis is tested using the regression Equation (2) where Y represents 
each of the firm performance measures. Table 5-6 presents the results of the 
logistic and OLS regression analyses used to test Hypothesis 2. These 
analyses have been performed using a hierarchical approach resulting in 
Models 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 shown in Table 5-6. 
 (2) Y = β0 + β1FSIZE + β2IND_M + β3IND_E + β4IND_W + β5IND_T + 
β6IND_F + β7MDIV + β8QPM + β9MDIV*QPM + ε 
As presented in Chapter 4, the data used for testing hypothesis 2 is 
analysed in two phases (Cohen et al. 2003; Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003; 
Schoonhoven, 1981). Firstly, the signs and statistical significance of the 
unstandardised beta coefficients of each interaction effect –that is β9 in 
Models 8, 10 and 12– are reviewed. When the dependent variable is 
business goals achievement, the Exp(b) value of the interaction effect –that 
is Exp(b9)– is contrasted with β9  as there is evidence suggesting that under 
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specific circumstances this value is more reliable than the statistical 
significance of the β9 coefficient39. Secondly, if the β9 coefficients are 
statistically significant –or different from 1 in the case of the Exp(b9)–, the 
joint effect of the main and interaction terms is plotted. The results of the 
analyses of both of these phases are presented in turn. 
Table 5-6 shows the outputs of the regression analyses conducted to 
test Hypothesis 2. In particular, it shows the parameters of the main effects 
of measurement diversity (MDIV) and quality of performance measures 
(QPM_cent) on firm performance and the interaction effect of these two 
predictors (MDIV*QPM_cent). The interaction effect coefficient (β9) is 
positive when the dependent variables are return on assets (ROA: β9= 
1.991), and sales growth (SALESG: β9= .587). β9 is negative when the 
dependent variable is business goals achievement (BGOALS: β9= -.554). 
However, none of these coefficients is statistically significant at p≤.10, 
which means that there is a high probability that they could be zero. These 
findings indicate that the data do not support Hypothesis 2. Due to the lack 
of significance of the interaction effect’s coefficients, the graphical 
                                                 
 
39 As suggested by Menard (1995), in logistic regression the interpretation of the beta 
coefficients must be done in combination with the Exp (b) value. The rationale is that the 
statistical significance of the Wald statistic tends to become underestimated. The Exp (b) 
value is an indicator of the change in odds resulting from a unit change in the predictor. If 
the value of Exp (b) is greater than 1, this indicates that as the predictor increases, the odds 
of the outcome occurring also increase. If the value of Exp (b) is less than 1, this indicates 
that as the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring decrease.  
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representation of the joint effect of the main and interaction terms is not 
presented.  
Chapter 5. Research findings 
 166
Table 5-6 Hypothesis 2: Results of regression analyses of MDIV, QPM and MDIVQPM as predictors of the firm performance measures1.2 
 BGOALS3 ROA SALESG 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 4
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.]
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Constant (β0) -.430 .650 -.203 .816 24.646*** 22.782*** 7.437 6.838 
 (1.32)[.65]  (1.39)[.88]  (6.66)[.00] (7.29)[.00] (5.57)[.19] (6.06)[.26] 
FSIZE (β1) .386 1.471 .349 1.417 -.569 -.393 .682 .750 
 (.27)[.16] [.86][2.53] (.28)[.22] [.81][2.48] (.91)[.53] (.95)[.68] (.60)[.26] (.66)[.25] 
IND_M (β2)     -12.609** -11.619* -9.834* -9.547* 
     (4.73)[.01] (4.99)[.02] (4.60)[.04] (4.76)[.05] 
IND_E (β3)      -12.913** -12.267* -10.176* -9.976* 
     (5.03)[.01] (5.15)[.02] (4.69)[.03] (4.79)[.04] 
IND_W (β4)     -14.711*** -13.719*** -9.092♣ -8.831♣ 
     (4.85)[.00] (5.11)[.00] (4.67)[.06] (4.81)[.07] 
IND_T (β5)     -16.651*** -15.919*** -7.947♣ -7.732 
     (5.42)[.00] (5.56)[.00] (4.83)[.10] (4.93)[.12] 
IND_F (β6)     -11.937** -11.033* -7.245 -6.985 
     (4.75)[.01] (4.97)[.03] (4.62)[.12] (4.76)[.14] 
MDIV (β7) -.474 .623 -.512 .599 -3.333* -3.253* -1.851♣ -1.849♣ 
 (.53)[.37] [.22][1.78] (.55)[.35] [.20][1.76] (1.55)[.04] (1.56)[.04] (1.11)[.10] (1.12)[.10] 
QPM_cent (β8) .354 1.424 .680 1.975 1.677 .619 .325 .009 
 (.50)[.48] [.53][3.85] (.80)[.39] [.41][9.58] (1.49)[.26] (2.22)[.78] (1.08)[.76] (1.63)[.99] 
MDIV*QPM_cent (β9)   -.554 .575  1.991  .587 
   (1.05)[.60] [.07][4.55]  (3.09)[.52]  (2.25)[.76] 
         
         
Durbin-Watson=      2.022  1.813 
R2= .035  .038  .235 .239 .141 .142 
Adj R2=     .143 .136 .045 .032 
∆R2=   .003   .005  .001 
Model χ2 / F= 3.239  3.514  2.568** 2.309* 1.460 1.288 
Block χ2  / ∆F=      .415  .068 
N= 85  85  76 76 80 80 
1  Statistical significance: ♣p≤.10; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001  
2 The industry dummy representing agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying (IND_A) is used as reference category. Its beta coefficient is represented by 
the constant (β0). 
3 These results were obtained through a logistic regression due to the fact that BGOALS is a dummy variable. The R2 of this regression shown in the table represents the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test. The Durbin-Watson test and Adj. R2 do not apply for logistic regressions. 
4 Numbers within ( ) are the standard errors (SE). Numbers within [ ] are p-values [Sig]. In the case of Exp (b) the numbers within [ ] are the lower and upper significance 
values. 
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5.3.3. Hypothesis 3: Measurement diversity, firm 
performance and reward effectiveness 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the relationship between measurement 
diversity and firm performance was mediated by the effectiveness of the 
reward system. The mediation effect of reward system effectiveness is 
analysed using Equations (2) and (3) (Venkatraman, 1989). 
(2) RWEFF = α + α 1FSIZE + α 2MDIV + ε 
(3) Y = β0 + β1FSIZE + β2IND_M + β3IND_E + β4IND_W + β5IND_T + 
β6IND_F + β7MDIV + β8RWEFF + ε 
As explained in Chapter 4, if the α2 coefficient in Equation (2) is 
statistically significant and the β7 coefficient in Equation (3) is not 
statistically different from zero, then the mediating effects of reward system 
effectiveness will be strongly supported. As Venkatraman (1989) indicates, 
this would imply that the presence of RWEFF is necessary for the 
transmission of effects of MDIV on Y. If this occurs the relationship is 
referred to as a “complete mediation model” (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 430). 
If the α 2 coefficient in Equation (2) is statistically significant and the β7 
coefficient in Equation (3) is also statistically significant, then a direct effect 
between measurement diversity and firm performance exists, and an indirect 
effect between measurement diversity and firm performance through reward 
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system effectiveness exists, which implies a “partial mediational model” 
(Venkatraman, 1989, p. 430).  
Table 5-5 presents the results of the logistic and OLS regression 
analyses conducted to test this hypothesis. Firstly, the signs and statistical 
significance of the unstandardised beta coefficients of measurement 
diversity and reward system effectiveness are examined in the different 
regression models. Data show that when firm performance is measured as 
business goals achievement (BGOALS), reward system effectiveness 
positively affects firm performance. When firm performance is measured as 
return on assets (ROA) and sales growth (SALESG), reward system 
effectiveness is negatively related to firm performance. However none of 
the unstandardised beta coefficients of reward system effectiveness is 
statistically significant. This indicates that they could be zero, which is 
sufficient to show that Hypothesis 3 is not supported by the data.  
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Table 5-7 Hypothesis 3: Results of regression analyses of MDIV and RWEFF as predictors of the firm performance measures1,2 
 BGOALS3 ROA SALESG RWEFF 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 4 
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Constant (β0) -2.276 .103 25.181*** 10.594 2.627*** 
 (1.91)[.23]  (8.61)[.00] (6.72)[.12] (.340)[.00] 
FSIZE (β1) .276 1.318 -.267 .866 .224*** 
 (.31)[.37] [.72][2.39] (1.03)[.80] (.65)[.19] (.069)[.00] 
IND_M (β2)   -13.702*** -11.062*  
   (4.81)[.00] (4.73)[.02]  
IND_E (β3)   -14.458*** -11.267*  
   (5.10)[.00] (4.84)[.02]  
IND_W (β4)   -15.717*** -9.910*  
   (4.87)[.00] (4.78)[.04]  
IND_T (β5)   -18.829*** -9.336♣  
   (5.41)[.00] (4.91)[.06]  
IND_F (β6)   -13.161*** -8.326♣  
   (4.85)[.00] (4.80)[.08]  
MDIV (β7) -.557 .573 -2.997♣ -1.939♣ .095 
 (.56)[.32] [.19][1.71] (1.66)[.07] (1.16)[.09] (.129)[.46] 
RWEFF (β8) .682 1.978 -.204 -.773  
 (.48)[.15] [.77][5.05] (1.34)[.88] (.92)[.40]  
      
      
Durbin-Watson=   2.048 1.654 1.779 
R2= .056  .217 .158 .123 
Adj R2=   .118 .058 .101 
∆R2=      
Model χ2 / F= 4.869  2.184* 1.573 5.685** 
Block χ2  / ∆F=      
N= 82  72 76 84 
1  Statistical significance: ♣p≤.10; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 
2 The industry dummy representing agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying (IND_A) is used as reference category. Its beta coefficient is represented by 
the constant (β0). 
3 These results were obtained through a logistic regression due to the fact that BGOALS is a dummy variable. The R2 of this regression shown in the table represents the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test. The Durbin-Watson test and Adj. R2 do not apply for logistic regressions. 
4 Numbers within ( ) are the standard errors (SE). Numbers within [ ] are p-values [Sig]. In the case of Exp (b) the numbers within [ ] are the lower and upper significance 
values. 
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5.3.4. Hypothesis 4: Measurement diversity, firm 
performance and business risk 
Hypothesis 4 states that the relationship between measurement 
diversity and firm performance is moderated by business risk such that 
measurement diversity in executive incentive pay is positively associated 
with firm performance when business risk is high or low and negatively 
associated with firm performance when business risk is moderate. This 
Hypothesis has been tested using Equation (4) where Y represents the 
different firm performance proxies (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003).  
(4) Y= β0 + β1FSIZE + β2IND_M + β3IND_E + β4IND_W + β5IND_T + 
β6IND_F + β7MDIV + β8RISK + β9RISK2 + β10MDIV*RISK + 
β11MDIV*RISK2 + ε 
The sample data were fitted to this Equation and Table 5-8 presents 
the results of the regression analyses performed. As with previous analyses, 
a hierarchical approach was used for computing the regressions. The data 
have been analysed in two phases as suggested in Chapter 4. Firstly, the sign 
and statistical significance of the unstandardised beta coefficient of the 
curvilinear interaction –that is β11– and the Exp(b11) in the case of the 
logistic regression when the dependent variable is BGOALS, are reviewed. 
If these coefficients are statistically significant, then the joint effect of the 
main and interaction terms is plotted.  
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When firm performance is measured as BGOALS, β11 is positive and 
statistically significant at p≤.05. Exp(b11) is greater than 1, and its lower and 
upper confidence intervals are 1.03 and 1.49 respectively. This indicates that 
this result is fairly reliable, showing that there is only a 5 percent chance 
that these analyses with another sample will provide a different result to the 
one obtained here. When firm performance is measured as ROA, or 
SALESG the β11 obtained with these regression models is not statistically 
significant. These findings show that only when firm performance is 
measured as business goals achievement, is the effect of measurement 
diversity on firm performance moderated by business risk.  
In order to further understand how business risk moderates the effect 
of measurement diversity on the extent to which business goals are 
achieved, the main and interaction terms from Model 24 are plotted. For 
interpretation purposes, it is assumed that all variables are continuous. Two 
approaches for plotting these terms are used that will help to illustrate the 
outcomes from two different perspectives. First, three different values of 
business risk are selected: moderate, low and high. As recommended by 
Cohen et al. (2003) and Jaccard and Turrisi (2003), the three values were: 
the mean of RISK, the RISK value that is 1 standard deviation below the 
mean of RISK, and the RISK value that is 1 standard deviation above the 
mean of RISK. The mean of RISK was 4.194 and its standard deviation was 
3.158. Then, a “low” business risk corresponds to 1.036, a “high” business 
risk corresponds to 7.352, and a “moderate” business risk corresponds to the 
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mean. Three different lines were plotted, one for each of the RISK values 
using Equation (5) as shown in Figure 5-1. 
(5) BGOALS = (β7 + β9RISK+ β11RISK2) MDIV 
 
Figure 5-1 The effect of measurement diversity on business goals achievement at three 
different levels of business risk 
 
 
 
 
 
This representation of the joint effect shows that when business risk is 
high or moderate the relationship between business goals achievement and 
measurement diversity in executives’ incentive systems is negative. When 
business risk is low the effect of measurement diversity on business goals is 
positive. This graph is illustrative but it can be misleading for theory testing 
purposes as will be seen below.  
As suggested by Schoonhoven (1981), there is another way for 
plotting the effect of risk on the relationship between measurement diversity 
and business goals achievement. This method involves the rewriting of 
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Equation (5) as a partial derivative shown in Equation (6). Equation (6) now 
indicates that the effect of MDIV on BGOALS is a function of RISK. 
(6) ∂BGOALS/∂MDIV= β7 + β9RISK+ β11RISK2 
This function can be plotted by using different values of RISK as 
Figure 5-2 shows. Using this graph the interpretation of the results is 
slightly different. Figure 5-2 indicates that when business risk is low and 
high the effect of measurement diversity on business goals achievement is 
positive; when business risk is moderate the effect of measurement diversity 
on business goals becomes negative. In Figure 5-1 the use of the mean + and 
– its standard deviation missed the true effect of measurement diversity on 
business goals achievement over the range of the business risk due to its 
specific value. Therefore, Figure 5-2 is used to test Hypothesis 4 as it is 
more reliable.  
Figure 5-2 The effect of measurement diversity on business goals achievement over the 
range of values of business risk 
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In summary, the findings indicate that Hypothesis 4 is supported when 
firm performance is measured as the extent to which business goals are 
achieved –β11 is statistically significant, and Figure 5-2 shows the expected 
relationship between the three variables under investigation. Hypothesis 4 is 
not supported when firm performance is measured as return on assets, or 
sales growth. 
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Table 5-8 Hypothesis 4: Results of regression analyses of MDIV, RISK, RISK2, MDIVRISK and MDIVRISK2 as predictors of the firm performance 
measures1,2 
 BGOALS3 ROA SALESG 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 
 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 4 
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper]
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper]
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper]
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Constant(β0) 2.028 7.596 1.819 6.166 .400 1.492 22.912*** 22.789*** 22.483*** 7.177 6.520 5.212 
 (1.85)[.272]  (1.84)[.32]  (2.03)[.84]  (6.83)[.00] (6.88)[.00] (7.42)[.00] (5.63)[.21] (5.64)[.25] (5.76)[.37] 
FSIZE(β1) .185 1.203 .148 1.160 .038 1.039 -.267 -.363 -.357 .720 .666 .528 
 (.32)[.57] [.64][2.26] (.33)[.64] [.61][2.20] (.35)[.91] [.52][2.07] (.93)[.77] (.95)[.70] (.99)[.72] (.60)[.23] (.60)[.27] (.62)[.40] 
IND_M(β2)       -13.391*** -13.453*** -13.638*** -9.239* -9.292* -8.452♣ 
       (4.66)[.00] (4.69)[.00] (4.83)[.00] (4.47)[.04] (4.46)[.04] (4.46)[.06] 
IND_E(β3)       -13.721*** -13.928*** -14.185*** -9.940* -10.373* -9.266* 
       (4.95)[.00] (5.00)[.00] (5.23)[.00] (4.57)[.03] (4.57)[.03] (4.59)[.05] 
IND_W(β4)       -15.948*** -16.040*** -16.260*** -9.147* -9.406* -8.657♣ 
       (4.72)[.00] (4.76)[.00] (4.90)[.00] (4.53)[.05] (4.52)[.04] (4.52)[.06] 
IND_T(β5)       -16.365*** -16.280*** -16.425*** -6.283 -6.229 -4.631 
       (5.40)[.00] (5.44)[.00] (5.74)[.00] (4.87)[.20] (4.85)[.20] (4.92)[.35] 
IND_F(β6)       -13.885*** -13.752*** -13.981*** -6.457 -6.183 -4.695 
       (4.63)[.00] (4.67)[.00] (4.88)[.00] (4.48)[.15] (4.47)[.17] (4.53)[.30] 
MDIV(β7) -.436 .646 .400 1.492 8.100* 3293.471 -3.087♣ -1.888 -.839 -.728 1.321 -.703 
 (.61)[.47] [.19][2.13] (1.29)[.75] [.12][18.54] (4.22)[.05] [.85][1201] (1.63)[.06] (2.98)[.53] (5.03)[.87] (1.17)[.53] (2.09)[.53] (3.43)[.83] 
RISK(β8) -.274*** .760 -.208 .812 .696 2.006 .315 .457 .696 -.180 .025 .453 
 (.10)[.00] [.62][.93] (.13)[.11] [.63][1.05] (.61)[.25] [.60][6.70] (.27)[.25] (.40)[.26] (1.65)[.67] (.19)[.34] (.26)[.92] (1.05)[.67] 
MDIV*RISK(β9)   -.147 .864 -3.020* .049  -.268 -.786  -.441 .652 
   (.20)[.46] [.58][1.30] (1.36)[.03] [.00][.70]  (.56)[.63] (2.05)[.70]  (.37)[.24] (1.36)[.63] 
RISK2(β10)     -.071 .931   -.021   -.034 
     (.05)[.14] [.85][1.02]   (.13)[.88]   (.08)[.68] 
MDIV*RISK2(β11)     .212* 1.237   .045   -.102 
     (.09)[.03] [1.03][1.49]   (.17)[.79]   (.11)[.35] 
Durbin-Watson=         2.070   1.766 
R2= .145  .171  .273  .215 .218 .219 .167 .186 .225 
Adj R2=       .116 .105 .076 .057 .064 .078 
∆R2=        .003 .001  .019 .039 
Model χ2 / F= 11.260**  11.810♣  18.712**  2.160* 1.922♣ 1.530 1.525 1.521 1.529 
Block χ2 / ∆F=   .550  6.902*   .231 .037  1.410 1.459 
N= 75  75  75  72 72 72 70 70 70 
1 Statistical significance: ♣p≤.10; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001  
2 The industry dummy representing agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying (IND_A) is used as reference category. Its beta coefficient is represented by the 
constant (β0). 
3 These results were obtained through a logistic regression due to the fact that BGOALS is a dummy variable. The R2 of this regression shown in the table represents the Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test. The Durbin-Watson test and Adj. R2 do not apply for logistic regressions. 
4 Numbers within ( ) are the standard errors (SE). Numbers within [ ] are p-values [Sig]. In the case of Exp (b) the numbers within [ ] are the lower and upper significance values. 
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5.3.5. Hypothesis 5: Measurement diversity, firm 
performance and ownership 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the impact of measurement diversity on 
firm performance is moderated by ownership structure such that 
measurement diversity in executives’ pay is positively associated with firm 
performance when firms are manager-controlled. In order to test this 
hypothesis Equation (7) was used, where Y represents the firm performance 
measures proxies. Each equation was computed in SPSS using a hierarchical 
approach that resulted in eight models. Table 5-7 presents the results of 
these models.  
(7) Y= β0 + β1FSIZE + β2IND_M + β3IND_E + β4IND_W + β5IND_T + 
β6IND_F + β7MDIV + β8OWN + β9MDIV*OWN + ε 
The data are analysed using the two phases proposed in Chapter 4. 
Initially, the algebraic signs and statistical significance of the 
unstandardised beta coefficients of each interaction effect –that is β9– are 
explored. In the case of the logistic regression presented in Model 27 the 
Exp(b) value of the interaction effect –that is Exp(b9)– is examined in 
combination with the unstandardised beta coefficient due to its greater 
reliability (Menard, 1995). If the beta coefficients are statistically significant 
–and different from 1 in the case of the Exp(b)–, the joint effect of the main 
Chapter 5. Research findings 
 177
and interaction terms is plotted. The findings from these phases are 
presented as follows. 
As can be seen in Table 5-9, the unstandardised beta coefficients of 
the interaction effects between measurement diversity and ownership 
structure (MDIV*OWN: β9) are positive when firm performance is 
measured as return on assets (ROA), and sales growth (SALESG). The 
interaction effect beta coefficient is negative when firm performance is 
measured as the extent to which business goals are achieved. However none 
of these coefficients is significant at p≤10. The Exp(b9) is less than 1 but the 
values of its 95 percent confidence interval contain 1, which shows that 
there is a high probability of Exp(b9) to be 1.  
These findings show that the relationship between measurement 
diversity and firm performance is not moderated by ownership structure. 
Therefore, there is a lack of empirical support for Hypothesis 5.  
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Table 5-9 Hypothesis 5: Results of regression analyses of MDIV, OWN and MDIVOWN as predictors of the firm performance measures1,2 
 BGOALS3 ROA SALESG 
 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 
 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 4 
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Exp(b) 
(Lower-Upper) 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Constant (β0) -2.890 .056 -3.679 .025 25.923*** 26.034*** 6.937 6.695 
 (1.61)[.07]  (1.73)[.03]  (6.80)[.00] (6.87)[.00] (5.53)[.21] (5.59)[.24] 
FSIZE (β1) 1.124*** 3.076 1.223*** 3.398 -.662 -.682 1.152♣ 1.155♣ 
 (.39)[.00] [1.43][6.59] (.41)[.00] [1.53][7.55] (.99)[.50] (1.01)[.50] (.65)[.08] (.65)[.08] 
IND_M (β2)     -13.666*** -13.501*** -10.981** -10.519* 
     (4.67)[.00] (4.76)[.00] (4.57)[.01] (4.72)[.02] 
IND_E (β3)     -14.113*** -14.080*** -11.359** -11.045* 
     (4.96)[.00] (5.00)[.00] (4.67)[.01] (4.75)[.02] 
IND_W (β4)     -15.805*** -15.706*** -10.468* -10.114* 
     (4.78)[.00] (4.84)[.00] (4.66)[.02] (4.75)[.03] 
IND_T (β5)     -18.472*** -18.504*** -9.327* -9.126* 
     (5.20)[.00] (5.24)[.00] (4.71)[.05] (4.76)[.05] 
IND_F (β6)     -13.250*** -13.199*** -8.274♣ -7.954♣ 
     (4.64)[.00] (4.68)[.00] (4.59)[.07] (4.67)[.09] 
MDIV (β7) -.708 .493 -.038 .962 -2.991♣ -3.170♣ -2.022♣ -2.269♣ 
 (.59)[.23] [.15][1.56] (.72)[.96] [.23][3.98] (1.58)[.06] (1.79)[.08] (1.12)[.07] (1.26)[.07] 
OWN (β8) -2.086*** .124 -1.022 .360 .821 .418 -1.749 -2.297 
 (.77)[.00] [.02][.56] (1.06)[.34] [.04][2.89] (1.74)[.63] (2.54)[.87] (1.23)[.16] (1.76)[.19] 
MDIV*OWN (β9)   -1.937 .144  .747  1.016 
   (1.30)[.13] [.01][1.84]  (3.40)[.82]  (2.32)[.66] 
         
Durbin-Watson=      2.046  1.831 
R2= .149  .199  .222 .222 .167 .169 
Adj R2=     .128 .115 .072 .061 
∆R2=      .000  .002 
Model χ2 / F= 12.814**  15.199**  2.352* 2.066* 1.752♣ 1.561 
Block χ2  / ∆F=   2.384   .048  .191 
N= 83  83  75 75 79 79 
1  Statistical significance: ♣p≤.10; *p≤0.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001  
2 The industry dummy representing agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying (IND_A) is used as reference category. Its beta coefficient is represented by 
the constant (β0). 
3 These results were obtained through a logistic regression due to the fact that BGOALS is a dummy variable. The R2 of this regression shown in the table represents the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test. The Durbin-Watson test and Adj. R2 do not apply for logistic regressions. 
4 Numbers within ( ) are the standard errors (SE). Numbers within [ ] are p-values [Sig]. In the case of Exp (b) the numbers within [ ] are the lower and upper significance 
values. 
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5.3.6. Hypothesis 6: Measurement diversity, firm 
performance and organisational culture 
Hypothesis 6 proposes that the impact of measurement diversity on 
firm performance is moderated by organisational culture. It is expected that 
measurement diversity will be negatively associated with firm performance 
when organisational culture emphasises the value of control rather than 
flexibility, and that measurement diversity will be positively associated with 
firm performance when organisational culture emphasises the value of 
flexibility rather than control. Similar to previous sections, this hypothesis is 
tested according to Equation (10) where Y represents each of the four 
different firm performance measures. 
(10) Y= β0 + β1FSIZE + β2IND_M + β3IND_E + β4IND_W + β5IND_T + 
β6IND_F + β7MDIV + β8CULT + β9MDIV*CULT + ε 
After substituting the sample data in Equation 10 using a hierarchical 
approach, Table 5-10 presents the results of the eight regression models 
obtained. Hypothesis 6 is tested using the same two phases employed for 
testing Hypotheses 2, 4 and 5. These are: (1) the review of the algebraic sign 
and statistical significance of the unstandardised beta coefficients of the 
interaction term (MDIV*CULTdom: β9); and (2) the graphical 
representation of the joint effect of the main and interaction terms if β9 is 
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statistically significant, in order to better interpret the relationships between 
firm performance, measurement diversity and organisational culture. 
Table 5-8 shows that the unstandardised beta coefficients of the 
interaction effects (MDIV*CULTdom: β9) are negative when firm 
performance is measured as return on assets (ROA) and sales growth 
(SALESG). Nevertheless, none of these beta coefficients is statistically 
significant at p≤0.10. When firm performance is measured as BGOALS, β9 
is positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, the Exp(b9) value is 
greater than 1, and its 95 percent confidence interval is also greater than 1. 
This indicates that the coefficients for the interaction term are highly 
reliable.  
In sum, the data show that organisational culture moderates the 
relationship between measurement diversity and firm performance when 
measured by business goals achievement. It does not moderate the 
relationship between measurement diversity and firm performance measured 
by ROA and sales growth. Now, in order to further understand the joint 
effect of measurement diversity and organisational culture on business goals 
achievement the following two functions (Equations 11 and 12) are plotted 
as suggested in previous sections. Figures 5-3 and 5-4 show the resulting 
plots.  
(11) BGOALS = (β7 + β9 CULT)  MDIV 
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(12) ∂BGOALS/∂MDIV = β7 + β9 CULT   
In Figure 5-3, as presented in Chapter 4, three values of organisational 
culture are used. In this case, since organisational culture ranges from -10 to 
10 with a value of zero which represents that the firm does not have a 
dominant organisational culture, the three values selected were -10, 10 and 
zero. -10 represents firms characterised for having very strong control 
oriented values. 10 represents firms characterised for having very strong 
flexibility oriented values. 0 represents firms characterised by having the 
same emphasis on both flexibility and control. 
Figure 5-3 The effect of measurement diversity on business goals achievement at three 
different levels of organisational culture 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4 The effect of measurement diversity on business goals achievement over the 
range of values of organisational culture 
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The plotted lines in Figures 5-3 and 5-4 show that the effect of 
measurement diversity on firm performance is positive when organisational 
culture emphasises flexibility rather than control. It is negative when 
organisational culture emphasises control rather than flexibility or when 
organisational culture emphasises both control and flexibility to the same 
degree.  
In summary, these findings support Hypothesis 6 when firm 
performance is measured by business goals achievement. However, when 
firm performance is measured by return on assets or sales growth 
Hypothesis 6 is refuted. 
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Table 5-10 Hypothesis 6: Results of regression analyses of MDIV, CULT and MDIVCULT as predictors of the firm performance measures1,2 
 BGOALS3 ROA SALESG 
 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 
 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 4 
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.]
Exp(b) 
[Lower][Upper] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Β 
(SE)[Sig.] 
Constant (β0) -.237 .789 .927 2.526 25.384*** 24.932*** 6.937 6.695 
 (1.34)[.86]  (1.52)[.54]  (6.71)[.00] (6.75)[.00] (5.53)[.17] (5.59)[.17] 
FSIZE (β1) .409 1.505 .437 1.548 -.450 -.374 1.152 1.155 
 (.28)[.15] [.86][2.62] (.29)[.14] [.86][2.77] (.93)[.63] (.93)[.69] (.65)[.26] (.65)[.27] 
IND_M (β2)     -13.921*** -13.849*** -10.981* -10.519* 
     (4.64)[.00] (4.65)[.00] (4.57)[.03] (4.72)[.03] 
IND_E (β3)     -14.280*** -14.437*** -11.359* -11.045* 
     (4.94)[.00] (4.96)[.00] (4.66)[.02] (4.74)[.02] 
IND_W (β4)     -16.143*** -16.234*** -10.468* -10.114* 
     (4.76)[.00] (4.78)[.00] (4.65)[.05] (4.75)[.05] 
IND_T (β5)     -18.659*** -18.852*** -9.327♣ -9.126♣ 
     (5.17)[.00] (5.19)[.00] (4.71)[.07] (4.76)[.08] 
IND_F (β6)     -13.362*** -13.497*** -8.274♣ -7.954♣ 
     (4.62)[.00] (4.63)[.00] (4.58)[.10] (4.67)[.10] 
MDIV (β7) -.479 .620 -2.007* .134 -3.116* -2.697♣ -2.022♣ -2.269♣ 
 (.55)[.38] [.21][1.81] (1.03)[.05] [.01][1.03] (1.58)[.05] (1.68)[.10] (1.11)[.09] (1.25)[.10] 
CULTdom (β8) -.295 .744 -1.533* .216 -.031 .461 -1.749 -2.297 
 (.20)[.14] [.49][1.11] (.67)[.02] [.06][.807] (.51)[.95] (.84)[.58] (1.23)[.54] (1.76)[.82] 
MDIV*CULTdom (β9)   1.484* 4.411  -.764  1.016 
   (.70)[.03] [1.11][17.49]  (1.04)[.46]  (2.32)[.84] 
         
Durbin-Watson=      2.000  1.811 
R2= .052  .124  .220 .226 .145 .145 
Adj R2=     .127 .121 .048 .035 
∆R2=      .006  .000 
Model χ2 / F= 4.809  10.959*  2.364* 2.147* 1.500 1.319 
Block χ2  / ∆F=   6.150**   .538  .039 
N= 85  85  76 76 80 80 
1  Statistical significance: ♣p≤.10; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001  
2 The industry dummy representing agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying (IND_A) is used as reference category. Its beta coefficient is represented by the 
constant (β0). 
3 These results were obtained through a logistic regression due to the fact that BGOALS is a dummy variable. The R2 of this regression shown in the table represents the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test. The Durbin-Watson test and Adj. R2 do not apply for logistic regressions. 
4 Numbers within ( ) are the standard errors (SE). Numbers within [ ] are p-values [Sig]. In the case of Exp (b) the numbers within [ ] are the lower and upper significance 
values. 
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5.4. Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the descriptive statistics of the research, the 
correlation matrix with all the variables under study and the results of the 
regression analyses performed in order to test the six hypotheses discussed 
in Chapter 3.  
Table 5-11 presents the results of each hypothesis. In summary, 
Hypothesis 1 was refuted. According to the data the use of non-financial 
performance measures in addition to financial performance measures in 
executives’ incentives is associated with firm performance. However, this 
association does not occur in the expected direction as measurement 
diversity is found to affect firm performance in a negative way rather than in 
a positive one. Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 were not supported as the data did not 
show that the quality of performance measures, reward system effectiveness 
or ownership structure interacts with the relationship between measurement 
diversity and firm performance. Hypothesis 4, which predicts that the 
relationship between measurement diversity in executives’ annual incentives 
is moderated by business risk in a curvilinear form and Hypothesis 6, which 
predicts that the relationship between measurement diversity in executives’ 
annual incentives is moderated by organisational culture, were both 
supported by the empirical evidence. However, this only occurred when 
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firm performance was measured by the extent to which business goals are 
achieved.  
Table 5-11 Summary of results for each hypothesis under investigation 
 Key variables: 
Independent 
 
Dependent 
Type of 
relationship  
Empirical 
results 
Hypothesis 
testing 
H1  Measurement 
diversity 
 Business 
Goals  
 ROA 
 
 Sales growth 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(none) 
 Linear 
(negative) 
 Linear 
(negative) 
Refuted 
H2  Measurement 
diversity; 
quality of 
performance 
measures; and 
interaction 
 Business 
Goals  
 ROA 
 
 Sales growth 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(none) 
 Linear 
(none) 
 Linear 
(none) 
Refuted 
H3  Measurement 
diversity, 
reward 
effectiveness 
 Business 
Goals  
 ROA 
 
 Sales growth 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(none) 
 Linear 
(none) 
 Linear 
(none) 
Refuted 
H4  Measurement 
diversity; 
business risk; 
and interaction 
 Business 
Goals  
 
 ROA 
 
 
 Sales growth 
 Curvilinear 
(positive/ 
negative) 
 Curvilinear 
(positive/ 
negative) 
 Curvilinear 
(positive/ 
negative) 
 Curvilinear 
(positive/ 
negative) 
 Curvilinear 
(none) 
 
 Curvilinear 
(none) 
Partially 
supported 
H5  Measurement 
diversity; 
ownership 
structure; and 
interaction 
 Business 
Goals  
 ROA 
 
 Sales growth 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(none) 
 Linear 
(none) 
 Linear 
(none) 
Refuted 
H6  Measurement 
diversity; 
organisational 
culture; and 
interaction 
 Business 
Goals  
 ROA 
 
 Sales growth 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(positive) 
 Linear 
(none) 
 Linear 
(none) 
Partially 
supported 
 
Among the results it was also found that the use of measurement 
diversity is positively correlated to firms operating in financial 
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intermediation, real estate, renting and business administration industries or 
electricity, gas, water and construction industries. It is negatively correlated 
to firms operating in manufacturing industries. In addition to this, the most 
used financial corporate performance measures in executives’ incentives 
were found to be: Net Operating Income, Revenues, and Earnings per share 
(EPS). As per the non-financial corporate performance measures, those most 
used for determining executives’ incentive pay were found to be: Customer 
Satisfaction, Employee Satisfaction and Core Competencies and Skills. 
When the number of corporate performance measures used for determining 
executive pay was compared to the number of performance measures used 
to assess overall firm performance, it was found that only 50 percent of the 
financial performance measures and 46.8 percent of the non-financial 
performance measures used for assessing firm performance are also used for 
compensation purposes. 
Other interesting findings from the data analysis were that firms in 
which their reward system is perceived to be effective are more likely (1) to 
have high quality of performance measures; (2) to achieve their business 
goals; (3) to be manager-controlled; (4) to be large organisations; and (5) to 
have an organisational culture where control values are predominant (i.e. 
market or hierarchy culture). 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter discusses the findings presented in Chapter 5. It is 
structured in five sections. Section 6.1 reviews the research results presented 
in Chapter 5 and highlights the research contributions to performance 
measurement research, agency theory and contingency theory. Section 6.2 
describes the implications that the research results may have for 
practitioners. Section 6.3 summarises the study limitations. Section 6.4 
establishes different directions for future research in the performance 
measurement literature. Finally, section 6.5 presents the research 
conclusions. 
6.1. Research implications and key 
contributions 
The purpose of this research was twofold. Firstly, the research looked 
at the impact of using financial and non-financial performance measures in 
executives’ incentives on firm performance. Secondly, the research 
investigated the interaction effects of two internal management control 
variables –quality of performance measures and reward system 
effectiveness– and three contextual variables –business risk, ownership 
structure and organisational culture. A theoretical model was developed 
comprising six hypotheses. These hypotheses were tested using a 
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combination of survey and archival data extracted from a sample of UK 
publicly quoted and private companies during the fiscal year 2003/04.  
Hypothesis 1 argued that the use of measurement diversity in 
executive incentives was positively related to firm performance. This 
hypothesis was tested using multivariate analysis. In particular, logistic and 
OLS regression analysis were employed depending on the nature of the firm 
performance measure used. The data showed that measurement diversity 
was negatively related to firm performance assessed by ROA and sales 
annual growth. Measurement diversity was also negatively related to firm 
performance when this variable was assessed by business goals 
achievement40. However, in the case of business goals achievement, the 
relationship was not statistically significant at p≤ .05. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 1 was refuted based on the results of the data analysis.  
From a performance measurement perspective, several reasons may 
explain the negative impact of the use of financial and non-financial 
information in executive incentive systems. Firstly, the impact of this type 
                                                 
 
40 As explained in Chapter 4, firm performance was measured using three different proxies. 
Two of them –ROA and sales growth– capture the economic results of the organisation and 
as such they were correlated (see Chapter 5, Table 5-4). However, the objective of the third 
one –business goals achievement– is to capture the perception of respondents about how 
well their organisation is doing as a whole, i.e. how effective it is in reaching its goals. As 
seen in Table 5-4 this measure does not correlate with the previous two, which suggests that 
it is assessing a different dimension of firm performance. 
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of incentive design may have a lag effect on financial performance (e.g. 
Banker, Potter, and Srinivasan, 2005). Non-financial performance measures 
are meant to be long-term oriented so their impact on performance may take 
some time to emerge. Secondly, the implementation of this type of incentive 
design may be more complex than previously expected and this might be a 
reason why organisations are not finding financial benefits (e.g. Neely et al., 
2000). They might be struggling with implementation issues. As an area for 
further research it would be interesting to examine to what extent the 
implementation process used to integrate financial and non-financial 
performance measures in executive incentive systems is a moderator factor 
of the relationship between the use of measurement diversity and firm 
performance. Finally, the findings of this hypothesis may also be explained 
if the relationship between the use of measurement diversity in incentives 
and firm performance is considered in the reverse direction41 –after all 
regression analysis does not imply causation (Cohen, Cohen et al., 2003). 
That is organisations that are underperforming are the ones more likely to 
use financial and non-financial information in their executive incentive 
systems.  
                                                 
 
41 I would like to thank one of the externals examiners of this thesis, Prof. David Otley, for 
providing me with this suggestion. 
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The results of hypothesis 1 are not a complete surprise as they are in 
line with the results of a similar study conducted by Ittner, Larcker and 
Randall (2003). In their study they found that greater reliance on 
measurement diversity was positively associated with 1-year stock returns 
but negatively associated with ROA and sales growth, although none of the 
negative associations was statistically significant at p≤ .05. They also found 
that extensive use of Balanced Scorecard systems (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996; 2001; 2004), which are performance measurement systems 
characterised by their use of a diverse set of performance measures to assess 
firm performance, was associated with low ROA and this finding was 
significant at p≤ .05. 
From an agency theory perspective, the finding of hypothesis 1 
contradicts previous agency research conduced by researchers such as 
Feltham and Xie (1994) and Hemmer (1996) among others; even though, it 
supports the work of multi-task agency research conducted by Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1991). Feltham and Xie (1994) and Hemmer (1996) based on 
the informativeness principle (Holmstrom, 1979), propose that financial 
performance measures should be supplemented or replaced by non-financial 
performance measures in incentive systems in order to positively affect 
business results. The data used in this study do not support this proposition; 
in fact, they show the opposite effect to the one expected.  
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The study results are more in line with what Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) find when multi-criteria performance measures are used for incentive 
purposes. In particular, Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) model suggests 
that when multiple measures of performance are used agents will focus their 
efforts on those that are easier to achieve at the expense of others that are 
harder to reach, even if this allocation of effort is detrimental to the firm. 
Thus, for Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) the positive impact of a larger 
number of performance measures is unclear.  
This research argues that the impact of using financial and non-
financial performance measures in incentives can be better understood when 
contingency theory research on management control systems is taken into 
consideration. Contingency theory research on management control systems 
states that the impact of management control systems on firm performance 
depends on organisational contingencies, and that the configuration of a 
management control system should be fitted to organisational contingencies 
in order to positively affect firm performance (Fisher, 1998; Hayes, 1977; 
Otley, 1980). Hypotheses 2 to 6 of this research take into consideration 
contingency theory premises and argue that the relationship between 
measurement diversity and firm performance depends on specific internal 
and external organisational factors.  
In particular, this study looks at two internal management control 
factors: performance measurement quality and reward system effectiveness; 
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and three contextual factors: business risk, ownership structure and 
organisational culture. These factors have been chosen mainly because their 
effects on management control systems and firm performance have been 
critically highlighted in agency-based research (e.g. Miller et al., 2002; 
Werner et al., 2005) and contingency-based research (e.g. Fisher, 1995b; 
1998; Hayes, 1977; Otley, 1980).   
In brief, hypothesis 2 argues that the relationship between 
measurement diversity and firm performance will be positive when the 
quality of performance measures is high. Hypothesis 3 suggests that 
measurement diversity will be related to firm performance indirectly 
through its effect on reward system effectiveness. Hypothesis 4 states that 
measurement diversity will be positively associated with firm performance 
when business risk is high or low and negatively related with firm 
performance when business risk is moderate. Hypothesis 5 proposes that 
measurement diversity will be positively associated with firm performance 
when firms are manager-controlled –i.e. managerial discretion is high– and 
negatively associated with firm performance when firms are owner-
controlled –i.e. managerial discretion is low. Finally, Hypothesis 6 predicts 
that measurement diversity will be positively associated with firm 
performance when organisational cultural values are clan or adhocracy 
values. Measurement diversity will be negatively associated with firm 
performance when organisational cultural values are market or hierarchy 
values.  
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These hypotheses were tested using logistic and OLS regressions with 
main and interaction effects. Firm performance was assessed using three 
different measures. Two of them were financial –i.e. ROA and sales annual 
growth– and one is based on perception –that is business goals achievement. 
The research data partially supports hypothesis 4 indicating that firms 
transfer financial risk to executives by using financial performance 
measures in executive incentive pay whenever this transfer appears to have 
the potential to improve the overall business performance –i.e. when there is 
moderate business risk. When financial performance is beyond the control 
of executives –i.e. when business risk is high or low–, the use of financial 
performance measures only in executive incentive systems is likely to be 
dysfunctional. This is because the observed results cannot be directly 
attributed to managerial decisions or actions and the use of non-financial 
performance measures is a method used by firms in order to balance the 
effects of incentives on executives’ behaviour and final performance. This 
finding follows the same pattern found in the work of Miller et al. (2002) 
when looking at the effect of business risk on the relationship between 
CEO’s incentives and firm performance. 
The research data also partially supports hypothesis 6 suggesting that 
firms characterised by having an organisational culture which emphasises 
values such as flexibility, performance improvement and risk taking –i.e. 
clan and adhocracy cultures– will make use of non-financial performance 
measures in addition to financial performance measures in their executive 
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incentive systems and this will have a positive effect on their performance. 
Firms characterised by having an organisational culture which emphasises 
values such as control, stability and risk aversion –i.e. market and hierarchy 
cultures– will make greater use of financial performance only and this will 
have positive effects on their performance.  
Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 are not supported by the data, suggesting that 
neither the performance measures quality, reward system effectiveness or 
ownership structure seem to interact with the relationship between 
measurement diversity and firm performance. The results of these three 
hypotheses is somehow surprising as one would expect the quality of 
performance measures, the perceived effectiveness of the reward system and 
the ownership structure of the organisation to have some effect on the 
performance impact of measurement diversity. Some explanations could be 
put forward regarding these unexpected results.  
In the case of hypotheses 2 –the moderating effect of the quality of 
performance measures–, it could be argued that the metric designed for 
assessing the quality of performance measures might have been deficient as 
it might have missed attributes of performance measures that are more 
important than the ones selected. For example, two of these attributes might 
be: the extent to which executives perceive the performance measures to be 
the “right ones” for measuring the true performance of the organisation and 
the extent to which the performance measures are accurate and reliable. 
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Further research including a more complete metric of the perceived quality 
of performance measures may find additional insights that could help to 
better explain the results found in this thesis.  
The results of hypothesis 3 –the mediating effect of reward system 
effectiveness– may be better understood if the work of Ittner, Larcker and 
Meyer (2003) is taken into consideration. These authors have found that 
when measurement diversity –in particular, the non-financial measures of 
performance– is used for incentive purposes employees perceive the reward 
system to be more subjective and this subjectivity generates feelings of 
unfairness. The work of these authors might explain why this thesis finds 
reward system effectiveness to be positively associated with firm 
performance –assessed by business goals achievement– (see Chapter 5, 
Table 5-4)42 but not associated with measurement diversity.  
The findings of hypothesis 5 –the moderating effect of ownership 
structure– could be explained if a different argument to the one proposed in 
Chapter 3 is put forward43. That is, if the use of measurement diversity is 
                                                 
 
42 The table showing the regression results of Hypothesis 3 (Chapter 5, Table 5-7) also 
presents a positive association between business goals achievement and reward system 
effectiveness. This relationship is not significant at p< .05 but it is very close to be 
significant at p ≤ .10. 
43 I would like to thank one of the externals examiners of this thesis, Dr. Martin Larraza-
Quintana, for providing me with this suggestion.  
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more common in manager-controlled firms because non-financial measures 
are perceived by managers as measures that can be easily manipulated. Then 
the use of non-financial measures in executive incentives would be a 
reflection of an agency cost (i.e. lack of alignment between the interest of 
the principal/owner and the agent/managers). In this case, measurement 
diversity could be detrimental for firm performance in manager-controlled 
firms. In other words, the moderating effect of ownership structure on the 
relationship between measurement diversity and firm performance could be 
negative. However, since managers in manager-controlled firms are also 
stockholders –which means that they are also interested in increasing firm 
performance–; then, this stock ownership may neutralise the negative effect 
of their decisions to include non-financial performance measures in 
incentives and this may explain the absence of a significant moderating 
effect of ownership structure (i.e. managers as stockholders will pursue firm 
performance maximisation regardless of the relative ownership structure of 
the firm). 
In summary, these results indicate that the use of financial and non-
financial performance measures in executives’ incentives may actually be 
detrimental for organisational performance, in contrast to what authors such 
as Kaplan and Norton (1996; 2001; 2004; 2006), Banker et al. (2000), or 
Said et al. (2003) suggest. However, the negative relationship between the 
use of financial and non-financial performance measures in executives’ 
incentives and firm performance might not apply to all organisations in all 
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circumstances. That is, under specific conditions, such as those of high or 
low business risk, and clan or adhocracy cultural values, the use of multi-
criteria performance measures for determining executives’ incentive pay 
may be beneficial for organisations. These findings suggest that when 
investigating the performance impact of measurement diversity in 
executives’ incentives, a more prolific topic on which to focus is a search 
for those “idiosyncratic conditions” (Miller et al., 2002, p. 752) in which 
particular performance measures in executives’ incentives produce better 
results, rather than concentrating on the search for links between 
measurement diversity and firm performance per se. 
This study extends prior performance measurement research in several 
ways (see Table 6-1). Firstly, it contributes to the body of literature looking 
at the performance impact of measurement diversity (e.g. Banker et al., 
2000; Hoque and James, 2000; Ittner and Larcker, 1995; Ittner, Larcker and 
Randall, 2003; Said et al., 2003; Van der Stede et al., 2006). In particular, it 
provides evidence to show that the use of measurement diversity in 
executives’ incentives is negatively associated with firm performance 
(measured by return on assets and sales annual growth).  
Secondly, it contributes to the body of literature looking at the 
moderator factors that may affect the relationship between measurement 
diversity and firm performance (e.g. Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Hoque 
and James, 2000). To this stream of research, the study contributes by 
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finding (1) that business risk –defined as environmental uncertainty– affects 
the relationship between measurement diversity in executives’ incentives 
and firm performance (measured by business goals achievement) in a 
curvilinear way rather than in a linear way as previously proposed by Hoque 
(2005)44; (2) that organisational culture not only affects managerial 
decisions about the type of performance measures used to assess firm 
performance as suggested by Henri (2006), but also the relationship between 
the type of performance measures that managers use to determine executive 
incentive pay and firm performance; and (3) that ownership structure, the 
quality of performance measures and the reward system effectiveness do not 
influence the relationship between measurement diversity in executives’ 
incentives and firm performance. 
This study contributes to the agency theory literature by providing 
evidence that does not support the theoretical propositions provided by 
Feltham and Xie (1994) and Hemmer (1996) among others. These authors 
suggest that the use of measurement diversity in incentives will be 
beneficial for organisations but as the data have shown this may not be the 
case in all circumstances. This finding is more in line with the work 
                                                 
 
44 It must be noted that Hoque (2005) measures environmental uncertainty using a survey 
scale and not a financial measure as the one used in this study. Thus, his results may differ 
from the results obtained in this thesis due to the different proxies used to assess 
environmental uncertainty or business risk. 
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conducted by agency base researchers Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) who 
find that the use of measurement diversity in incentives may generate 
dysfunctional behaviours that may be detrimental for firm performance. 
In addition, this study is the first to provide theoretical arguments 
associating agency theory premises with organisational culture using the 
Competing Values Framework (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Most previous 
research has looked at the application of agency theory to national cultures 
(e.g. Ekanayake, 2004), but little research has focused on the application of 
agency theory to organisational cultures with the recent exception of Kulik 
(2005) or Jones et al. (2007). Furthermore, this study is based in the UK, 
whilst the majority of the agency-based compensation and performance 
measurement research has been conducted in the US (Merchant et al., 
2003). Finally, this study applies a survey methodology in combination with 
archival data. This is important because agency-based hypotheses have been 
mainly tested using archival data alone, which has serious limitations for 
producing valuable insights (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). 
This study also contributes to the contingency theory of management 
control systems as it supports the premise that there is no universally 
appropriate management control system –in this case, the executive 
incentive system– which applies equally to all organisations in all 
circumstances (Fisher, 1995b; 1998; Otley, 1980). 
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Table 6-1 Summary of main contributions to knowledge 
Literature Previous knowledge Contributions to knowledge 
Performance 
Measurement, in 
particular the area 
focused on the use 
of non-financial 
performance 
measures in addition 
to financial 
performance 
measures in 
management control 
systems 
 Inconclusive evidence about the impact of using 
measurement diversity in management control 
systems.  
- Some researchers have found a positive 
relationship between measurement diversity 
and economic performance (Govindarajan and 
Gupta, 1985; Hoque, 2004; Ittner and Larcker, 
2003), perceived performance (Ittner and 
Larcker, 1995), and future economic and stock 
market performance (Banker et al, 2000; 
Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003). 
- Other researchers have found that 
measurement diversity is not associated with 
current economic performance (Perera and 
Poole, 1997) or that this association is 
negative (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003).  
(1) This research finds that the use of 
measurement diversity in executives’ 
annual incentives is negatively 
associated with economic 
performance (measured by ROA and 
Sales Growth).  
 
  The relationship between the use of non-financial 
performance measures in addition to financial 
performance measures in management control 
systems is influenced by the following 
organisational contingencies: 
- Environmental uncertainty/business risk 
(Hoque, 2005). 
- Business strategy (Govindarajan and Gupta, 
1985; Gupta, 1987). 
- Organisational size (Hoque and James, 2000). 
- Industry (Schiehll, 2001).  
 Organisational culture is a contextual variable 
that affects the use of financial and non-financial 
performance measures in management control 
systems (Henri, 2006) 
(2) This research finds that the 
relationship between measurement 
diversity in executives’ annual 
incentives and firm performance 
(measured by the degree to which 
organisations achieve their goals) is 
influenced by business risk in a 
curvilinear way, not in a linear way as 
previously suggested; and 
organisational culture.  
(3) This study also finds that the 
relationship between measurement 
diversity in executives’ annual 
incentives and firm performance is 
not influenced by ownership 
structure, the quality of the 
performance measures or the reward 
system effectiveness. 
Agency theory, in 
particular the 
positivist agency-
based research 
stream 
 Inconclusive knowledge about the benefits of 
using non-financial performance measures in 
addition to financial performance measures in 
incentive systems. 
- Some researchers suggest that it is beneficial 
for organisations (Feltham and Xie, 1994; 
Hemmer, 1996). 
- Other researchers assert that the use of 
measurement diversity for compensation 
purposes may be detrimental for organisations 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). 
(4) This research finds that the use of 
measurement diversity for 
compensation purposes cannot be 
universalistic as it can be beneficial or 
detrimental for organisations 
depending on their circumstances. 
  Agency theory predictions are influenced by 
national culture (e.g. Ekanayake, 2004) 
(5) This research theoretically associates 
agency theory with organisational 
cultural values assessed by the 
Competing Values Framework 
(Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). 
  Most previous agency-based research looking at 
the relationship between performance 
measurement and compensation has been 
developed in the US, using archival data or 
survey data (Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Merchant et al, 
2003). 
(6) This research presents evidence 
collected in the UK.  
(7) It also uses both archival and survey 
data. 
Contingency 
theory, in particular 
the contingency 
theory of 
management control 
systems 
 The relationship between management control 
systems and firm performance is dependent on 
organisational contingencies (Fisher, 1995b; 
Otley, 1980) 
(8) This research finds evidence that 
supports previous research. 
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6.2. Implications for practice 
Based on the findings extracted from this research, organisations 
should pay close attention to their particular organisational circumstances 
before embarking on the design of multi-criteria executive incentive systems 
in order to better influence their business results. In particular, they should 
pay attention to the business risk to which they are exposed and to the 
cultural values they emphasise. The potential effects of both of these factors 
are further described in turn. 
 The effect of business risk on the performance impact of 
measurement diversity 
In the case of business risk, the research suggests that organisations 
operating in high and low business risk environments will be better off by 
using non-financial performance measures in addition to financial 
performance measures in their executives’ incentive systems; whereas, 
organisations operating in moderated business risk environments will be 
better off by using financial performance measures only in their executives’ 
incentives. High levels of business risk reduce the ability of executives to 
influence the financial performance measures included in their incentives. 
This is because external contingencies may affect the results of those 
measures more than the executives’ business decisions or actions. When 
business risk is high the use of financial performance measures only in 
executives’ incentives imposes higher income and employment risk on 
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executives and this may have detrimental effects on shareholders’ value. For 
example, executives may be pushed to adopt extreme risk reduction 
decisions such as the avoidance of high-risk projects (Hoskisson et al., 
1993), reducing R&D expenditures (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) or 
broadening diversification at the expense of profits (Amihud and Lev, 
1981).  
In these circumstances, previous research proposes the reduction of 
the incentive pay size in order to minimise the dysfunctional behaviours that 
the executives’ inability to influence financial performance measures may 
produce (e.g. Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Miller et al., 2002). However, 
this solution may not be feasible any longer as the size of incentives is 
mainly determined by industry and firm size standards (e.g. Davis and Edge, 
2004). Alternatively, as this research suggests, the use of non-financial 
performance measures in circumstances of high business risk may help to 
reduce the risk supported by executives and may help to predict future 
performance results.  
Non-financial performance measures in executives’ incentives can 
give executives strategic information about their customers, internal 
processes, competitors, suppliers and employees that are difficult to capture 
with the use of financial performance measures only (Feltham and Xie, 
1994; Kaplan and Norton, 1996; 2001; 2004; 2006). Furthermore, non-
financial performance measures are less likely to be subject to the effects of 
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external environmental factors and are more likely to be influenced by 
executives’ decisions and actions (Hoque, 2005).  
Under conditions of low risk, the use of executive incentive systems 
based on financial performance measures only may not be adequate. In low-
business risk environments, the results of financial performance measures 
are easy to predict. These results, however, are likely to be independent 
from executives’ decisions or actions and dependent on internal or external 
organisational contingencies (e.g. lack of competitors in the same market). 
Under low-risk circumstances (e.g. lack of growth opportunities), high 
reliance on financial performance measures may have detrimental effects on 
shareholder value. For instance, executives may be driven to distort 
accounting data (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992) in order to affect 
results. Therefore, using a similar argument to the one used under 
circumstances of high risk, the use of non-financial performance measures 
in executives’ incentives can be employed as a way to balance the 
dysfunctional behaviours created by financial measures and this will have 
positive effects on firm performance (e.g. Feltham and Xie, 1994; Hemmer, 
1996). 
Under circumstances of moderate risk, the use of financial 
performance measures only in executives’ incentives may be an adequate 
practice. This is because the ability of executives to influence those 
measures increases and dysfunctional behaviours oriented to reduce income 
Chapter 6. Discussion and conclusions 
 204
risk and employment risks are less likely to occur (e.g. Miller et al., 2002). 
The use of non-financial performance measures in firms operating in 
moderate risk conditions is not required as the use of financial performance 
measures only is an appropriate means of evaluating and rewarding the 
effects of executives’ decisions and actions. In fact, as this research has 
shown, the use of non-financial performance measures for determining 
executive pay in firms operating in moderate risk environments may have 
detrimental effects on the firm’s overall performance.  
 The effect of organisational culture on the performance impact of 
measurement diversity 
In the case of organisational culture, this research shows that 
organisations which emphasise values such as flexibility, discretion or risk-
taking –that is Clan and Adhocracy organisational cultures– will be better 
off using a combination of financial and non-financial performance 
measures in executive incentive systems. Alternatively, organisations which 
emphasise values such as control, stability or risk-aversion –that is Market 
and Hierarchy organisational cultures– will be better off using financial 
performance measures only in their executives’ incentive pay.  
In organisations with Clan and Adhocracy cultures, the use of 
measurement diversity for determining executives’ incentive pay will be 
beneficial for firm performance as these types of organisations are more 
likely to emphasise long-term performance improvement, and both financial 
as well as non-financial business goals. In organisations with Market and 
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Hierarchy cultures, the use of measurement diversity for determining 
executives’ incentive pay will be at odds with their underlying values of 
emphasising financial controls and therefore it will not have beneficial 
effects for overall organisational performance. 
6.3. Limitations 
The results of this research are subject to a number of limitations. 
Firstly, the sample size is relatively small, even though it is larger than some 
of the samples used in previous performance measurement research (e.g. 
Hoque, 2005). Secondly, the analyses conducted to determine sample biases 
showed that the data were biased towards very large organisations. Thirdly, 
in the final sample some industries were more represented than others. For 
instance, firms operating in financial, real estate, renting and business 
administration had a greater proportion compared to the population than 
firms operating in manufacturing or wholesale, retail, hotel and restaurant 
industries. Fourthly, the study focuses on corporate performance measures 
used in executives’ annual incentive systems. Corporate performance 
measures are just one type of the performance measures used in executives’ 
annual incentives (team or individual performance measures have not been 
considered). Finally, the study only looks at annual incentive systems. The 
use of non-financial performance measures in addition to financial 
performance measures for determining base pay increases, long-term 
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incentives, performance appraisals or employment status (promotions and 
terminations) has not been investigated.  
6.4. Areas of further research 
This study raises a number of issues for further research. The first 
issue is the understanding of why the use of measurement diversity 
negatively affects firm performance, contrary to the predictions of agency 
theory. Researchers such as Banker et al. (2004), Ittner, Larcker and Meyer 
(2003), Lipe and Salterio (2000; 2002) or Roberts, Albright and Hibbets 
(2004) have already started to look at this phenomenon by focusing on the 
difficulties that the use of financial and non-financial performance measures 
may generate for organisations. Among their results, they have found that 
the use of multi-criteria performance measures increases the perceived 
subjectivity of the incentive system, which in turn affects its perceived 
effectiveness. In their explanations of this phenomenon these researchers 
have relied on psychology-based theories rather than on economic-based 
theories. Future research could extend this body of research by developing a 
theoretical framework based on both psychology theories (e.g. procedural 
justice, equity theory, motivational theories) and economic theories (e.g. 
agency theory).  
The second issue is to examine better ways for assessing the quality of 
performance measures. In this research, a specific metric has been designed 
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for evaluating the perceived quality of performance measures; however, key 
attributes of performance measures may have been absent in this metric as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. Thus, further research could try to improve 
the measurement of this variable in order to fully understand its moderating 
effect on the relationship between measurement diversity and firm 
performance.  
The third issue is to study in more detail the impact of measurement 
diversity on perceived reward system effectiveness. Questions such as “are 
there any other reasons apart from the one provided in this thesis that may 
explain why the use of measurement diversity does not have a positive 
effect on reward system effectiveness?” or “to what extent does the use of 
measurement diversity in incentives increases subjectivity and feelings of 
unfairness among the employees?” could be of great interest for future 
research.  
The fourth issue is to further investigate the relationship between the 
use of ownership structure, measurement diversity and firm performance. 
As shown in this thesis two different arguments can be presented regarding 
this relationship. On the one hand, in Chapter 3 (hypothesis 5) it is argued 
that measurement diversity will improve firm performance in manager-
controlled firms. On the other hand, earlier in this Chapter a counter 
argument is presented. That is, that measurement diversity will harm firm 
Chapter 6. Discussion and conclusions 
 208
performance in manager-controlled firms. Further research could shed some 
light about which of these two arguments is more accurate.  
The fifth issue is to analyse the impact of other internal and external 
contingencies that may affect the relationship between measurement 
diversity in executives’ incentives and firm performance. Some examples of 
these contingencies are: organisational structure (e.g. Donaldson, 2001), 
external economic environment (i.e. systematic risk) (e.g. Miller and 
Bromiley, 1990), management style (e.g. Lawler, 1985), or trust (e.g. Busco, 
Riccaboni and Scapens, 2006; Coletti, Sedatole and Towry, 2005).  
The sixth issue is to investigate the appropriateness of using non-
financial performance measures for both informational and compensation 
purposes. As Gjesdal (1981) suggests, performance measures that are useful 
for valuing the firm (i.e. informational purposes) may not be appropriate for 
assessing and rewarding managerial performance (i.e. compensation 
purposes). For instance, customer satisfaction may be an adequate measure 
for determining firm performance but its results may be influenced by many 
factors that are outside the executive’s control (Ittner, Larcker and Meyer 
2003). Consequently, taking into consideration the controllability principle 
proposed by agency theorists (Demski and Feltham, 1978), customer 
satisfaction may not be an appropriate measure for evaluating and rewarding 
executives’ performance. This research has highlighted that the 
consequences of using the same non-financial performance measures for 
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informational and compensation purposes may have detrimental results for 
the organisation. Future research could focus on identifying potential 
solutions to this problem.  
Finally, the seventh issue is the need to find better ways for using non-
financial information for determining pay. Future research could search for 
different ways in which to link non-financial performance measures to the 
different components of a reward system. Even though performance 
measurement authors normally assume that performance measures are 
linked to incentives (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; 2001; 2004; 2006), in 
practice, performance measures can be linked to monetary compensation     
–base pay increases, annual incentives and long-term incentives45–; but also 
to related compensation –recognition, employment status (i.e. promotions 
and terminations), and learning opportunities. Each of these reward 
elements has a specific purpose (e.g. Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Pavlik et al., 
1993). In particular, annual incentive systems are meant to drive short-term 
performance (Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992). 
Financial performance measures are supposed to be short-term oriented and 
non-financial performance measures long-term oriented (e.g. Kaplan and 
                                                 
 
45 Benefits or “perks” are another reward component. However, they have not been 
included here as they do not tend to be linked to performance. They are linked to specific 
jobs or management levels. 
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Norton, 1996). Based on these descriptions, the use of non-financial 
performance measures may not fit the main purpose of annual incentive pay, 
which is to drive short-term performance. This may be one of the reasons 
why the use of non-financial performance measures in annual incentives is 
not generating positive effects on firm performance. Consequently, the use 
of non-financial performance measures may be more appropriate in other 
reward elements. Thus, the search for the most adequate way to use non-
financial performance measures for evaluating and rewarding could be an 
interesting avenue for further research. 
6.5. Research conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to address two key research 
questions. Firstly, what effect does the use of measurement diversity in 
executives’ incentive systems has on firm performance? Secondly, to what 
extent is the relationship between measurement diversity in executives’ 
incentive pay and firm performance influenced by business risk, ownership 
structure, organisational culture, the perceived quality of performance 
measures and the perceived reward system effectiveness?  
In response to the first question this study finds that the use of 
measurement diversity in executives’ annual incentive systems negatively 
affects firm performance measured by ROA and sales annual growth. The 
effect is also negative when firm performance is measured by the extent to 
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which business goals are achieved but this negative association is not 
statistically significant. 
In response to the second question this study finds the following. On 
the one hand, business risk and organisational culture are both factors that 
moderate the relationship between the use of measurement diversity in 
executives’ annual incentive systems and firm performance. On the other 
hand, ownership structure, the perceived quality of performance measures 
and the perceived reward system effective are factors that have no effect on 
this relationship. 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that the 
use of non-financial performance measures in addition to financial 
performance measures in executives’ annual incentives can be detrimental 
for organisational performance. However, the negative effect of using multi-
criteria performance measures in executives’ incentives is not universal –i.e. 
it does not affect all organisations under all circumstances. Organisations 
that operate in high or low business risk environments and organisations that 
have clan or adhocracy cultural values will find performance benefits in the 
use of measurement diversity in executives’ annual incentives.  
The results of this thesis also suggest that the investigation of the 
direct effect of using measurement diversity for compensation purposes on 
firm performance may be pointless. A more fruitful avenue to pursue when 
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looking at this relationship is to search for those idiosyncratic conditions in 
which the use of this management control mechanism appears to work best.  
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APPENDIX A: INTRODUCTORY LETTER 
FOR SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Date 
«Title» «First_Name» «Surname» 
«Position» 
«Company_name» 
«RO_Address_Line_1» 
«RO_Full_Postcode» 
 
Dear «Title» «Surname» 
 
Linking Business Performance Measurement to reward has a positive impact on 
performance! 
That is the theory - but to date there is insufficient evidence to support it. 
As companies seek to drive greater performance through the business and look to their people 
to deliver this, we believe it is important to have a better understanding of the link between 
performance and reward. To explore this link further we are partnering with the Human Capital 
Consultancy Watson Wyatt to conduct a UK study on the link between business performance 
measurement and reward systems. We would like to invite you to participate in this study. 
By simply completing a questionnaire you will receive a full report of the findings.  This report 
will tell how companies use business performance measurement systems, how these systems 
are linked to reward and where the greatest value is to be found.  We believe the findings will 
be invaluable in helping you guide your company’s evolution in this area. 
The survey can be completed either on paper or online. If on paper, please return the 
questionnaire in the enclosed business reply envelope. If online please go to 
www.watsonwyatt.com/cranfield.  The closing date for all responses is 12th December. 
We thank you in anticipation for contributing to this important study. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Monica Franco 
Research Officer 
Cranfield School of Management 
Cranfield, Bedford MK43 0AL 
Tel. 01234751122 ext. 2926 
Email: monica.franco@cranfield.ac.uk
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APPENDIX B: PILOT SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
Practitioners who completed and reviewed the pilot survey instrument 
Name Position Years of 
experience 
Area of knowledge46 Company/ 
University 
Meeting format Date 
1. David Jacques Performance 
Measurement 
Manager 
>15 Practical experience in the design, 
implementation and management of PM 
systems 
Belron Roundtable 10/12/03 
2. Andy Shilten Performance 
Measurement 
Manager 
>5 Practical experience in the design of PM 
systems 
City & Guilds Roundtable 10/12/03 
3. David 
Leeming 
Planning Manager >10 Practical experience in the design of PM 
systems 
Co-operative Group Roundtable 10/12/03 
4. Susan Perry-
whitehead 
Performance 
Measurement 
Manager 
>10 Practical experience in the implementation 
and management of PM systems 
DHL E-mail 03/09/03 
5. Stuart Hepburn Global Reward 
Director 
>15 Consulting and practical experience on the 
implementation and management of EC 
GlaxoSmithKline E-mail/ 
Telephone 
08/08/03 
                                                 
 
46 Abbreviations used: Performance Measurement (PM), Executive Compensation (EC), Human Resources (HR) 
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Name Position Years of 
experience 
Area of knowledge46 Company/ 
University 
Meeting format Date 
6. Alan 
Pankhurst 
HR Director >20 Practical experience on the implementation 
and management of HR systems and EC 
Guardian Media Group In person 06/08/03 
7. Mandy 
Devonald-Batt 
HR Director >20 Practical experience on the implementation 
and management of HR systems and EC 
SAS In person 23/07/03 
8. Radha Startin Compensation and 
Benefits Director 
>10 Consulting and practical experience on the 
implementation and management of EC 
Shell In person 06/08/03 
9. Monica 
Montealegre 
HR Manager >8 Practical experience on the implementation 
and management of HR systems and EC 
Siemens E-mail/ 
Telephone 
07/08/03 
10. Sharon 
Dietrich 
HR Director >15 Practical experience on the implementation 
and management of HR systems and EC 
Smith & Nephew In person 05/08/03 
11. Judith 
Davidson 
Director of Strategy 15 Practical experience in the design, 
implementation and management of PM 
systems 
Sodexho Roundtable 10/12/03 
12. Christine 
Shillington 
UK Reward Manager >15 Consulting and practical experience on the 
implementation and management of EC 
Unilever E-mail 26/09/03 
13. Tracey Kneller UK Reward Manager >10 Consulting and practical experience on the 
implementation and management of EC 
Vodafone E-mail 11/08/03 
14. Stan Tennison Performance 
Measurement 
Manager 
10 Practical experience in the design of PM 
systems 
Vodafone Roundtable 10/12/03 
15. Richard 
Cheeseman 
Marketing Manager 5 Marketing knowledge (survey format) Watson Wyatt Ltd. E-mail/ 
Telephone 
 
16. Stephen 
Martin 
Senior Consultant >10 Consulting experience (PM and EC) Watson Wyatt Ltd. E-mail  
17. Beverly Keene Marketing Director  15 Marketing knowledge (survey format) Watson Wyatt Ltd. E-mail/ 
Telephone 
22/08/03 
18. Russell 
Huntington 
Partner >20 Consulting experience (EC) Watson Wyatt Ltd. In person  
19. Jonathan 
Gardner 
Research and 
Development Director
>12 Research and consulting experience (EC) Watson Wyatt Ltd. E-mail  
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Academics and support staff who completed and reviewed the pilot survey instrument 
Name Position Years of 
experience  
Area of knowledge Company/ 
University 
Meeting format Date 
20. Prof. Shaun 
Tyson 
Professor of HR >25 Research and teaching experience (EC) Cranfield SoM In person  
21. Prof. Luis 
Gomez-Mejia 
Professor of 
Management 
>25 Research and teaching experience (EC) Arizona State 
University 
In person  
22. Prof. Andy 
Neely 
Professor of PM >15 Research and teaching experience (PM) Cranfield SoM E-mail and 
Telephone 
 
23. Bernard Marr Research Fellow 5 Research and practice experience (PM) Cranfield SoM In person  
24. Dr. Ruth 
Bender 
Senior Lecturer >10 Research and teaching experience (EC) Cranfield SoM In person  
25. Dr. Mike 
Kennerley 
Senior Research 
Fellow 
15 Research (PM) Cranfield SoM In person  
26. Dr. Mike 
Bourne 
Senior Research 
Fellow (My PhD 
supervisor) 
10 Research and teaching experience (PM). Cranfield SoM In person 12/08/03 
27. Richard Elliot Visiting Fellow >25 Consulting and practical experience in the 
design, implementation and management of 
PM systems 
Cranfield SoM Roundtable 10/12/03 
28. Adrian 
Edelman 
PhD student 15 Research and practice knowledge (PM) Cranfield SoM In person  
29. James Collins PhD student 20 Research and practice knowledge (HR) Cranfield SoM E-mail/ in person  
30. Javier Marcos PhD student >10 Research and practice knowledge (HR) Cranfield SoM In person  
31. Pietro Micheli PhD student 2 Research experience (PM) Cranfield SoM In person  
32. Dina Gray PhD student/ 
Company director 
>15 Business and people management in industry 
and research experience (PM) 
Cranfield SoM In person  
33. Angela Walters CBP Knowledge 
Manager 
10 Knowledge management experience Cranfield SoM In person  
34. Alison Isham CBP Secretary 10 Administration experience Cranfield SoM In person  
35. Jacqueline 
Brown 
CBP Secretary  >15 Administration experience Cranfield SoM In person  
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY INSTRUMENT  
 

W W W . W A T S O N W Y A T T . C O M
Questionnaire 
Cranfield School of Management in conjunction
with Watson Wyatt LLP
Strategic performance measurement
and reward systems survey
Introduction
Watson Wyatt and Cranfield School of Management would like to invite you to participate in this survey of major
organisations in the UK. This study is part of a doctoral project, the focus of which is to investigate the link between strategic
performance measurement, reward practices and business performance (see figure 1). There is no cost to participate and
participation will entitle you to receive a free copy of the survey results, which will help to guide your company’s evolution in
this important area in the future.
The questionnaire is structured into five sections:
I. Business performance measurement system (e.g. Balanced Scorecards, Key Performance Indicators)
II. Reward practices (i.e. base pay, annual incentives) and Performance Appraisal process
III. The impact of the link between BPM systems and reward practices
IV. Organisational culture
V. Business strategy
Figure 1
The questionnaire is designed to be easy and quick to complete and should take no more than 20 – 30 minutes. If you prefer
you can complete the survey online at www.watsonwyatt.com/cranfield
If you have any questions about the survey please contact: Paul Richards at Watson Wyatt on 020 7227 2319 or email
paul.richards@eu.watsonwyatt.com, or Monica Franco at Cranfield School of Management on 01234 751122 ext. 2926 or email
monica.franco@cranfield.ac.uk 
Confidentiality statement
Watson Wyatt and Cranfield School of Management will use the information provided by you for research purposes. We will
hold your individual responses to the survey in confidence and any distribution or publication of the information collected will
not identify your contribution. Readers of the report will be interested in the types of companies that participated in the survey,
therefore we plan to list a representative sample in the report. 
To ensure you receive your copy of the results please complete the following:
Name of person completing the survey: 
Job title/role: Company name:
Address:
City: County: Post code:
Email: Phone:                                     Fax:
1
Section I Section III
Business Performance
Measurement (BPM) System
Reward practices &
Performance Appraisal
process
Section II Moderators
Link
· BPM system effectiveness
· Reward practice effectiveness
· Performance Appraisal
system effectiveness
· Individual behaviour
and performance
Section IV Section V
Corporate
culture
Business
strategy
Firm
performance
Strategic performance measurement and reward systems survey
Type of company and respondent perspective
I will be responding to this questionnaire from the point of view of a… (mark only one)
 single company not affiliated to any other company 
 subsidiary company  
 parent company 
The full name of the company I am responding for is _______________________________________________________
NB Since the research is investigating the most common practices in the UK, please try to focus on your UK environment only
Section I. Business Performance Measurement system
A Business Performance Measurement (BPM) system does not refer to the Performance Management or Appraisal system. It
refers to the processes managers use in order to measure their company’s financial and non-financial performance, and in order
to check whether their business strategy is being implemented. 
1 Does your company use a BPM system?
 Yes
 No - please specify why  ____________________________________________________________
(Go to question 9)
2 My company uses the following Business Performance Measurement (BPM) system…
To a great To some To a little Not Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. extent extent extent at all know
a Balanced Scorecard     
b Business Excellence model (e.g. EFQM)     
c A set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)     
d Our own BPM system based on one of the above. Which one? ______     
e Our own BPM system not based on any of the above     
f Other – please specify: _______________________________________     
3 My company’s Business Performance Measurement system (e.g. Balanced Scorecard, set of KPIs, etc.) has the 
following characteristics…
Neither
Strongly agree nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. Agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a It is linked to our business strategy      
b It uses a strategic map with cause-and-effect
relationships among objectives      
c It uses a balanced set of performance measures
(e.g. financial, customers, people, process, etc.)      
d It uses a methodical target setting process.
Targets are set based on a rigorous analysis of performance data      
e It is communicated to all employees      
f It is integrated with our budgeting processes      
g It is integrated with our appraisal processes      
h It is integrated with our reward system      
2
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Section I
Sec. III
Sec. II Sec.IV Sec.V
Figure 1
4 My company’s Business Performance Measurement system started to be used…
This 1 to 2 3 to 6 More than Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. year years ago years ago 6 years ago N/A know
a By the top executive team      
b By senior managers      
c By all other employees      
d To determine pay      
e To evaluate individuals      
f To determine budgets      
5 The following people have participated in the development of our Business Performance Measurement system
(e.g. Balanced Scorecard, set of KPIs, etc.)…
To a great To some To a little Not Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. extent extent extent at all know
a CEO     
b Top executive team     
c Senior managers     
d Middle managers     
e HR function     
f IT managers     
g External consultants     
h Other – please specify: _________________________________
6 My company uses its Business Performance Measurement system to…
To a great To some To a little Not Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. extent extent extent at all know
a Measure business results     
b Manage strategy implementation     
c Assess the validity of the business strategy     
d Manage the budgeting processes     
e Manage operations processes     
f Inform decision making     
g Encourage improvement of business processes     
h Conduct internal benchmarks     
i Conduct external benchmarks     
j Communicate strategic priorities to employees     
k Communicate strategic priorities to external stakeholders     
l Comply with legal requirements     
m Monitor managers’ productivity     
n Reward managers’ contribution to business performance     
7 Top executives and senior managers receive information about the level of achievement of…
Top executives Senior managers
Don’t Don’t 
Please mark two responses for each line. Weekly Monthly Quarterly Yearly N/A know Weekly Monthly Quarterly Yearly N/A know
a Strategic goals            
b Corporate performance
measures            
c Their business unit
performance measures            
d Other business units’
performance measures            
e Their individual
performance measures            
3
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8 My company’s different employee groups have the following level of awareness, use and acceptance of the Business 
Performance Measurement (BPM) system
Uses, Uses and 
understands understands Uses the BPM Aware of
and is a clear the BPM system, but the BPM Not aware
supporter of the system, but isn’t doesn’t fully system, but of the Don’t
Please mark one response for each line. BPM system a supporter understand it doesn’t use it BPM system Know
a CEO      
b Top executive team      
c Senior managers      
d Middle managers      
e Rest of employees      
Section II.   Reward system
Important: For the following questions please focus on the top executives’ reward schemes and senior managers’ reward
schemes. Reward plans for specific employee groups, such as R&D or sales, are out of the scope of this study.
9 The following people have participated in the selection of the measures included in top executives’ and 
senior managers’ reward schemes
Top executives Senior managers
To a To a To a To a
great To some little Not at Don’t great To some little Not at Don’t
Please mark two responses for each line. extent extent extent all know extent extent extent all know
a CEO          
b Top executive team          
c Senior managers          
d Remuneration committee          
e HR function          
f External consultants          
g Other – please specify: ______________          
10 On average, top executives’ and senior managers’ base pay are considered to be…
Top executives Senior managers
Don’t Don’t 
Please mark two responses for each line. Yes No know Yes No know
a Above competitive market salaries (above our industry median)      
b Similar to competitive market salaries (our industry median)      
c Below competitive market salaries (below our industry median)      
11 Top executives’ and senior managers’ base pay increases are based on…
Top executives Senior managers
Don’t Don’t 
Please mark two responses for each line. Yes No know Yes No know
a Performance criteria included in BPM system
(e.g. Balanced Scorecard, KPIs)      
b Performance criteria not included in BPM system      
c Competencies included in BPM system      
d Competencies not included in BPM system      
e Years of service      
f Industry rate      
g Other – please specify: ________________________________      
4
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12 In my company…
Top executives Senior managers
To a To a To a To a
great To some little Not at Don’t great To some little Not at Don’t
Please mark two responses for each line. extent extent extent all know extent extent extent all know
a Performance results below targets are
likely to affect managers’ employment
status in the short-term (i.e. termination)          
b Performance results above targets are
likely to affect managers’ promotions
in the short-term          
13 My company uses a pay-for-performance annual incentive plan that is… 
This type of incentive plan pays out when a specific performance level is achieved. This performance level can be 
determined based on an overall subjective basis or based on either financial or non financial measures.
Top executives Senior managers
Please mark two responses for each line. If “yes” include what proportion
of the total annual incentive is based on that plan. Example: In company X, Don’t Don’t
annual incentives are discretionary based (20%) and budget based (80%). Yes No N/A know Yes No N/A know
a Discretionary based 
Performance results are considered on an overall
subjective basis, no specific measures are used to
determine payouts ___%    ___%   
b A peer company comparison plan
Top management selects measures of performance and
a group of peer companies to be compared against ___%    ___%   
c Based on Management by Objectives (MBO)
Goals for company wide, business unit, team and/or
individual performance measures are set for each
manager. Progress and goal attainment are measured
and monitored in appraisal sessions. ___%    ___%   
d Based on the BPM system
(e.g. Balanced Scorecard, KPIs) 
Similar to Management by Objectives but goals and
measures are integrated with the BPM system ___%    ___%   
e Based on budgets
Budget targets for company-wide team and/or
individual are set for each manager ___%    ___%   
f Based on performance improvement
Company selects performance criteria; incentive
fund is created based upon improvements over
prior year’s results ___%    ___%   
g Other – please specify: ______________________ ___%    ___%   
100% 100%
14 Top executives’ and senior managers’ long-term incentive plans are… 
Long-term incentives refer to multiyear performance plans. Payouts can be made in cash, shares, stock options, etc.
Top executives Senior managers
Please mark two responses for each line. If “yes” include what proportion Don’t Don’t
of the total annual incentive is based on that plan. Yes No N/A know Yes No N/A know
a Based on Management by Objectives (MBO) ___%    ___%   
b Based on the BPM system
(e.g. Balanced Scorecard, KPIs) ___%    ___%   
c Based on the measures not included in
the BPM system ___%    ___%   
d Other – please specify: _______________________ ___%    ___%   
100% 100%
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15 On average, if on-target performance is achieved this year, the percentage of base pay that will be earned in 
incentives is… (If not known please enter D/K and if not applicable enter N/A)
Please include the corresponding % in each line. Top executives Senior managers
a Annual incentives ____% over Base Pay ____%  over Base Pay
b Long-term incentives ____% over Base Pay ____%  over Base Pay
16 On average, the weights of the measures my company uses to determine annual incentives are…
(If not known please enter D/K and if not applicable enter N/A)
Please include the corresponding % in each line and column. Top executives Senior managers
a Corporate measures _____% ______%
b Business Unit measures _____% ______%
c Individual measures _____% ______%
d Other – please specify: _______________       _____% ______%
TOTAL 100 % 100 %
17 My company uses the following metrics to measure corporate performance. Please mark whether these metrics are 
also included in the top executives’ and senior managers’ corporate level incentives
(Please mark only the measures that your company uses)
Measure Measure Measure Measure
included included included included
in top in senior in top in senior
Measure of executives’ managers’ Measure of executives’ managers’
corporate corp. level corp. level corporate corp. level corp. level
performance incentives incentives performance incentives incentives
Financial perspective Operations perspective
Cash flow ratio    Capacity to innovate   
Earning per share (EPS)    Cost of quality   
EBITDA    Defects rates   
EVA©    Idea generation rate   
Gross margin    Maintenance cost   
Net Operating Income    New product development   
Return on assets (ROA)    Productivity/yield   
Return on equity (ROE)    Profit from new product   
Revenues    R&D spend   
Year-over-year growth    Service quality audit   
TSR    Other – please specify:
Other – please specify: ___________________   
___________________    ___________________
___________________ ___________________
___________________
Customer perspective: People perspective
Advertising spend vs. sales    Personal scorecard   
Competitors’ measures    Employee satisfaction   
Customer loyalty    Employee turnover   
Customer retention    Leadership   
Customer satisfaction    Workforce capabilities   
Internal customer satisfaction    Safety incidents   
Market share    Core competencies and skills   
Other – please specify: Other – please specify:
___________________    ___________________   
___________________ ___________________
___________________ ___________________
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18 My company updates the…
Less than Every Every 2 Every 4 Every 7 or Don’t
Please mark one response for each line. yearly year to 3 years to 6 years more years N/A know
a Performance measures included in short-term incentives       
b Performance measures included in long-term incentives       
c Specific competencies included in base pay plans       
19 My company makes significant changes in our…
Less than Every Every 2 Every 4 Every 7 or Don’t
Please mark one response for each line. yearly year to 3 years to 6 years more years N/A know
a Business Performance Measurement system       
b Performance appraisal system       
c Base pay scheme (e.g. job grades, competencies, etc.)       
d Base pay increase criteria       
e Annual incentive scheme       
f Long-term incentive scheme       
20 The following characteristics describe the type of measures top executives and senior managers have in their 
incentive plan:
Top executives Senior managers
Neither Neither
agree agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t Strongly nor Strongly Don’t
Please mark two responses for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Individuals have control
over the measures they
are responsible for            
b Measures are few in number
(on average, 7 or less)            
c Measures reflect
strategic goals            
d Measures reflect
business unit goals            
e Measures reflect
individual goals            
f Measures are easy
to understand            
g Measures are easy
to set (in our business)            
h Measures are easy
to manipulate            
i Measures are outcome
oriented (avoidance of
activity or task oriented
measures)            
j Measures are objective
(avoidance of subjectivity)            
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21 Reward system effectiveness
Top executives Senior managers
Neither Neither
agree agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t Strongly nor Strongly Don’t
Please mark two responses for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Our reward practices
are effective            
b Our reward practices
contribute to retention and
attraction of individuals            
c Individuals are happy with
the way the reward system
contributes to the
achievement of overall
organisational goals            
d Individuals understand
our reward practices            
e Individuals accept our
reward practices            
f Individuals are motivated
by our reward practices            
22 The performance appraisal my company uses for top executives and senior management is…
Top executives Senior managers
Please mark two responses for each line. If “yes” include what proportion Don’t Don’t 
of the total annual incentive is based on that plan. Yes No N/A know Yes No N/A know
a Competency-based
Performance is defined in terms of
predetermined competencies ___%    ___%   
b Result-based 
Performance is defined in terms of target achievement
 Based on the BPM system
(e.g. Balanced Scorecard, KPIs) ___%    ___%   
 Based on budget targets ___%    ___%   
 Based on measures included in MBO ___%    ___%   
c Discretionary-based ___%    ___%   
100% 100%
23 The performance appraisal of top executives and senior managers is formally conducted by…
Top executives Senior managers
Don’t Don’t 
Please mark two responses in each line. Yes No know Yes No know
a Their superior, peers and subordinates (360 feedback)      
b Their superiors and peers      
c Their superior      
d Other – please specify: ________________________________      
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24 Performance appraisal effectiveness
Top executives Senior managers
Neither Neither
agree agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t Strongly nor Strongly Don’t
Please mark two responses for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Our performance appraisal
process is effective            
b Managers are good at
judging the information
extracted from our
BPM system for
evaluating people            
c Individuals understand
our performance
appraisal process            
d Individuals accept our
performance appraisal
process            
e Our performance appraisal
process is considered to
be objective            
Section III.  Impact of the link between BPM systems and rewards
25 My company uses the BPM system’s measures to determine rewards because we believe this linkage…
(if your company does not use its BPM system to determine rewards please specify why in the blank space below* and 
go to question 27)
To a great To some To a little Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. extent extent extent Not at all know
a Facilitates managers’ understanding of our business strategy     
b Encourages managers to focus on our financial as well as non-financial
performance results     
c Motivates managers to achieve better performance     
d Induces the desired behaviours     
e Facilitates alignment between managers’ actions and strategic goals     
f Encourages cooperation     
g Other – please specify: ___________________________________
*Why has your company not linked its BPM system to its reward practices? ____________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Sec. I
Section III
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Figure 1
26 The alignment of our reward practices with our business performance measurement system has produced the
following effects… Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Increased the effectiveness of our reward system      
b Increased the effectiveness of our BPM system      
c Increased the effectiveness of our performance appraisal process      
d Increased managers’ understanding of strategic priorities      
e Increased managers’ focus on strategic priorities      
f Increased number of actions that produce long-term results      
g Increased managers’ performance (according to their appraisal)      
h Increased managers’ focus on improvement rather than control      
i Increased managers’ motivation      
j Increased managers’ working hours      
k Induced the type of behaviours needed to achieve
strategic priorities      
l Induced dysfunctional behaviours      
m Increased managers’ tendency to only work for what they are
being evaluated for      
n Increased managers’ work intensity (how hard they work)      
o Other – please specify: __________________________________      
Section IV  Corporate culture
27 My company is…
Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a People-oriented. It is like an extended family, in which people
seem to share a lot of themselves      
b Dynamic and entrepreneurial. People are willing to take risks      
c Results-oriented. A major concern is reaching our targets.
People are very competitive and achievement-oriented      
d Control and structure-oriented. Formal procedures generally
govern what people do      
28 Management style in my company is characterised by…
Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Teamwork, consensus, and/or participation      
b Individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and/or uniqueness      
c Hard-driving competitiveness, high demands, and/or
achievement      
d Security of employment, conventionality, and/or stability
in relationships      
10
Strategic performance measurement and reward systems survey
Figure 1
Section IV
Sec. I
Sec. III
Sec. II Sec.V
29 The leadership in my company is generally considered to exemplify…
Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Mentoring, facilitating, and/or nurturing      
b Entrepreneurship, innovating, and/or risk taking      
c A no-nonsense, aggressive, and/or results-oriented focus      
d Coordinating, organising, and/or smooth-running efficiency      
30 The “glue” that holds the company together is…
Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Loyalty and mutual trust      
b Commitment to innovation and development. There is an
emphasis on being on the cutting edge      
c Emphasis on achievement and goal accomplishment.
Aggressiveness and winning are common themes      
d Formal rules and policies. Maintaining a smooth-running
organisation is important      
31 My company emphasises…
Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Human development. High level of trust, openness, and/or
participation persists      
b Acquiring new resources and creating new challenges. Trying
new things and/or prospecting for opportunities are valued      
c Competitive actions and achievement. Hitting stretch targets
and/or winning in the marketplace are dominant      
d Permanence and stability. Efficiency, control and/or smooth
operations are important      
32 My company defines success on the basis of…
Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a The development of teamwork, employee commitment,
and/or concern for people      
b Having the most unique or the latest products.
It is a product leader and/or innovator      
c Winning in the market place and/or outpacing the competition.
Competitive market leadership is key      
d Efficiency. Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling and/or
low cost production are critical      
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Section V.   Business strategy
33 My company…
 Aims to become the lowest-cost producer in our industry (i.e. cost-leadership strategy)
 Focuses on providing quality products highly valued by our customers (i.e. product-differentiation strategy)
 Focuses on providing the best total solution for our key customers’ problems. The focus is on individual key
customers rather than markets (i.e. customer-intimate strategy)
34 My company…
Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Responds rapidly to early signals of business opportunities
in our market      
b Has greater flexibility to respond to changes in our
environment than our competitors      
c Has the ability to adjust capacity within a short period of time      
d Has the ability to change product or service offerings rapidly      
35 My company…
Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Offers a larger range of products and services than our
competitors      
b Is first to market new products and services      
c Responds rapidly to early signals of innovation opportunities
in our market      
d Expects most of our future growth in profits to come from
our new product and service offerings      
36 My company…
Neither
agree
Strongly nor Strongly Don’t 
Please mark one response for each line. agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
a Is most active in developing the markets it currently serves,
rather than entering new markets with our products or services      
b Operates in markets for its products and services that are
highly predictable      
c Is more cost-efficient than its competitors      
d Can easily forecast how actions of competitors will
affect its performance      
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Figure 1
Section V
Sec. I
Sec. III
Sec. II Sec.IV
General information
37 The number of people employed by my company on a full-time basis is... (mark only one)
 Fewer than 500      500 to 999      1,000 to 2,999      3,000 to 9,999      10,000 or more
38 My parent company head office is in… (if no parent company, please mark your own)
 UK      USA      Germany      France      Italy      Other country _____________________
39 My company is a… (mark only one)
 Private company 
 Public company (quoted on the UK stock exchange)
 Public company (quoted on another country stock exchange)
 Other – please specify: _____________________________________
40 In the last financial year reported, my company has… (mark only one)
 Exceeded its financial/business performance goals
 Met its financial/business performance goals
 Fallen short of its financial/business performance goals
 Significantly failed to meet its financial/business performance goals
41 Over the past year, my company has…
 Downsized/restructured
 Grown/expanded
 Merged with another company
 Been aquired by another company
 Gone through other major organisational changes – please specify: ______________________________________
 None of the these
Any additional comments you would like to add...
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for your help. 
Please return the questionnaire in the enclosed business envelope or send it directly to: Emma Harraden, Watson Wyatt LLP,
21 Tothill Street, Westminster, London SW1H 9LL. Alternatively you can fax it to Emma Harraden on 020 7222 9182.
If you would like to receive a copy of a recent article about the topic of our survey please tick here and ensure you have given
us your email address  
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF COMPANIES 
INCLUDED IN FINAL SAMPLE 
Company name 
1. 3I PLC 
2. 3M UNITED KINGDOM PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
3. AKER KVAERNER ENGINEERING SERVICES LIMITED 
4. ALFRED MCALPINE PLC 
5. ALLIANZ MARINE (UK) LIMITED 
6. ALSTEC GROUP LIMITED 
7. AMEY PLC 
8. ANDREW WEIR & COMPANY LIMITED 
9. ANTALIS LIMITED 
10. ARCADIA GROUP BRANDS LIMITED 
11. ARGOS LIMITED 
12. ASTRAZENECA PLC 
13. ATOS ORIGIN IT SERVICES UK LIMITED 
14. AUTOGLASS LIMITED 
15. AVENTIS PHARMA LIMITED 
16. AVERY BERKEL LIMITED 
17. AVERY WEIGH-TRONIX HOLDINGS LIMITED 
18. AVIVA PLC 
19. AWE PLC 
20. BAA LIMITED 
21. BAE SYSTEMS (OPERATIONS) LIMITED 
22. BAILLIE GIFFORD & CO LIMITED 
23. BG GROUP PLC 
24. BLACKROCK INTERNATIONAL, LTD. 
25. BORAX EUROPE LIMITED 
26. BPB PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
27. BRIDGESTONE UK LIMITED 
28. BRISTOL & WEST PLC 
29. BRITANNIA GROUP LIMITED 
30. BRITANNIA REFINED METALS LIMITED 
31. BRITISH NUCLEAR GROUP SELLAFIELD LIMITED 
32. BT GROUP PLC 
33. CABLE AND WIRELESS PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
34. CAPITAL ONE BANK (EUROPE) PLC 
35. CARILLION PLC 
36. CARLSON MARKETING GROUP (UK) LIMITED 
37. CENTRICA PLC 
38. CLIFFORD CHANCE LONDON LIMITED 
39. COATS HOLDINGS LTD 
40. COLORCON LIMITED 
41. DE LA RUE PLC 
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Company name 
42. DRS DATA AND RESEARCH SERVICES PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
43. DUNFERMLINE BUILDING SOCIETY  
44. EDF ENERGY PLC 
45. ELAN CORPORATION PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
46. EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED 
47. EXEL LIMITED 
48. FIRST DATA MOBILE HOLDINGS LIMITED 
49. FOSECO HOLDING LIMITED 
50. GARTNER U.K. LIMITED 
51. GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC 
52. GUARDIAN MEDIA GROUP PLC 
53. HALIFAX PLC 
54. HFC BANK LIMITED 
55. IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC 
56. INSTRON LIMITED 
57. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL SERVICES LIMITED 
58. INTENTIA (UK) LIMITED 
59. INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS LIMITED 
60. ITNET LIMITED 
61. JOSIAH WEDGWOOD & SONS LIMITED 
62. KINGSTON COMMUNICATIONS (HULL) PLC 
63. LADBROKES BETTING & GAMING LIMITED 
64. LAND ROVER 
65. LANIER UNITED KINGDOM LIMITED 
66. LINX PRINTING TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED 
67. LLOYD'S REGISTER QUALITY ASSURANCE LIMITED 
68. LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC 
69. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE PLC 
70. MARS U.K. LIMITED 
71. MARSH LIMITED 
72. MARSHALL OF CAMBRIDGE (HOLDINGS) LIMITED 
73. MASTERLEASE LIMITED 
74. MCCAIN FOODS (GB) LIMITED 
75. MCCORMICK (UK) LIMITED 
76. MILLER INSURANCE SERVICES LIMITED 
77. MOTABILITY FINANCE LIMITED 
78. NACCO MATERIALS HANDLING LIMITED 
79. NATIONAL GRID PLC 
80. NATIONAL HOUSE-BUILDING COUNCIL 
81. NEWELL & BUDGE LIMITED 
82. NORWICH & PETERBOROUGH BUILDING SOCIETY  
83. NZMP (AEM) LIMITED 
84. OIL STATES INDUSTRIES (UK) LIMITED 
85. OKI EUROPE LIMITED 
86. OOCL (UK) LIMITED 
87. OXOID LIMITED 
88. PA CONSULTING SERVICES LIMITED 
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Company name 
89. PREMIER FARNELL PLC 
90. QAD EUROPE LIMITED 
91. QEK GLOBAL SOLUTIONS (UK) LTD 
92. RHODIA UK LIMITED 
93. RICARDO PLC 
94. ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC 
95. ROYAL LIVER INSURANCE SERVICES LIMITED 
96. ROYAL LONDON MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY LIMITED (THE) 
97. SAFEWAY STORES LIMITED 
98. SAITEK PLC 
99. SANOFI-SYNTHELABO LIMITED 
100. SAS SOFTWARE LIMITED 
101. SCHERING HEALTH CARE LIMITED 
102. SCHRODERS PLC 
103. SCOTT WILSON LTD 
104. SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE PLC 
105. SCOTTISH WIDOWS PLC 
106. SERCO GROUP PLC 
107. SHELL (UK) LIMITED 
108. SIEMENS VAI METALS TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED 
109. SMG PLC 
110. SMITH & NEPHEW PLC 
111. SONY ERICSSON MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT 
LIMITED 
112. STAGECOACH GROUP PLC 
113. TAMDOWN REGENERATION LIMITED 
114. TELEWEST COMMUNICATIONS GROUP LIMITED 
115. THE BANK OF NEW YORK EUROPE LIMITED 
116. THE IMAGINATION GROUP LIMITED 
117. THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
118. THE SAGE GROUP PLC 
119. TOTAL E&P UK PLC 
120. UNUM LIMITED 
121. VISA MANAGEMENT SERVICES LIMITED 
122. VOLVO CAR UK LIMITED 
123. WATSON WYATT LIMITED 
124. WEDGE GROUP GALVANIZING LIMITED 
125. WESSEX WATER LIMITED 
126. WEST BROMWICH BUILDING SOCIETY  
127. WESTBURY LIMITED 
128. WILLIAM JACKSON & SON LIMITED 
129. WOOLWORTHS GROUP PLC 
130. WS ATKINS PLC 
* Two respondents did not disclose the names of their companies (these have been 
labelled ‘unknown 1’ and ‘unknown 2’ in the data set). 
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List of companies excluded from final sample 
Company name 
1. BELRON UK                     
2. BP PLC                           
3. CO-OPERATIVE GROUP (CWS) LIMITED 
4. GKN PLC                          
5. GRAMPIAN COUNTRY FOOD GROUP LIMITED 
6. I.T. WORLD SERVICES LIMITED 
7. IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PLC 
8. NATIONWIDE INVESTMENT GROUP LIMITED 
9. NORTHUMBRIAN WATER LIMITED                       
10. NOVO NORDISK LIMITED 
11. RWE NPOWER PLC 
12. SODEXHO LIMITED                          
13. STUDENT LOANS COMPANY LIMITED 
14. VODAFONE PLC                        
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APPENDIX E: FINAL SAMPLE CLASSIFIED BY INDUSTRY 
EUROSTAT category description UK SIC code and description (from FAME) Final sample of companies 
(1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining 
and quarrying 
    1110 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas      BG GROUP PLC 
(1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining 
and quarrying 
    1120 Service activities incidental to oil and gas 
extraction excluding surveying                             
OIL STATES INDUSTRIES (UK) LIMITED 
(1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining 
and quarrying 
    1110 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas      ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC 
(1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining 
and quarrying 
    1110 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas      SHELL (UK) LIMITED 
(1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining 
and quarrying 
    1110 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas      TOTAL E&P UK PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6601 Life insurance                                                        UNUM LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
   6523 Other financial intermediation not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
3I PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7487 Other business activities not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
AKER KVAERNER ENGINEERING 
SERVICES LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6603 Non-life insurance                                                 ALLIANZ MARINE (UK) LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7487 Other business activities not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
ALSTEC GROUP LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7415 Holding companies including head Offices          ATOS ORIGIN IT SERVICES UK LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting,     6601 Life insurance                                                       AVIVA PLC 
Appendices 
263 
 
EUROSTAT category description UK SIC code and description (from FAME) Final sample of companies 
and business administration 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7522 Defence activities                                                  AWE PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6523 Other financial intermediation not elsewhere 
classified                                                               
BAILLIE GIFFORD & CO LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6523 Other financial intermediation not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
BLACKROCK INTERNATIONAL, LTD. 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6511 Central banking                                                     BRISTOL & WEST PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6511 Central banking                                                     CAPITAL ONE BANK (EUROPE) PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7487 Other business activities not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
CARLSON MARKETING GROUP (U.K.) 
LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7487 Other business activities not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
CLIFFORD CHANCE LONDON LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
- -                                                                              DUNFERMLINE BUILDING SOCIETY 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7200 Computer and related activities                             FIRST DATA MOBILE HOLDINGS LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7415 Holding companies including head offices           FOSECO HOLDING LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6512 Other monetary intermediation                             HALIFAX PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6512 Other monetary intermediation                             HFC BANK LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    9305 Other service activities not elsewhere classified   INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL SERVICES 
LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7222 Other software consultancy and supply                 INTENTIA (UK) LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting,     7260 Other computer related activities                         ITNET LIMITED 
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EUROSTAT category description UK SIC code and description (from FAME) Final sample of companies 
and business administration 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    9271 Gambling and betting activities                             LADBROKES BETTING & GAMING 
LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7487 Other business activities not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
LLOYD'S REGISTER QUALITY 
ASSURANCE LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6512 Other monetary intermediation                             LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6711 Administration of financial markets                      LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6603 Non-life insurance                                                 MARSH LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6603 Non-life insurance                                                 MILLER INSURANCE SERVICES LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6521 Financial leasing                                                    MOTABILITY FINANCE LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6603 Non-life insurance                                                 NATIONAL HOUSE-BUILDING COUNCIL 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7222 Other software consultancy and supply                 NEWELL & BUDGE LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
- -                                                                              NORWICH & PETERBOROUGH BUILDING 
SOCIETY 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7414 Business and management consultancy 
activities                                                                 
PA CONSULTING SERVICES LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7222 Other software consultancy and supply                 QAD EUROPE LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7420 Architectural and engineering activities and 
related technical consultancy                                 
RICARDO PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6603 Non-life insurance                                                 ROYAL LIVER INSURANCE SERVICES 
LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting,     6601 Life insurance                                                        ROYAL LONDON MUTUAL INSURANCE 
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EUROSTAT category description UK SIC code and description (from FAME) Final sample of companies 
and business administration SOCIETY LIMITED (THE) 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7222 Other software consultancy and supply                 SAS SOFTWARE LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7487 Other business activities not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
SCHERING HEALTH CARE LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6712 Security broking and fund management                SCHRODERS PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7420 Architectural and engineering activities and 
related technical consultancy                                 
SCOTT WILSON LTD 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6601 Life insurance                                                        SCOTTISH WIDOWS PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7414 Business and management consultancy 
activities                                                                 
SERCO GROUP PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    9220 Radio and television activities                              SMG PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7487 Other business activities not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
SONY ERICSSON MOBILE 
COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT 
LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6523 Other financial intermediation not elsewhere 
classified                                                               
THE BANK OF NEW YORK EUROPE 
LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7414 Business and management consultancy 
activities                                                                 
THE IMAGINATION GROUP LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    6713 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 
not elsewhere classified                                         
THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PUBLIC 
LIMITED COMPANY 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7222 Other software consultancy and supply                 THE SAGE GROUP PLC 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
- -                                                                             VISA MANAGEMENT SERVICES LIMITED 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7487 Other business activities not elsewhere 
classified                                                                
WATSON WYATT LIMITED 
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(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
- -                                                                              WEST BROMWICH BUILDING SOCIETY 
(6) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting, 
and business administration 
    7420 Architectural and engineering activities and 
related technical consultancy                                 
WS ATKINS PLC 
(2) Manufacturing     3663 Other manufacturing not elsewhere classified      3M UNITED KINGDOM PUBLIC LIMITED 
COMPANY 
(2) Manufacturing     2441 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products     ASTRAZENECA PLC 
(2) Manufacturing     2924 Manufacture of other general purpose 
machinery not elsewhere classified                      
AVERY BERKEL LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     2924 Manufacture of other general purpose 
machinery not elsewhere classified                       
AVERY WEIGH-TRONIX HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     2960 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition            BAE SYSTEMS (OPERATIONS) LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     2662 Manufacture of plaster products for 
construction purposes                                            
BPB PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
(2) Manufacturing     2741 Precious metals production                                   BRITANNIA REFINED METALS LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     1716 Manufacturing of sewing threads                         COATS HOLDINGS LTD 
(2) Manufacturing     2441 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products     COLORCON LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     2222 Printing not elsewhere classified                           DE LA RUE PLC 
(2) Manufacturing     3002 Manufacture of computers and other 
information processing equipment                        
DRS DATA AND RESEARCH SERVICES 
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
(2) Manufacturing     2441 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products     ELAN CORPORATION PUBLIC LIMITED 
COMPANY 
(2) Manufacturing     2213 Publishing of journals and periodicals                  EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     7222 Other software consultancy and supply                 GARTNER UK LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     2442 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations        GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC 
(2) Manufacturing     2212 Publishing of newspapers                                      GUARDIAN MEDIA GROUP PLC 
(2) Manufacturing     1600 Manufacture of tobacco products                         IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC 
(2) Manufacturing     3320 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for 
measuring, checking, testing, navigating and 
INSTRON LIMITED 
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other purposes, except industrial process 
control equipment                                                  
(2) Manufacturing     2625 Manufacture of other ceramic products                 JOSIAH WEDGWOOD & SONS LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     3410 Manufacture of motor vehicles                              LAND ROVER 
(2) Manufacturing     2956 Manufacture of other special purpose 
machinery not elsewhere classified                       
LINX PRINTING TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     1584 Manufacture of cocoa; chocolate and sugar 
confectionery                                                         
MARS UK LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     3530 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft                  MARSHALL OF CAMBRIDGE (HOLDINGS) 
LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     1533 Processing and preserving of fruit and 
vegetables not elsewhere classified                       
MCCAIN FOODS (GB) LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     2922 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment    NACCO MATERIALS HANDLING LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     3663 Other manufacturing not elsewhere classified      OXOID LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     2466 Manufacture of other chemical products not 
elsewhere classified                                               
RHODIA UK LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     2441 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products     SANOFI-SYNTHELABO LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     1596 Manufacture of beer                                              SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE PLC 
(2) Manufacturing     2852 General mechanical engineering                           SIEMENS VAI METALS TECHNOLOGIES 
LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     2441 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products     SMITH & NEPHEW PLC 
(2) Manufacturing     2875 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products 
not elsewhere classified                                         
WEDGE GROUP GALVANIZING LIMITED 
(2) Manufacturing     1589 Manufacture of other food products not 
elsewhere classified                                               
WILLIAM JACKSON & SON LIMITED 
(5) Transport and storage     6110 Sea and coastal water transport                             ANDREW WEIR & COMPANY LIMITED 
(5) Transport and storage     6323 Other supporting air transport activities                BAA LIMITED 
(5) Transport and storage     6420 Telecommunications                                            BT GROUP PLC 
(5) Transport and storage     6420 Telecommunications                                             CABLE AND WIRELESS PUBLIC LIMITED 
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COMPANY 
(5) Transport and storage     6024 Freight transport by road                                       EXEL LIMITED 
(5) Transport and storage     6420 Telecommunications                                             KINGSTON COMMUNICATIONS (HULL) 
PLC 
(5) Transport and storage     6340 Activities of other transport agencies                    OOCL (UK) LIMITED 
(5) Transport and storage     6021 Other scheduled passenger land transport             STAGECOACH GROUP PLC 
(5) Transport and storage     6420 Telecommunications                                             TELEWEST COMMUNICATIONS GROUP 
LIMITED 
(3) Utilities and construction     4521 General construction of buildings and civil 
engineering works                                                
ALFRED MCALPINE PLC 
(3) Utilities and construction     4521 General construction of buildings and civil 
engineering works                                                 
AMEY PLC 
(3) Utilities and construction     4521 General construction of buildings and civil 
engineering works                                                 
BRITANNIA GROUP LIMITED 
(3) Utilities and construction     4011 Production of electricity                                        BRITISH NUCLEAR GROUP SELLAFIELD 
LIMITED 
(3) Utilities and construction     4521 General construction of buildings and civil 
engineering works                                                 
CARILLION PLC 
(3) Utilities and construction     4021 Manufacture of gas                                               CENTRICA PLC 
(3) Utilities and construction     4011 Production of electricity                                        EDF ENERGY PLC 
(3) Utilities and construction     4011 Production of electricity                                        NATIONAL GRID PLC 
(3) Utilities and construction     4525 Other construction work involving special 
trades                                                                    
TAMDOWN REGENERATION LIMITED 
(3) Utilities and construction     4100 Collection, purification and distribution of 
water                                                                      
WESSEX WATER LIMITED 
(3) Utilities and construction     4521 General construction of buildings and civil 
engineering works                                                 
WESTBURY LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5190 Other wholesale                                                     ANTALIS LIMITED 
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(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5242 Retail sale of clothing                                           ARCADIA GROUP BRANDS LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5212 Other retail sale in non-specialised stores             ARGOS LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5020 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles            AUTOGLASS LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5146 Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods                      AVENTIS PHARMA LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5190 Other wholesale                                                     BORAX EUROPE LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5190 Other wholesale                                                     BRIDGESTONE UK LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5510 Hotels                                                                     INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5184 Wholesale of computers, computer peripheral 
equipment and software                                         
LANIER UNITED KINGDOM LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5010 Sale of motor vehicles                                          MASTERLEASE LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5139 Non-specialised wholesale of food , beverages 
and tobacco                                                            
MCCORMICK (UK) LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5133 Wholesale of dairy produce, eggs and edible 
oils and fats                                                           
NZMP (AEM) LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5143 Wholesale of electrical household appliances 
and radio and television goods                              
OKI EUROPE LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5186 Wholesale of other electronic parts and 
equipment                                                              
PREMIER FARNELL PLC 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5020 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles            QEK GLOBAL SOLUTIONS (UK) LTD 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5211 Retail sale in non-specialised stores with food, 
beverages or tobacco predominating                     
SAFEWAY STORES LIMITED 
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(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5143 Wholesale of electrical household appliances 
and radio and television goods                              
SAITEK PLC 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5010 Sale of motor vehicles                                          VOLVO CAR UK LIMITED 
(4) Wholesales, retail trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurants 
    5248 Other retail sale in specialised stores                    WOOLWORTHS GROUP PLC 
* Two respondents did not disclose the names of their companies (these have been labelled ‘unknown 1’ and ‘unknown 2’ in the data set). 
